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This dissertation explores the philosophy of digitally interactive works and video games. 
There are two central questions to this thesis, namely, what is distinctive about computer 
art, and more specifically, what is distinctive about the interactivity that these kinds of 
works afford? The latter question is a response to the former, but, as I will articulate in 
the chapters that follow, this distinctive type of interactivity is not restricted to works 
that are comprised of digital media. As it turns out, games (especially video games) are 
paradigmatic examples and so both analytic aesthetics and game theory are relevant to a 
discussion of interactivity. 
In what follows, I address topics that pertain to interactivity such as art categories, 
prescriptions, appreciation, and ontology. This thesis will show that interactive works 
consist of unique displays and prescriptions and are, therefore, a distinctive category of 
art. I conclude that interactive works do not belong in a performance ontology, that the 
prescriptions of interactive art bear player engagement, and, importantly, the distinctive 























The broad focus of this dissertation is digitally interactive art and video games with an 
aim at pinpointing the distinctive features of such works. In order to achieve this aim, I 
analyse a number of standard conditions of digital works that pertain to their formal 
features, their ontology, how a viewer responds to them, and some of the potential 
problems these features raise for philosophical accounts of art. Although the scope of this 
dissertation pertains to interactive works, in which the computer and digital media drive 
the foundational research, the primary objective is to discuss the value of video games 
within analytic ǤǡǮǯǡ          evance of video 
games. I shall argue that certain interactive works are distinctive because of their display 
variability and this type of variability bears upon user (and player) engagement. In short, 
I argue that interactive works, given some of their distinctive features, are ontologically 
different than performance works. 
Of course, no account of video games is complete without experiencing at least some 
amount of gameplay first hand. Therefore, in order to fully deal with certain philosophical 
issues entailed by video games in the chapters that follow, I draw on my own gameplay 
experiences and present them in first person.  
This dissertation has two sections. Section 1 concerns a philosophy of digitally interactive 
art, or what we now define as computer art, and Section 2 focuses more specifically on 
video games.  
The first section is comprised of four chapters. The reader will notice that I  Ǯǯǡ Ǯ ǯǡ Ǯ ǯǤ Although these phrases reference similar works, I have tried to be 
intentional about the ones I use (and when I use them) because, while computer art is 
necessarily art, digitally interactive works are not. I make this distinction in recognition 
that not all video games are works of art and I would not wish to indicate such a claim or 
mislead the reader.  
Chapter 1 examines the perceptual features of computer art, which highlights, in a 
Waltonian sense, the features that are standard and contra-standard to the category. This 
chapter introduces the significance of interactivity, the key feature of computer art and 
primary topic of this dissertation.  
Chapter 2 offers a summary of the many ways in which the term interactivity is used and 
understood within the arts. Building from philosophers such as David Novitz and Dominic 
Lopes, I present categories of interactivity that differentiate works based on what the     Ǥ    Ǯ ǯ   
sense are the focus for the remainder of this dissertation.   
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Chapter 3 focuses on the digital medium. This chapter reflects my initial interest in the 
distinctive properties of digital media and how digital technologies allow for certain 
works to be responsive to the users. By the completion of this chapter, it became clear to 
me that interactivity, rather than digital media, would be the new focus. I should also note 
that at the time of writing this chapter in 2012, Katherine Thomson-Jones had not 
published her seminal 2015 article, which addresses many of the issues I tackle here.  
Chapter 4 concludes Section 1 of this dissertation with a look at the ontological issues 
that surround digitally interactive art. This chapter has two parts. Part 1 offers a cursory 
look at the autographic-allographic distinction as it relates to computer art; Part 2 is a 
detailed account of the type-token distinction and computer art, which is a topic that is 
referenced in proceeding chapters.  
Section 2 is comprised of six chapters and begins a narrower focus on video games. It will 
of course be obvious that, in many of the chapters that follow, I draw upon the 
instrumental features of games in order to discuss various philosophical issues about 
them. However, before beginning, I wish to point out that it is my view that games can be 
important in and of themselves. My statement echoes games philosopher Bernard De ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡǡǮǯ.1  In a new ǯǡThe Well-
ǣǯǡEric Zimmerman 
writes a forward to the volume with a similar sentiment anǡǮȏȐǡ
images, or telling stories, engaging in play is what it means to be human. Games do not          ǯǤ2 There is a  Ǯ ǯǯcorollary with these views, which I, as someone who regularly 
plays games and appreciates art, am sympathetic to. Of course, in the pages that follow, I 
have set the autotelic nature of games aside to focus on other philosophical aspects of 
video games, such as their ontology and the prosocial behaviour that we potentially can 
learn from gameplay.  
Chapter 5 is an introductory chapter for the reader who is unfamiliar with the many kinds 
of video games that are available for gameplay; it also addresses how video games might 
qualify as artworks. I provide an overview of video games to show why some are clearly 
considered art forms more than others, but also to show that the distinctions between 
them are hazy. At the end of this chapter, I offer an account of different player types.  
Chapter 6 is one of the thesis chapters in this dissertation in which I analyse the ontology 
of interactivity. Although computer art and video games are newer studies within analytic 
aesthetics, philosophers of art have already made great progress in pinpointing the 
distinctive features of interactivity. Consequently, I begin with a literature review of the 
significant ontological accounts of interactivity and work display objects. I then discuss 
interactivity and player engagement before I conclude with a section on performance 
versus interactive art. This chapter has been provisionally accepted for the 
Routledge Handbook to the Philosophy of Games, edited by C. Thi Nguyen and John R. 
Sageng. 
                                                          
1 De Koven (1978). 
2 In the introduction by Zimmerman as found in De Koven (2013). 
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Chapter 7 is one of the significant developments in this dissertation. I defend an 
algorithmic ontology of video games, which includes significant accounts by Lopes, Berys 
Gaut, Grant Tavinor, and Dominic Preston. This chapter is important within the 
philosophy of art and games for two reasons Ȃ one, because it fills a gap within the current 
literature regarding what, exactly, an algorithm is and, two, it defends a compatibility 
between aesthetics and philosophy of games regarding game identity. This chapter has 
been provisionally accepted for The Aesthetics of Videogames in the Routledge Studies in 
Contemporary Philosophy series, edited by Grant Tavinor and Jonathan Robson.   
Chapter 8 continues the algorithmic ontology discussion to address the abstract nature 
of video games (if they are abstract). Loosely following a Levensonian approach, I 
conclude this chapter by proposing that video games, although they are abstract-like, are 
destructible entities.   
Chapter 9 changes the focus of this dissertation to the phenomenological and epistemic 
aspects of video games. More specifically, I focus on virtual reality games and discuss how 
players might empathise with their avatars or their player-characters.  
Chapter 10 is the final chapter, which takes a closer look at the gaming groups, rather 
than the games. I first discuss certain paradoxes that arise for players during gameplay, 
and then turn to an explanation of how those paradoxes help create successful game 
communities.  
























Appreciating an object, of any category, begins with perception. If we see an object that is 
small, feathered, and beaked, then we normally assess it as a bird. This psychological 
process, according to Kendall Walton, is also how we categorise things, not only in 
ordinary life, but with works of art. We perceive some works as paintings and others as 
music because the former consists of flat surfaces and pigment and the latter consists of 
tonal sounds and timbre. These features are typical of the works and their respective 
categories even though we usually take these kinds of features for granted. By now, this 
is a well-known theory within aesthetics, but in this introduction chapter, I apply ǯ  ǡ Ǯ  ǯ to discuss the significant features of the 
relatively young art category called computer art. 1   ǯabout how certain features affect how we 
categorise things, and his view that not every category we perceive a work within is 
correct. Second, I describe two examples of computer art that are typical of both the 
digital works that we find within the museum and of the works we can access from a 
networked computer. For both kinds, I consider the perceptual features that we view as 
standard and unusual to the works. In the final section, I present my view that computer 
art is not a category that one would normally assess works within (in a Waltonian sense) 
due to their perceptual features and the history of more institutionalised artworks. As I 
will explain, the perceptual features of these works would, instead, cue our senses to 
categorise them as interactive versions of their established parent categories (e.g., 
interactive literature instead of computer art, and so on). This will also emphasise a   ǯ         ǯ
signature features, interactivity. I use the word signature rather than necessary because, 
contra Lopes, I will suggest interactivity is merely standard to the category of computer 
art. Interactivity will be the primary focus of this dissertation. 
1.1 Categories of Art 
Categorising art is important because our aesthetic judgements are broadly influenced 
by the category we are judging a work within. In this respect, our judgements are 
dependent on the perceived category and, therefore, certain values we place on a specific 
artwork are also dependent on that perceived category. In other words, if we look at a 
work of art within one category, its properties can seemingly differ if we were to later 
perceive it within another category. By now, this Waltonian concept is broadly accepted, 
but the category of computer art is relatively new, and so this chapter will investigate 
certain features which we take to be standard to the category and question if those 
perceived features help us determine that computer art is the correct category. But first, 
what, according to Walton, is an art category and how do we know if it is the correct one? 
Categories of art consist of groups of works that are perceptually discernible, meaning, 
the artwork must have, according to Walton, perceptual features that are distinguishable 
                                                          
1 Walton, K. L. (1970).  
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enough to guide our classification of it. One such category that Walton regularly refers to        ǮǯǤ    sed because its 
constitutive artworks are typically stationary and flat with a pigmented surface. There 
are also sub-categories that can be perceptually distinguished from this broader one like 
paintings that are abstracted or paintings that are impressionistic. These distinguishable 
categories do not require background information or empiricism to be perceived as such 
because the features of the works act as sense-making cues, which naturally inform our 
judgements about them.  
Of course, a viewer will need to be familiar with certain features in order to recognise 
them as pertaining to a certain category. I must be familiar, for example, with the features 
of Surrealism if I am to recognise a work as a surrealist painting. Interestingly, Brian Laetz 
suggests then, that categories such as forgeries or fakes would not qualify as Ǯǯ      readily distinguishable from their forged 
originals.2 ǡǡǮǯǮǯǤat such a category 
could include Rembrandt forgeries. 
The properties or features of the work that are perceptually distinguishable and guide 
our categorisation are either standard, variable, or contra-standard relative to the 
category you perceive a work within. 
(1) Standard features are fǮjust in case it is among those in 
virtue of which works in that cǯ.3 ǯǡǡǮǯǤǡ
its flatness and immobility would not be surprising features because they are standard 
within painting. For the viewer, these features are unremarkable. 
(2) Variable features have nothing to do with features that qualify it for that category, 
whether the features are present or absent. So, with a painting it would matter little 
whether an Impressionist painter used blue or green pigment to render a patch of grass; 
in this case, the colour makes no difference to its being perceived within the category of ǲǳǤǡǡǡ
to the category you perceive it as belonging to. Although colour is a variable feature     ǡ     Ǯ-in-the-style-of-ǯ-
blue-ǯǡ      ǡ  ǡ     ǯǡntra-standard.  
(3) Contra-     ǲ      
respect to that category - that is, a feature whose presence tends to disqualify works as    ǳǤ4 Again, within the category of painting, mobility or three-
dimensionality might seem at odds because, as mentioned above, we expect works of 
paintings to be stationary and flat. Sometimes, if a contra-standard feature becomes 
standard over time, a new category will emerge and then the contra-standard feature will 
                                                          
2 Laets (2010).  




be seen as standard to the new category. So, paintings with objects fixed to the surface 
became more readily distinguished as mixed media, assemblage, collage, or the like, 
rather than mere paintings. Within those former categories, any degree of three-
dimensionality would seem standard and flatness would, perhaps, appear contra-
standard. 
The above does not suggest that just any category is correct for a given work. Consider, 
for example, Rauschenberg's Bed (1955), which can be perceived as having both depth or 
lacking depth because, as stated, its standard and contra standard properties are ǯǤ  Bed appears to have volumetric depth 
then you might have perceived it as a sculptural work, but with unusual flatness; if you 
perceived it as flat, then you might judge it as a painting, but with unusual depth. Either       ǡ      ǯ  
foreground, that a work might belong within many categories.  
In light of the above, it is important to note that ǯǡthat 
his account is not based in aesthetic relativism; the category that we perceive a work 
within will not necessarily be a correct category. We might give Bed a poor critique if we 
assess it as a sculpture and criticise its lack of three dimensionality; sculpture is not the 
correct category. Bed also lacks the standard features of paintings, which would also be 
an incorrect category. Assemblage is, however, the correct category. This is not to say that 
a category that is not correct is a wrong category altogether, it might just be the case that 
it is not correct enough. For example, an object can correctly be assessed as a flower, and 
it can also correctly be assessed as a daisy. Classifying an object as a daisy would be more          Ǯǯ    ory helps to 
distinguish its distinctive features.     ǡ Ǯǯ  
informative.   
An initial categorization will most likely be automatic, but there are guidelines that 
ultimately point us towards the correct category. According to Walton, there are five 
general rules we can use to determine category correctness.  
Walton suggests, 
The following circumstances count toward its being correct to perceive 
a work, W, in a given category, C: 
(i) The presence in W of a relatively large number of features standard 
with respect to C. The correct way of perceiving a work is likely to be 
that in which it has a minimum of contra-standard features for us. I take 
the relevance of this consideration to be obvious. It cannot be correct to  ǯ      ǡ   
possible, just because that work has too few of the features which make 
kinetic sculptures kinetic sculptures. But of course this does not get us 
verǡǲ
ǡǳǡ
for being perceived as a painting and as a guernica.  
(ii) The fact, if it is one, that W is better, or more interesting or pleasing 
aesthetically, or more worth experiencing when perceived in C than it is 
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when perceived in alternative ways. The correct way of perceiving a 
work is likely to be the way in which it comes off the best.  
(iii) The fact, if it is one that the artist who produced W intended or 
expected it to be perceived in C, or thought of it as C.  
(iv) The fact, if it is one, that C is well established and recognized by the 
society in which W was produced. A category is well established in and 
recognized by a society if the members of the society are familiar with 
works in ǡǯ
mentioning, exhibit works of that category together, and so forth Ȃ that 
is, roughly if that category figures importantly in their way of classifying 
works of art.5  
 
Walton offers these four conditions as guidelines for correct categorization, and he adds 
a fifth, that it might be important for a correct assessment of a work for us to consider the 
mechanical process used to create it.6 ǯ-
empiricism view places a strong emphasis on the natural instincts and the psychology of 
a viewer. This means she will not use these conditions in the immediate process of 
categorising a work because she will have already perceived an object as belonging to one 
category or another. These guidelines do, however, indicate the correct category that a 
work should be assessed within. The usual interpretation of this is that a work will have 
correct categories that it belongs to just as it will have categories it does not belong to 
(e.g., the painting Guernica belongs to a category of painting, not to a category of Ǯguernicasǯ).  
Laetz offers a slightly different interpretation of a ǮǯǤǡ 
A dif    ǯ     
category is not merely one that a work belongs to. Rather, among all the 
various categories any work belongs to, it is a special, privileged ǯetic character. On 
this interpretation, seeking a correct category to judge a work is not to 
seek a category that it belongs to; instead, it is to seekȄamong all the 
categories we already know it belongs toȄone that is aesthetically 
active. Such a category might be complex or it might be nested within 
other categoriesȄas the category of cubist paintings is nested within 
the category of paintings, to take a simple example.7  
The above conception of categories is an attractive one because it requires the 
correct category to be the one in which the work appears at its best. However, I 
take issue with the fact that ǯ ǯȋȌ
condition over all the others. Walton gives no indication that one condition is 
privileged over any other in determining correct categories. According to the 
                                                          
5 Walton, p. 151-152. 
6 Ibid., p. 152-153. 
7 Laetz, p. 295. 
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other conditions (including the mechanical process), it will not always be the 
case that a work will appear at its best in its correct category. In fact, condition 
(iii), as I will show, factors significantly in the following discussion of computer 
art.  
1.2 The Perceptual Features of Computer Art 
I am interested in the above with respect to a category defined by Dominic Lopes, which 
he calls computer art. I will discuss his definition in more depth shortly, but in brief, 
computer art is a category for artworks that are interactive, and they are interactive 
because of the computer. The proliferation of digital systems within the arts makes 
computer art an increasingly critical category to analyse and, since it is a more recent 
category of art compared to established ones like painting and literature it is worth 
pointing out the discernible features. Before analysing the distinctive features, and before ǯǡǯǡȋ
of which are used interchangeably in art texts today).  
The digital medium (if we can describe it singularly) has been around for nearly one 
hundred years and so it is not so new any longer, yet it continues to receive considerable 
attention within the arts. Technology and digital systems have been introduced into 
many, if not all categories of art, making digital media relevant to discussions within film, 
photography, installation and, and more. As such, the digital term is broadly used and we 
see it applied to works in general ways.8 For these reasons, Lopes clarifies that digital 
works are not necessarily a category of art, or, as he calls it, digital art is not an 
appreciative art kind. Instead, Lopes claims that digital art characterises broad grouping 
of works (e.g., we can classify specific photographs as digital versus those that are non-
digital). Broad art kinds such as digital art can be useful especially when we want to group 
works based on their similar characteristics, e.g., there are art kinds such as paintings 
created before 1900, songs whose lyrics have the  Ǯǯ  ǡ  
directed by those under the age of 40. These can all be interesting and useful categories 
for various reasons, but these kinds are not appreciative art kinds.9  According to Lopes, 
a kind is an appreciative art kind just in case we normally appreciate a 
work in the kind by comparison with arbitrarily any other works in that 
kind.10 
Appreciative art kinds consist of categories like painting, music, and film.11 While acrylic 
paintings can be distinguished from oils, acrylic paintings are not appreciative art kinds, ǮǯǤ
the sense that, while acrylics are a type of paint, they did not create a new appreciative 
system to assess paintings when they were introduced; rather, paint created the 
                                                          
8 ǡǮǯǮǯǡ
are ambiguous and overlapping terms.  
9 Lopes (2010). p. 17. 
10 Ibid.  
11 One potential problem with an account of appreciative art kinds is that it does not address sub-
categories that are also appreciative kinds.  
15 
 
appreciative category.12 Therefore, digital works are better suited within subcategories 
under their traditional parent categories, and so works like digital films belong to the ǮǯǡǯǮǯǡǮǯǡǤ13 If digital 
works belong within other categories, then I agree with Lopes that the computer creates     ǡ ǡ       ǮǯǤ 
Defining the computer is not necessary for Walton's process of categorisation if the 
category is already familiar to us, but a definition could benefit our understanding of what ǯ ȋ 
features must be known to a person if they have any chance of categorising it correctly).  
A computer is simply anything that runs a computational process. According to Lopes, 
this needs fleshing out or else, by this definition the human brain would qualify as a 
computer, which would falsely lead to placing some works like conceptual art, literary 
works, and musical compositions into the category of computer art.14 A distinctive 
requirement of computer art is that a computational process must follow a set of 
prescribed rules to generate the perceivable features of the artwork (the output).15 Lopes 
goes on to say that ǲonal process is any pattern of actions that instantiates Ǥǳ16 A ǯǡ
it an image, text, sound, environmental change, etc. The input and output must relate in ȋǮǯȌtput; this 
relationship is known as a transfer function, although the mechanics of a transfer function 
can be analogue or digital. 
Criticisms regarding ǯ for 
things that are not intuitively computers. Although his aim is to exclude things like the 
recitation of the alphabet as constituting a computer-generated work, his definition of a 
computer seems to broadly, nonetheless, include the human brain. Brains do compute 
yet, while there is no agreement on whether brains function like computers or not, they 
are not themselves computers. ǯdefinition 
of computers, at least as it relates to computer art, which he claims stems from the use of 
the word ǮǯǤ17 Rough 
has other objections in relation to the unbounded definition of computers by Lopes, but 
those pertain to his focus on video games and are less relevant to computer art in general. 
Perhaps some artificial requirement should still be included in a definition of computers, 
at least where computer art is involved, in order to exclude biological matter from 
qualifying as a computer, thus, exclude brains from qualifying as art generating organs.   
Rough defines a computer as a device intended for running the computational process of 
                                                          
12 Ibid. p. 19. 
13 Ibid. p. 18-19. 
14 Ibid. p. 16-19. 
15 Ibid. p. 29-35. 
16 Ibid. p. 44. 
17 Rough (2016), p. 217. 
16 
 
instantiating the rules and which mediates the inputs and outputs in a fixed manner.18 
This paraphrasing of ǯre restrictive, ǡǯǤGiven the debate at hand, my following analysis will 
suppose the computers are electronic devices.            ǡ     ǯ
account of computer art. Lopes claims that computer art is an appreciative kind because ǲwe normally appreciate a work in the kind by comparison with arbitrarily any other 
works in that kindǳ.19 For Walton, the perceived features of a work are the indicators that Ǥǯǡwe 
see a work as belonging to a certain category, or comparison class, if we see certain 
features as standard to that category. Consequently, we should analyse what the features 
of computer art are in order to determine if it is bona fide Waltonian category. 
Lopes defines a work of computer art just in case: 
(1) it's art, (2) it's run on a computer, (3) it's interactive, and (4) it's interactive because 
it's run on a computer. 
According to Lopes, these jointly sufficient conditions are what make this category 
distinctive, and the final condition is especially important for my research here.  
Interactivity is primarily what distinguishes works of computer art from works with 
related media such as digital images.20 However, one could argue that there are no 
significant reasons that computer art should necessarily be interactive. To a larger degree, 
it may be argued that necessary conditions are too restrictive and we should instead 
endorse that standard conditions as Walton proposes. I am sympathetic to this criticism 
of necessary features, especially when we consider examples like digital installations that 
consist of moving images and sounds, but, while it may seem like a work of computer art, 
the changes are not related to user input. 
The trouble with necessary and sufficient conditions is that they will often fail, in 
principle or over time, especially as artists find new ways to transgress against the norms 
of established art categories. That so, it may be odd to think of computer art without 
interactivity as a necessary feature because, after all, there is a wide range of established 
non-interactive digital works that we would be hard pressed to view as computer art (i.e., 
digital images or photographs). Indeed, computer art seems odd without interactivity as  ǡ   ǯ  of contra-standard features. If interactivity is 
standard to computer art then our response to a non-interactive computer work would 
be to question this difference in comparison to other computer artworks because it is not 
consistent with our computer art-viewing practices (or, in this case, art-interactive 
practices). Perhaps this is where one could question the appropriateness of the 
appreciative art kind account that Lopes proposes because it offers no reason to think 
that sub-categories might exist where each sub-category is also an appreciative kind. In 
this case, I could offer that computer art consists of interactive and non-interactive sub-
                                                          
18 Ibid., p. 218. 
19 Lopes (2010), p. 17. Also see Lopes (2014). 
20 It will be discussed later on why I find this interesting, but I do not intend for this to mean the 
experience is superior to the experience of other works.  
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categories.21 All this to say, Lopes is right to emphasise interactivity as a distinctive 
feature of computer art, but ǯ 
categories and standard conditions suffice. Nonetheless, in what follows, I will focus on 
interactivity as a significant feature of most computer artworks. ǯprototypical works of computer art to analyse. 
Dear Esther, developed by The Chinese Room, sometimes labelled as a game and 
sometimes as a work of literature, allows users to navigate through environments and 
create different narratives on the computer. According to its description on the website,  
Dear Esther is a ghost story, told using first-person gaming technologies. 
Rather than traditional game-play the focus here is on exploration, 
uncovering the mystery of the island, of who you are and why you are 
here. Fragments of the story are randomly uncovered when exploring 
the various locations of the island, making each journey a unique 
experience.22 
The next example is, Looking at a Horse, created in 2013 by Evan Boehm: 
You walk into a dark room and projected on the wall in front of you is a 
frenzied mass of dots. A friend walks in and the dots are connected by a 
wireframe body-  ǯ ǡ  ǡ   
horse. As more viewers trickle in, the horse continues to evolve, adding 
polygonal musculature and a shimmering skin. Eventually, when 
enough people are watching, the beast transcends its earthly form and 
transforms into some other ghostly, ethereal thing entirely. Then, as 
people filter out of the room, it goes through the same process in 
reverse, dissolving back to the elemental cloud of points.23 
Computer art, as defined by Lopes, includes works with vastly different displays, genres, 
and ways in which the works are consumed. With that said, the two described above make 
an obviously limited list. I choose these two examples because, broadly speaking, 
computer art consists of works that are either run directly on a recognisable computer 
system and from your own home (usually videogames or those like Dear Esther), or the 
kinds of works found in gallery spaces, which do not usually include salient systems that 
the user will interact with (such as Looking at a Horse). Although I am sure there are 
exceptions that could be applied in the following analysis, my discussion of the following 
features will be as inclusive to all works of computer art as possible and exclusive of other 
categorical works.  
A typical feature that seems standard to many categories are their display components. 	ǡǮǯǮǯǡ
meaning will follow in the chapters to come. For paintings, it is usually standard that the 
display consists of some kind of flat surface (usually a canvas) and some kind of pigment 
                                                          
21 Thanks to Aaron Meskin for pushing me on this point.  
22  http://dear-esther.com/?page_id=2. 
23 http://www.creativeapplications.net/openframeworks/looking-at-a-horse-by-evan-boehm/.  
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(usually paint).  This is more complicated with computer art because there are many 
components that we might consider to be the medium in the same manner as we do with 
paintings, but ones that we might not always perceive as the display. The display of a 
work requires hardware, which sometimes includes a monitor, mouse, and keyboard.24 
These recognisable devices are standard to computers, but not necessarily standard to 
computer art. Although we may not perceive the computational system (as with Looking 
at a Horse) I take it for granted that a computational device is understood by the user to 
be present.  
Also, there are the code and digital media to consider, which cannot be perceived in the 
same way that paint, marble, or wood are perceived. In the case of digital systems, the 
algorithm and code are one thing and their instantiations, or the perceived features of the 
work, are another. Even the ones and zeros that are responsible for instantiating the ǯǡǡ
that have been assigned binary symbols. Although the disguised medium is unique with 
all digital kinds, it does not necessarily preclude our recognition of a work as digital in 
kind because the effects of the digital medium are perceivable nonetheless. If the kinds of 
effects are readily understood as digital, then there should be no problem for a user to 
comprehend that a computer and digital media are involved, even if they are not salient 
to the user. I will point out that my treatment of the algorithm and code here is somewhat 
general, however, they have significant bearing on the ontology of these works and so a 
more detailed account of the two features will be addressed in later chapters. It suffices 
to say for now, the computational device and digital medium would be viewed as 
standard features of computer art.  
Another standard feature of computer art is interactivity. ǯ
of computer art, it is a necessary condition of this category that the works be interactive.25 
Although agnostic about interactivity being a standard or necessary condition of 
computer art, Margaret Boden also stresses the aesthetic value that interactivity has for 
certain interactive works. She states: 
In computer-based interactive art, the aesthetic interest is not only, or 
not even primarily, in the intrinsic quality of the results (images and 
sounds). Rather, it is in the nature of the interaction between computer 
and human beings.26  
Recall that the interactivity in each comes from the transfer function of the digital system. 
A function is needed for the user to input information and another function is needed for 
an output, or number of outputs. Dear Esther is interactive because it requires a user to 
interact with a digital system to instantiate the work and its possible narratological 
outcomes. Looking at a Horse is interactive because the viewer is also needed to 
                                                          
24 For now, I will discuss these hardware components as features of the display because they can trigger 
our perception and how we identify works. However, this is not to suggest I that consider these as the 
media of the work. Details of this will be addressed in later chapters.  
25 Lopes considers the interactivity in Computer art might be a kind of medium. See, Atencia-Linares, P. 
(2011).  
26 Boden, M. A. (2009). p. 23. 
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instantiate different successive states of the horse. The responsiveness of the work is     ǯ     Ǥ   
monitor and mouse are not used for the interaction in the latter work, a sensor or counter 
receives the input from the person who enters the gallery space and a transfer function 
generates different stages of the horse, or its outputs. A user would perceive that her own 
movements are responsible for instantiating certain features of the work that were non-
perceptual before she made any movements. Given ǯ    ǡ
interactivity is an expected feature. This kind of responsive output would be distinctively 
discernible to the viewer as belonging to the workings of a computer. 
If interactivity is a standard feature in each of these works then how they are interactive 
might be variable.27 Again, variable outcomes do not pose challenges to our 
categorisation of a work because they do not prevent a work from being perceived within 
a category. A variable feature of interest to interactivity is the type of system that creates 
the results from the interaction. Digital systems have the potential for interactivity via 
either deterministic or stochastic systems. Arguably, these terms are superfluous to 
Walton's conditions, however, since a general understanding of the computer is still new 
to the arts, a brief background may lead to a more accurate recognition of interactivity as 
a perceivable feature. Deterministic systems have set and predictable outcomes while 
stochastic systems have known possible inputs, but where the outputs are random. For 
example, a car has gas and brake pedals. There are two possible inputs-- to accelerate or 
to brake. Assuming the car works properly, if you press the accelerator, the vehicle will 
always speed up. If you press the brake, the vehicle will always slow to a stop. That is an 
example of how a deterministic system works; it has a known outcome, which is 
dependent on the specific input.  
An example of stochastic-like interactivity can be described with the popular arcade 
game, Whack-A-Mole. The user stands in front of a cabinet, the top of which is covered in 
holes. The user stands there ready with a mallet and with the goal of using it to hit the 
mole each time it pops up. Once the user whacks the mole on the head (the input), the 
mole will pop-up again (its output), but in a random fashion. There is no determining 
where it will pop out, which makes the game more challenging and fun. I should point out 
that, works of computer art will usually be deterministic because they have to be 
programmed in a deterministic or certain way, but the works have the potential to appear 
deterministic or stochastic.28 As just described, deterministic or stochastic system are not 
an interactive feature exclusive to computer art. Although interactivity is standard to 
computer art, how it is interactive is a variable feature. In some cases, it is possible for a 
user to perceive whether the interactivity is perceptually deterministic or stochastic, but 
the more important claim here is that general interactivity would certainly be 
perceivable. This also relates to works such as video games, which Lopes considers to be 
possible subsets of computer art, where some aspects of a game might be more structured 
                                                          
27 How a work is interactive might also be a contra-standard feature. 
28 I suppose we could imagine a work where the artist programs a work to be random, but I am not sure 




and determined, and other aspects might offer more aleatoric results. Either way, the user 
would recognise these as characteristic features of interactivity.  
The two variable features mentioned above describe how interactivity might be 
perceived, but there are also different kinds of interactivity that computer art might 
entail. In this respect, the goals of computer art are variable features, which will become 
known to the user as they interact with it. For example, a work like Dear Esther requires 
a user to make certain decisions along the way, whereas Looking at a Horse is different to 
the extent that it entails very few options. Both require exploration, but in different ways 
and to different degrees. Consequently, the kind of interactivity that is driven by the goals 
will provoke a user to perceive the work within more correct categories such as 
interactive installation art, video game, playable computer art, or, as I will elaborate on ǡǮǯȋǤǤǡȌǤǡ
to computer art, it can also be standard or contra-standard to certain sub-categories. 
More on this in Chapter 6.  
Other variable features might include a range of sounds, sights, and other instanced 
displays of the work, not to mention the kinds or number of particular concrete objects 
that might be included with the displays. Although these features would all be important 
to the experience of a given work, it would not necessarily prevent a user from perceiving  Ǯǯǡ puter art is a known category to the user. 
That so, this would not always be the case. One could imagine that if a work had a greater 
number of concrete, non-digital objects included, the digital features might be minimised 
to the point it seems at odds with other associated computer artworks. This scenario does 
not describe a case where the features prevent the viewer from seeing the work as 
computer art, but these features will most likely stand out as odd for the category. These 
are what Walton calls contra-standard features.  
Contra-standard features give the viewer reason to pause and, perhaps, second-guess ǯǡǡ-standard 
ones are noteworthy. Computer art is a relatively newer category, but it borrows (and 
combines) concepts and features from many established categories of art such as film, 
painting, installation, and literature. If interactivity distinguishes computer art from the 
more traditional categories, then a minimal degree of interactivity is likely to seem odd 
compared to works like Dear Esther or Looking at a Horse. Minimal interactivity does not 
disqualify a work from being computer art, but it is contra-standard to the category. One 
such video game that upends our understanding of interactivity that we normally 
experience with a video game is Mountain. Much confusion has arisen from its being 
categorised as a video game because it lacks the standard interactive game-like qualities. 
An apt description of it reads as follows, 
Here's what you do in Mountain: look at a mountain, then look at it some 
more. It's a little more complicated than that, but not by much. You can 
rotate around the mountain, zoom in and out, and interact with a simple 
piano at the bottom of the screen. Every once and a while, an object, such 
as a banana, will come flying towards the mountain. More objects show 
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up, the world cycles through day and night, and the seasons change 
every once in a while. That's really it.29 
The instructions also upend our notions of interactivity because they state very clearly 
that the user does not need any controls to play the game. This presents a challenge for a ǡǯǡ
although the interactivity is minimal, the work still prescribes for users to generate its 
display. The minimal interactivity is odd for a candidate of interactive games, but Lopes 
suggests a similar example with Project X, a hyperlinked narrative based video game 
where you can track  
ǯ     Ǥ  Ǯǯǡ30 those like Mountain and Project X, will continue to challenge our concept 
of art, games, and interactivity, and although they may become more common, for now, 
their minimal interactivity serves as contra-standard feature within the category of 
computer art.  
1.3 Implications 
So, is computer art a category of art in a Waltonian sense? Walton suggests any category 
must be perceptually distinguishable. In more recent years, broader interpretations of ǯ             
properties, but any reading of Walton would suggest that those features be readily 
discernible (such as the example with the computing device).31 Certainly, a computer 
(with a monitor, mouse, keyboard) is perceptually distinguishable. It is also clear in 
works like Looking at a Horse that something digitally computational is at work. However, 
between the two prototypical examples presented earlier, only Dear Esther utilises a 
perceptually distinguishable device.  Looking at a Horse, while it would be obvious to the 
user that a digital response occurs directly from their input, does not have any 
perceivable devices, save for the video screen. In this case, a viewer would perceive the 
effects of the medium and most likely presume something digital is involved, but without 
the standard hardware, a user might be more likely to view the work within an 
established category, such as (digital) installation, interactive video, etc. As Lopes 
stipulates, the digital medium alone is not an appreciative category so one could simply 
view this work as an installation.  
Alternatively, if a viewer does recognise a work like Looking at a Horse as computer art, 
in virtue of its features, it is troubling (if not a paradox to the category) that under ǯ           Ǥ 
interactivity is an expected feature of computer art, Walton states that these kinds of 
features that are particular to a category will be un-noteworthy. This creates a kind of 
paradox for us regarding works like Looking at a Horse because artists like Boehm and 
others use technology to make their works stand out and to awe and impress the users. 
The last thing anyone strives for with technology is to be un-noteworthy or commonplace 
(and I think it is uncontroversial to say that most artists would never intend such a 
                                                          
29 ǡǤǯǯMountain in Giant Bomb News. July 15, 2014. 
http://www.giantbomb.com/articles/the-madness-of-david-oreillys-mountain/1100-4956/. Accessed 
August 2016. 




feature to be un-noteworthy). Again, maybe it is safe to say that interactivity is a standard 
feature of these works, but recall that I suggested that how they are interactive (or to the 
degree they are interactive) might be a non-standard feature. This view would at least 
seem to ǯintentions of 
the artist. What about video games and those similar to Dear Esther? 
Dear Esther is run on a computer, and so it is more plausible that it, and works like it, will 
cue their users to viewing the work as computer art. There is also a strong chance that its ǮǯǮǯǤǡǡ
a viewer would not be wrong to view Dear Esther within either of these categories. That 
in mind, we are told that the five guidelines presented above might help us to determine 
the correct category.32 ǯǤ 
As a recap, correct categories will usually decrease the number of contra-standards, will 
be the one in which the work is most pleasing, is the category the artist intended for the 
work to be assessed within, and finally, the category should take the mechanical means 
of production into account. For a game, Dear Esther lacks standard gaming features and 
is less obstacle and goal oriented than paradigmatic video games like Skyrim or Mass 
Effect.33 For a work of literature or film, its free-form and interactivity seems contra-
standard. In this respect, condition (i) is met if we assess Dear Esther as either interactive 
literature, or perhaps computer art, but (iii), (iv), and (v) would not necessarily work for 
computer art. Condition (ii), I would think, suggests a category of computer art. Mountain 
has fewer contra-      Ǯ ǯ ȋ  
game). While it could also have fewer contra-standards if viewed as computer art, the 
developers of the work intended it as a kind of experimental video game and so (iii), (iv), ȋȌǮǯǤLooking at a Horse, if we consider 
(i-v) is best suited under interactive installation. ǯǤ 
Walton states that certain art categories are more established than others, which may 
have consequences on correct categorization. Computer Ǯartǯ has been around for about 
a century, but it is relatively new as an appreciative art categǤ ǮǯǮǯǡǯǡǤǮElectronic ǯy less established, but recognised nonetheless. With both, literature ǡǤǮ[Video] 
gǯǡ
two to three decades, but less so as an art kind. In both cases, the broader parent-
categories are more firmly established than computer art and, while they are all potential 
categories, they do not fully get at the unique features of Dear Esther in the Lopesian 
sense. Interactive literature need not consist of works that are run on a computer (such 
as the game books), but it is a distinctive feature of Dear Esther that it is. That so, (iv) and 
(v) are at odds in helping us determine the correct category because interactive literature 
(or literature) are more established categories within society than computer art, but the 
                                                          
32 Laetz, B. (2010). 
33 I am assuming here that a work can be both a game and a work of art.  
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mechanical process of production directs us to a correct category of computer art. With 
the above examples, it would be clear that technology, electronics, and digital media are 
involved in the method of production, as well as in the display so, condition (v) does not 
eliminate computer art as a correct category.   ǯ   Dear Esther because, although it was 
originally advertised as a game, it was created by Dan Pinchbeck, researcher from the    ȋȌ   ? ? ? ?  Ǯ       Ƭ
Humanities Research Council to explore experimental game play aǯǤ34 In 
this quote, we can see that the intention was for game and literature categories. When it 
was first released, there was significant backlash from players for its minimal game-like 
qualities, but equally frustrating for those interested in interactive literature because the 
game-like features were contra-standard within the narrative. Now, Dear Esther seems to         Ǯ ǯǡ      
important perceivable features and minimise the contra-standard features.35  
Looking at Horse is more typical of museum-related works but it may not be any less 
problematic for ascribing computer art as its correct category. For one, the video screen 
is part of its display and it might prompt the viewer to perceive the work within film or ǡǤǡǯ
presence and movement is contra-standard to those categories and the work does not 
seem the most pleasing in non-interactive categories. However, the viewer is likely to      Ǯ ǯ  Ǯ ǯǤ  
various art websites characterise the work as an installation, thus relating to condition 
(iv) (here, given the other conǡǮǯ
correct category).36  
But would a user (or player) typically perceive any of these works as computer art? This 
depends entirely on the type of user because some may regularly play art games and 
would, therefore, have a greater sense of how to categorise such works; others who 
consider themselves regular museum goers might view certain works as installation and 
others would perhaps view it as non-art; still, others more familiar with the philosophy 
of art literature might readily view any or all the above works as computer art. We would ǯǯǡ
with works like Looking at a Horse. For example, if an exhibition banner was placed ǣǮǯǡǮǯǡǡ
within the exhibition fit under those categories. Without a gǯ
computer art, I am inclined to think that, while agreeing computer art is an appreciative 
art kind, most of these works would be more readily perceived within other categories. 
This alone does not mean computer art is not a correct category; Walton says that 
established categories make a difference in determining correct categories and to be fair, 
                                                          
34 Italics are my own. 
35 This category is potentially controversial since it is debated whether art and games are compatible 
objects of appreciation.  
36 For example: http://www.creativeapplications.net/openframeworks/looking-at-a-horse-by-evan-
boehm/ . Accessed August 2015.  
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computer art is relatively new. In fact, all the categories that I have suggested above, e.g., 
interactive installation, interactive fiction, etc., are just sub-categories of the broader 
category of computer art. Regardless, what this points to, is the significance of the 
interactive feature. 
Walton claims that if contra-standard features become standard within a category, a new 
category is usually created where that contra-standard feature becomes standard of the 
work. This is the case with interactive works because most would view the interactivity 
as a distinct feature compared to works of, say, traditional film or literature. My key point 
is that computer art, as the new category, has a stronger potential to be perceived (and Ȍ  Ǯǯ       teractive film, 
interactive installation, interactive literature, or perhaps even interactive painting in 
some cases. It could be that computer art, as a new category, will become more 
established in society and, at that point, it would be the distinguishable category. It might 
also be the case that the above points to computer art as too broad a category that needs 
further parsing between works that are more like literature, video games, or gallery 
works. 
All this to say, regardless of the category that we assess the above works within, we 
should deem interactivity to be a significant, if not necessary, feature of certain artworks. 
This is not solely true for computer art, however. As stated earlier, works such as 
interactive literature exist in hardcopy and electronic forms. The same is true for works 
belonging to theatre, installation, and video games. If many artworks are interactive in 
some way, whether the interactivity is standard, variable, or contra-standard to a correct 
category, then a more specific meaning of the term would be helpful. The following 
chapter will emphasise the overuse of the interactive term and will also assess the kind 
















Chapter 2: Classifying Interactivity 
 
2.1 Ǯǯ 
In the first chapter, I discuss the importance of interactivity as it relates to computer art. 
But, what do we mean precisely when we say an artwork is interactive? I believe there 
are good reasons for asking this question because, although it is a phrase commonly used 
to characterise works of art, in and outside of academia, we apply the term in both 
numerous and general ways. For example, a basic search on the internet returns this ǮǯǡǮ(of two people or things) influencing or having an effect on each 
otherǯ.1 Ǯǯȋseemingly less informative) reads, 
Ǯa form of art that involves the spectator in a way that allows the art to achieve its 
purposeǯ.2 Although we intuitively understand these meanings they leave something 
lacking to the analytic mind; to be sure, all art involves the spectator in some way. As is, 
this definition is applicable to all kinds of art works, or certainly to more kinds than the 
digitally interactive ones.  
Interactive art is a phrase we have equipped with many meanings. We might apply it to 
characterise a genre of works such as interactive literature, film, or installation, but how 
our intended meaning of interactivity relates to each category may be relative to ǯ
context, type, etc. Consider the game of chess. We might consider chess to be interactive, 
but one might question the degree or kind of interactivity of chess, especially if it is in 
comparison to, say, ice hockey. This latter example has more discernible signs of physical 
interactivity, which might give reason for someone to classify it as more highly interactive 
than chess. Perhaps, it is that chess needs a comparative class to judge how interactive it 
is, while hockey does not necessarily need a comparative class. This shows us that certain 
terms can be absolute at times, and context sensitive when used in a gradable application 
at other times.3 
Although far from complete, the task I undertake in this chapter is to survey and analyse 
the various and current accounts of interactive art. In other words, I view this chapter as 
a compass piece on the different kinds of interactive art that are discussed in different 
places. At the very least, more specific characterisations of the various interactive groups 
will be useful for clarity in moving forward with the kinds of works I wish to focus on in 
the bulk of this dissertation. More specific to my project here is my aim to differentiate 
the interactive arts so that I might focus more in depth on a specific kind of interactivity. 
To that end, this chapter takes up the topic of interactive art and attempts to lay down 
some groundwork.    
 
 
                                                          
1 https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-
8#q=define%20interactive  
2 Soler-Adillon, Joan (2015-12-21). "The intangible material of interactive art: agency, behavior and 
emergence". Artnodes. doi:10.7238/a.v0i16.2744 
3 McNally (2007).  
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2.2 Categorising Interactive Art 
The above briefly describes the various reasons we might apply the term interactivity to 
a work, but, what kinds of works does the term usually refer to? As an art historical genre, 
interactive art usually refers to works starting roughly between the latter 1950s through 
the 80s, with Happenings, installation, performance art and other such works that 
questioned the completeness or materiality of works. This experimentation continued to 
interest artists from the 1970s through the 90s with the introduction (and curiosity) of 
technology, all before the World Wide Web was introduced. However, all arts generally 
require a degree of interactivity if we aim to appreciate them because we can engage with 
a sculpture, for example, by walking around it to see as many features as possible. As any 
art historian will tell us, all works are best appreciated if we view the work from different 
vantage points and when we vary our location in relation to the work. A viewer 
participates with a work of art to contemplate, appreciate, and evaluate it, which 
exemplifies interactivity in one (widespread) form. Like participating with Happenings, 
the term interactivity can also imply a physical engagement between viewer and object, 
whereby a viewer manipulates a work to varying degrees in order to change certain 
features of it. In short, a work can be interactive in how it is appreciated, how it is 
produced, or how it is engaged with.  
Others have pointed out the dearth of research regarding this term, and so I am not alone 
in claiming there is a need for greater attention. To name two, digital curator Christiane      Ǯhas be  ǯ4, while Dominic Lopes ǡǮȏȐǮǯ ? ?Ǥreal 
tr      ǯ.5 It will become evident in this chapter that Lopes, 
among others, has done significant work in delineating between interactivity in the ǮǯǮǯǤ But what about other, lesser forms of interactivity? 
I should make it clear that I am not interested in a typology of interactivity that is based 
on the kinematics of the viewer or the object, i.e., the degree, appearance, or perceptibility 
of any physical movement by the viewer or of the object, which I feel would only continue 
to muddle the meaning of this term. After all, some highly interactive video games only 
require finger movement on the keyboard or controller, but architecture requires us to 
move our whole bodies from room to room. Would we classify architecture as more 
interactive than a video game? Most likely not.  
The kinds of interactivity I wish to address here are works that require the viewer to 
become an active participant with the work, where the interactivity is between the 
viewer and the work (not between artist and viewer nor object and environment). This ǮǯǡǤHere, I will consider the prescriptions 
of interactivity and the kinds of display the works consists of. I say this to minimise any 
assumption that what follows takes any evaluative stock of interactive works. In what 
remains of this chapter, I will explore different degrees and kinds of interactivity that are 
generally found between the viewer or user and the work, for which we can distinguish 
three groups: basic interactivity, participatory, and interactive (or strongly interactive) 
                                                          
4 Paul (2003). 
5 Lopes (2010), p. 36. 
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arts. What is missing from this chapter is a discussion on video games, which I will discuss 
more thoroughly in Section 2.  
In this chapter, I will first discuss a basic kind of interactivity that is usually associated 
with appreciation. This section is brief and somewhat general but it will serve to 
distinguish the other kinds of interactivity that I am interested in. The second section 
discusses David ǯǤǡǮǯǡ
do nothing to alter the works themselves, nor do they switch the status of the viewer to a Ǯuserǯ. The third section discusses works that are interactive in the stronger sense 
because the viewer, now the user, can change features of the work to some degree. Here, 
I employ a definition of interactivity by Dominic Lopes and, although this definition was 
intended for computer art, it is inclusive of many art kinds regardless of media. This will 
show us, in preparation for the chapters in Section 2, that interactivity is distinctive ǯǡ because of its media.  
2.3 Engagement  
Is a painting interactive? There are some, at least within academia, who would answer 
this question in the positive and my guess is that there are many who would agree that 
all works involve a degree of interactivity. In fact, art appreciation is itself a broad form 
of interactivity and, although trivial, it is important. Works with purposiveness, either 
political, social, or conceptual, might create a greater opportunity for cognitive 
interaction, but contemplative features of a work are not essential for this basic level of 
interactivity; even less purposive art carries a potential to motivate cognitive 
interactivity when we attend to the aesthetic and non-aesthetic features. 6 
Many accounts of aesthetic appreciation will conceptualise appreciation as a kind of 
interaction. I imagine these philosophers, those such as George Dickie, would consider 
the process of appreciation as a kind of interactivity because it requires active attention.7 
At first blush, tǯt our aesthetic attention 
must be disinterested.8 Others such as Martin Seel focus on the paradox of elective 
passivity that allows for strong cognitive participation with works because a viewer can 
explore many spaces and dimensions of a scene's environment, or perhaps the emotional 
characteristics of a musical score, and all while in a physically passive state. For example, 
Seel characterises the spaceship from Ridley Scott's, Alien (1979) as portraying an 
incredible interior and exterior depth, which a viewer can explore like a cathedral.9 This 
exploration is accomplished, unlike with architecture, in a stationary position. The same 
can be applied to sport spectatorship. A viewer who observes a game from the side-lines 
will do so in a passive state, but, in principle, this does not preclude a strong level of 
mental engagement.  
We can also characterise imagination as a kind (or degree) of interactivity. There are 
many examples of works from films and novels that contain intentional narrative or 
                                                          
6 Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
7 Dickie, George, (1964) Ȃ as found in Zangwell (1992).  
8 Kant (1928) p. 42-43. 
9 Anderson (2009) and Seel (2005). 
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visual gaps; these allow the viewer to fill details in by way of actively imagining them. 
Paintings and sculptures allow us to do the same. For example, the ancient Greek 
sculpture, The Discobolus of Myron (c. 460 BCE), is a figure of a nude male in a holding 
position Ȃ arched over and ready to release a discus. Although his posture is static, a 
viewer can easily imagine the successive movements that would follow from the 
(imaginative) potential energy and motions that comprise an actual discus throw. It is not 
just that viewers tend to do this, the work inspires such imaginings.  
This kind of imagined-seeing means that a rendering of every feature or instance is not 
necessary for appreciation of a work. There are also instances of works that allow viewers ǮǯǤǡ-Ǯǯǡ
if vampires do not exist.10 On this point, that same vampire may never appear on screen, Ǯǯ
sights or sounds merely associated with it. While this scenario can be extended to role-
playing games, video games, or choose your own adventure books, non-interactive 
categories such as film and music do not require physical activity, but an activity all the 
same.  
In addition to the above, which describes features that are intrinsic to a work, there are 
theories of art appreciation that require an understanding of external features such as 
the intent of the artist, the context of the work, or the history of the medium.11 This goes 
beyond merely appreciating the work for its perceptual features and, arguably, requires 
an additional (or at least different) level of engagement with the work. Perhaps 
knowledge that a particular painting was originally used as a political piece, or that 
certain works were stolen during World War II, impact how we engage with works and 
appreciate them.  
Surely more examples of how we engage our minds to appreciate art could be added here, 
but for the sake of my following thesis, I will take it for granted that the point I make here 
is a relatively accepted one, which is that all art requires an attentiveness to the works. 
Basic interactivity is not interactive in any interesting sense and should, therefore, not be 
a candidate for works that we normal consider interactive. As such, basic interactivity is 
better discussed in terms of engagement, rather than interactivity. As viewer engagement 
is a well-covered topic within aesthetics and philosophy of mind, I will move on to a 
discussion of more robust accounts of interactivity. 
2.4 Participatory Works 
Although the above characterises an implicit kind of interactivity that is important to all 
art kinds, there are artworks that require something additional of the viewer if the works 
are to be understood properly (or adequately). ǡǡǯǡThe 
Beanery (1965), a life-sized walk-ǯǡ
popular bar in downtown Los Angles. Once viewers step inside, they will notice sensory 
details that are individually important to the work; the sights, sounds, and smells of the 
                                                          
10 Ibid., p. 121-126. 
11 E.g., Levinson, J. (2011).  
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bar collectively provide a better reading of the work. Without a degree of physical 
participation, the relevant features of The Beanery could not be appreciated, i.e., if a 
viewer, instead of stepping inside the work were to only look inside, they would miss out 
on relevant features of the work.  
David Novitz defines these kinds of works as participatory art, or: 
[A]rt forms that cannot adequately be appreciated, and cannot function 
properly, unless the viewer is physically present in the artwork itself or 
a performance of it, and, while there, participates in certain activities 
that arise out of and are required by these works.12 
The term participatory is useful because it implies a different level of involvement than 
the basic mental engagement described above. Since Novitz uses the term participatory 
in a specific way, his definition and the conditions involved should be reviewed.13 
Importantly for Novitz, works that fulfil his above conditions of participatory art will 
usually be compound works, which means they are comprised of more than one work; 
non-participatory works will usually be discrete.14 For this reason, works of installation 
art or architecture are normally appreciated as participatory artworks because they are 
comprised of multiple works or events, and because they ǮǮǯǮǯȋȌǯ.15  
Paintings and sculpture (to name just two) would not usually qualify as participatory 
artworks because the viewer cannot enter into the works themselves since the works are 
discrete, or singular. 
That so, Novitz admits there are rare discrete works, such as Charles Ray's sculpture, Still 
Life, which can only be appreciated through participation.  Still Life is described as a table 
with mundane objects situated on the table top (e.g. a jar, bowl filled with flowers, a 
drinking glass, etc.). This sculpture is participatory because these objects on top of the ǮǯǤ, if 
she crouches down and looks underneath the table, she will notice an unplugged 
electrical cord that dangles from below the table top. The underneath side of the table, if    ǡ   Ǯ ǯ   n lights. 
These operate as on/off switches for the objects above the table. After the viewer notices 
these features, she will then, in principle, stand back up to have another look at the 
topside of the table to more adequately appreciate the work. 
For Novitz, Still Life, although it is not a compound work comprised of multiple works, is 
a participatory work. This example is like the Kienholz tableau, but, contrary to his ǡǮǯStill Life in the manner that they can 
                                                          
12 Novitz, p. 153. 
13 ǡǮǯǮǯǤain reason for those titles ǯǤǡ
that my use of the weakly interactive category connoted an evaluative meaning I do not intend.  
14 Novitz, p. 153. 
15 Ibid., p. 54. Here, Novitz refers to a hospital and, if it were to be appreciated from only the outside, then 
we might appreciate it as a building, but not as a functioning hospital.  
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enter a work like The Beanery. ǡǯ
works (but only of multiple objects). Although Novitz concedes there are problem cases 
for the category of participatory art, there is another and rather paradigmatic example of 
a discreet participatory work that not only serves as a counterexample, but draws 
attention to the strong possibility that there might be too many works like it for them to 
all be considered contra-standard. Consider Holbein's painting, The Ambassadors with the 
painted anamorphic skull at the bottom of the canvas. The skull first appears more like 
an odd disc or an unfortunate mistake made by the artist and its identity is not apparent 
to the viewer unless she stands within a certain location relative to the painting. If she 
does so, it becomes suddenly apparent that the odd smear of paint depicts a seemingly 
protruding skull. Although the meaning of the painting is debated, it is suggested that the 
skull helps us to re-interpret the painting as a memento mori, without which the work can 
be read quite differently (e.g., double portrait, historical documentation, etc.).16  
In this respect, The Ambassadors requires internal and external responses similar to 
appreciating a cathedral or hospital, although one cannot be in that painting.17 This 
suggests to me two things. Firstly, that our appreciation of all works benefits from 
perceiving as much (if not all) the features of the work as possible. However, that in and 
of itself does not make a work a participatory because this characterises the basic level 
of engagement described earlier. Secondly, that a viewer must be in the work, according ǯǡ consider all the potential 
counter-examples, like Still Life or The Ambassadors.18 ǯ
characterisation of some art forms, for works like architecture or some installation19, 
although it also unnecessarily excludes too many other works that prescribe similar 
responses from viewers. Perhaps all that is needed to salvage his definition without 
excluding works like Still Life and The Ambassadors is to remove the condition that    Ǯǯ   and instead note that what makes participatory works 
special is a particular prescription that goes beyond the norms of art-viewing. In some 
cases, the prescription Ǯin relation to the workǯǤ  
The examples presented above show us that we can use the term participatory in 
gradable ways. A viewer could experience The Ambassadors as less participatory than The 
Beanery given the varying prescriptions, but even with the degree of difference between 
these works, we have a sharper understanding of their distinctiveness compared to non-
participatory works than when we began. It is (at least intuitively) clear that 
                                                          
16 Hervey, Mary (1900); Rowlands, John (1985); Zwingenberger, Jeanette (1999).  
17 ǡǡǯDavid (e.g., the 
informative stone that is clenched in his right hand at his side, or the sling thrown behind his back), or 
paintings, like those by Hieronymus Bosch (e.g., the small characters and details in The Garden of Earthly 
Delights), require specific locations for a viewer to stand in order to adequately appreciate the work. 
However, this might be (unnecessarily) splitting hairs.  
18 There is a third issue to scrutiǯǡǤǲǳǡ
little to the ontology of the work. A viewer might not participate with the activities that arise from a work, Ǯǯǡǡ
participatory art kind.  
19 ǮǯBlu Tack is considered 
installation art, but we cannot be in the work.  
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prescriptions for participatory works seemingly have further constraints for adequate 
appreciation than non-participatory works. However, this difference is difficult to 
capture given that much of what we say about the requirements of participatory art can 
also be said of all art where a basic level of engagement is involved. 
If there is anything explicitly in common about basic interactivity and participatory 
works it is that the ǯ actions help them to understand the meaning of the work. So, 
participation as Novitz characterises it, increases our potential to appreciate certain 
works, but it does nothing to alter any particular feature of the work. That the work itself 
remains the same while the perceived features of the work become apparent makes 
participatory works similar to all non-interactive art; our experiences with these works 
will normally change, but the properties of the them are unchanged. With Still Life, the 
lights would flicker, the cable would dangle, and the objects would remain stable without 
the viewer noticing them. This is equally so of the skull in The Ambassadors. Nothing of 
these works changes from the participation (or lack thereof). For works like The 
Ambassadors, Lopes offers a nice characterisation with his statement that they require 
something more like what he ca Ǯ ǯ.20 This engagement places the 
viewer in an active role with the work of art but not an interactive role.21  
But what of works with features that can be changed? Works that vary in some way, not 
just in the perceptions and experiences they afford, would have to be distinguished from 
the above examples if the term interactivity is going to be useful in moving forward. The 
following will explore these kinds of works.  
2.5 Interactive Works 
If participatory works consist of features that are unnoticeable without active (physical) 
participation, then we need a concept for works that consist of features that can change 
because of our engagement with them. Dominic Lopes proposes, by now, a well-known 
definition for the interactivity that computer art entails. I will discuss his definition of 
interactivity shortly, but first, I will borrow one of his examples to illustrate how it 
characterises works that change in some way do to Ǯuserǯ interaction. Wooden Mirror 
(1999) hangs on a gallery wall and is comprised of 830 wooden tiles, which are operated 
by a servomotor. When a viewer stands in front of the display, a camera captures an image 
of the viewer and the tiles tilt to various degrees to reproduce the captured image, 
functioning similarly to the pixels of a digital image. 
Wooden Mirror is interactive in a different way than works like Still Life and The 
Ambassadors because it is not just that the perceptual features of the display appear to be 
different, they actually change as a result of our engagement with them. This kind of work 
is   ǯ    ǡ       Ǯ              ǯǤ22 This definition is informative because it stipulates that an interactive workǯ
display can change in some way, in either appearance, sound or other perceivable state, 
due to the interaction that are prescribed. We can distinguish these works from the ones 
                                                          
20 Lopes (2010) p. 41.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., p. 36. 
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described for the basic level of engagement and participatory works because 
appreciating a painting or a sculpture does not help to generate their displays in the 
manner Lopes defines. This concept of interactivity, that  ǯ   in ǯ, is differentiated from works that alter over time from some ȋǤǤǡ ǯ Spiral Jetty changes over time and a bronze 
sculpture will form a patina, but neither is an interactive work). We can also distinguish 
interactivity in the Lopesian sense from basic activity. Although  basic interactivity, or 
engagement, grants us access to a work such as turning the pages of a novel, this activity 
does nothing to generate the direction of the narrative, just as viewing all the relevant 
features of The Ambassadors does not generate any new features of the painting.  
Before addressing ǯ any further, I want to point out that non-computer 
interactive works are compatible with such an account of interactivity. Consider the 
example, El Lissitzky's Abstract Cabinet (1927-28). Abstract Cabinet is since destroyed 
but it originally existed as a modular room comprised of works by Modern artists such as 
Mondrian and Mies Van der Rohe. Various panels within the room were interchangeable, 
e.g., the viewer could slide the panels up and down, and side to side to rearrange the 
positions of the well-known artworks. Today, it is unclear just what Lissitzky's intention 
was with this work but many suggest that perhaps it was about changing our reading or 
interpretation of works by rearranging their environment. The prescription to rearrange 
the work into different patterns is what makes the work interactive in a different way 
than Still Life, or from a curator who moves a non-interactive painting from one wall to 
another.   
In his definition, Lopes stipulates that the interactivity must be prescribed. Prescribed 
interactivity excludes unwanted behaviour or vandalism from classifying as a permissible Ǥ	ǡǯThe Night 
Watch does not make the painting an interactive work because the artist never intended 
that action. Lissitzky intended for the viewers to rearrange the panels and, rules of the ǡǯǤ ǯ eption of interactivity seems to include works like Abstract Cabinet in the 
same way it includes Wooden Mirror, so one might worry that the definition is too broad 
if it covers both non-computer and computer based works. In what remains of this    ǯ -computer artworks 
from qualifying as strongly interactive like Wooden Mirror. What I want to set up for the 
reader is the point that interactivity of this kind is not limited by media.  
To make the broader point about interactive art across media, let us first consider the ǮǯǮǯǡǡ
both tend to connote functions and features of the computer. Do the users of Abstract 
Cabinet ǮǯǫAltǮǯǡ
that Lopes intends it to mean instantiating something to perceive it. Here, works like 
Abstract Cabinet might be excluded if we claim that the features (panels) of the display 
are already instantiated and are merely rearranged by the interactivity and not rendered, 
whereas, interactivity makes visible any of the given image on Wooden Mirror. However, 
this does not conceptualize the differences between the interactivity in these kinds of 
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works as much as it concerns the materiality of them. Abstract Cabinet, although better 
appreciated if a viewer interacts with it and moves the panels, consists of essential 
features that are perceptually ready for the viewer to appreciate without the interaction 
(this is not to discount the importance of rearranging the work). However, I would think 
we would have to agree that properties that are not intrinsic of the work will arise from 
the interactivity. After all, rearranging the panels changes the locations and environments 
of the individual works, which generates the properties.  ǡǡǤǯ
definition states explicitly that users generate the displays such as the images generated 
on Wood MirrorǤǮa pattern or structure that results from the ǯ Ǥǯ23  Ǯǯ
does not refer only to digital works, therefore, a painting is a display of one kind and a 
novel is a display of another kind. With works like paintings and sculptures, the object 
and the display are the same thing, but with the case of music, literature, and computer 
art, the display does not equate with any object per se. Instead, the display could be a set 
of sounds or images or, as Lopes states, something like a change in temperature. A ǯif they are to be considered candidates for the kind 
of interactivity he defines. A more detailed discussion of Lopesian displays and properties 
will be addressed in Chapter 6.  
So, what makes the former work different from the latter example? Essentially, computer 
art must have displays that are generated from a computational process. This should not 
suggest that the digital medium or an electronic computer are essential for a 
computational process to occur. Lopes offers a hypothetical work, Wooden Mirror 
Unplugged, as an example of non-digital computer art. This imagined work is a non-
electronic version of Wooden Mirror, which he describes like this, 
Now, in Wooden Mirror Unplugged, a human operator inspects a bank 
of 830 tiny etched glass screens onto which light is funnelled from the 
same number of lenses. Next to each screen is a graduated knob which 
sets an aperture, and the operator adjusts all the knobs until the light 
intensity is the same across all the screens. He then turns to a second set 
of knobs which mechanically tilt a grid of wooden tiles, and he adjusts 
each of these knobs to a marking that matches the marking on the 
corresponding screen knob.24  
The above is a work of computer art even though it is not operated on an electronic 
computer; instead of a digital transfer function, the input/output relationship is 
functioned between the human operator, who follows a kind of algorithm to match the 
subject in front of the mirror, and the variable tiles. Although the Unplugged version 
would not be as fast in generating the display outcomes, as Lopes points out, it functions 
                                                          
23 Lopes (2010), p. 37. 
24 Ibid., p. 46 Ȃ 47. 
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similarly to the plugged version, and so both are computer art.25 If Lopes assumes that 
brains are a kind of computer, he would not necessarily qualify Abstract Cabinet as 
computer art because the viewer does not rearrange the panels using an algorithm (or 
rule-set) in the same way the knob turner follows rules to generate an image. Abstract 
Cabinet does not qualify as computer art like the works Wooden Mirror and Wooden 
Mirror Unplugged, but it does have a variable display, and the interactivity it prescribes 
is not so different    Ǥ   ǡ ǯ  
includes the kinds of works that consist of variable displays, regardless of the media and 
devices used.  
A potential counter-ǯaccount of strong interactivity. Berys 
Gaut is one such critic who worries that, without a clearer concept of who the user is,     ǯ    ers from functioning as 
interactors of the work. More precisely, Gaut ǡǲthe audience role in the interactive 
case is to appreciate the work by instantiating it; merely watching the work while 
someone else instantiates it does not count as fully apprec Ǥǳ26 Although Lopes 
states that the audience and users of computer art are usually the same, Gaut states the 
distinction between audience and user is not sharp enough.27   ǡ ǯ
definition could include an example such as an audience who watches a performance, 
making the performance an interactive work because a display is generated by some user. 
Gaut clarifies that the user can only appreciate the work by generating it. Andrew Kania, 
following Gaut, continues this issue and supposes that it is possible a work could be ǲ-interacting audience could properly appreciate it through 
observing a third party exploratorily generating a displaǳǡǡǯǡ
should be (erroneously) viewed as interactive art.28  
ǯ ?Ǥǡo conclude this chapter, 
the above categories suggest that, although all works need some form of interaction to be 
properly appreciated, not all art is interactive in the same way. The first group of 
interactive works consists of everything from paintings, to sculpture, to film, and 
installation, all of which require active engagement for us to appreciate them. Although 
this characterises a form of mental activity, it only does so at a very basic level.  
Works such as Still Life and The Ambassadors are representative of the second group of 
interactive works, or works that are participatory. Although these kinds of works can ǡǯ
actions. While interactivity is not a standard feature of participatory works, they do 
prescribe a particular prescription for the viewer to notice certain features; without 
participation, adequate appreciation is not possible. Participation does nothing to 
generate the features of its display, but it changes our experiences of the work much like 
works in the first group.  
                                                          
25 	ǡǯǤ
However, I do think this inclusion allows for too many other things, which we do not normally intuit as 
computer art, e.g. some board games, improve works, etc.  
26 Gaut (2010), p. 143. 
27 See Lopes (2010), p. 83 and Gaut (2010) p. 143.  
28 Kania (forthcoming, 2018) p. 4 (in pre-published draft form).  
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The third group consists of works that are strongly interactive, in the way Lopes defines 
it, because their displays are variable. In cases such as these, viewers become users who 
are prescribed to generate the ǯ displays via the instructions of the artist or the 
framework of the algorithm. Works such as Abstract Cabinet and Wooden Mirror entail 
different kinds of responses than non-interactive works because both prescribe users, in 
the Gautian sense, to instantiate certain display features, which will bear on appreciation.  
I note in the introduction of this chapter that a discussion of video games is saved for the 
latter chapters. I preface this here because, while there are similarities in the interactivity 
we find in works across media, such as Abstract Cabinet and Wooden Mirror, there are 
interactive works that consist of even greater distinctions, such as many video games and 
other interactive fictions. The differences between the strongly interactive works require 
a more in-depth discussion on the ontology of a specific kind of interactive work, which 
is, once again, dependent on the displays rather than the media used. More on that in 
Section 2 of this dissertation. 
Each kind of work mentioned above has a better chance of appreciation if we understand 
their interactive differences. More can no doubt be said about this topic, but with these 
different groups in place, I am in a better position to distinguish between the ontologies 
of these interactive works. But before moving on, a background query on the significant 
properties of the digital medium will be helpful. By doing so, I aim to draw out a few of 
the unique features of digital works, be they museum driven works or things like video 
games. This too will be helpful for the ontology chapters that proceed. 
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Chapter 3: The Digital Medium: Specificity and Appreciation  
 
Although I stated in the previous chapter that the medium of a work does not necessarily 
affect the kind of interactivity at hand, digital media will bear on the ontology and 
experience of some works. Therefore, medium specificity is worth some attention. In this 
chapter, I discuss the distinctive possibilities of the digital medium in the production, 
display, and experience of certain artworks.  
 
I start by describing a short evolution of the names that are usually ascribed to digital art 
which have influenced the category we now label computer art. Since computer art 
includes works that run on analogue computers, I follow with a discussion of the digital ǯǤ
final section, I discuss the copyability of digital works by comparing the reproduction 
processes between digital works and more traditional works, thereby highlighting a few 
early observations of the digital medium by Nelson Goodman.1  
 
3.1 The Evolution of the Digital Category 
 
Essentially, digital works involve a computer processing system and so digital media 
refers to any media that has been encoded in a machine-readable format. Digital works 
pose an initial challenge to our classification of such works because digital media consists 
of many things like programmes, software, databases, video, and the like, which inspire 
the variety of nomenclature currently found in the literatureǤ	ǡǮǯ
used as an umbrella term within art history to signify a wide array of methods that 
include the production of an art object or works that have digital displays.2 Therefore,    Ǯ ?        ǡ although digital 
technologies can be utilised as a means of production, they do not always factor into our 
appreciation of the display. For example, there are many films that are now shot digitally, 
but we do not necessarily evaluate them differently than those shot on traditional film. 
This points to the fact that the digital medium is incorporated within many mainstream 
art practices and so is not, in and of itself, an indication of an Avant Garde category. In 
fact, the digital medium is currently used within many traditional categories of art such 
as sculpture, photography, film, drawing, public art, and, more recently, graffiti. 
  ? ? ? ?ǡǮǯto reference certain works because of cybernetics' 
influence on art, a term used within the field of engineering to describe a closed loop 
system. This concept was then applied to many social artworks involving a control source 
and a form of communication, such as performance works, where works created a 
feedback loop between an artist and a viewer.3 This category grew to be too inclusive and, 
therefore, too vague because it began to include any art process where an artist took a 
systematic, controlled approach to the production of their art, including works by non-
digital painters such as Frank Stella.  
 
                                                          
1 Portions of this chapter develop ideas from my MA thesis submitted to the University of Kent, 2013.  
2 Paul (2008), p. 53. 




Ȍd during the latter 
part of the twentieth century when art practices began using a variety of technological 
media for experimental works, within many different genres (e.g., video installations, 
electronic music, or performance art). New Media is an often-used phrase today, mostly 
within schools of art, but it too is a problematic title because it ambiguously refers to a 
wide range of possible media used in the production or the display of a given work. 
Moreover, media theorists have pointed out that digitaǮǯ
most media technologies have now been assimilated into software programmes.4 This 
means, artists do not necessarily deal with the digital medium directly like programmers 
will, and so the media used in the process of production is not always the key appreciative 
factor.  
 
Controversially, because of the dematerialised nature of digitally based works, a few 
critics and other art theorists of the twentieth century began to categorise digital works 
as Conceptual Art.5 Digital works, however, do not tend to be predominantly language or 
thought based, or rooted in any other noteworthy traditions of conceptual art. In addition,   ǯ 
salient perceptual features of the work such as lights, sounds, and other features which 
are not normally associated with conceptual artworks and their primary features. This 
touches on another problematic issue because a category of conceptual art (for digital 
works) presumes the artworks in question are dematerialized. The abstractness of these 
works is not specifically addressed in this chapter, but as it is a debated issue it will be 
discussed in the proceeding ontology chapters.  
 
3.2 Digital Versus Analogue 
 
Today, the above titles are still more or less still used for works that contain or use digital 
media. Although Lopes has, thankfully, narrowed a category for computer art, already 
introduced in the first two chapters, my analysis of the digital medium will be addressed 
more broadly in this chapter. As stated, computer art is interactive, and although digital 
systems do not make these works automatically interactive (e.g., artists can create digital 
images for display only), they can shape our ontological account of these works.6 Before 
elaborating on the differences between analogue and digital computers, which is 
important for the kinds of experiences they afford, let us first turn to the specificity of the 
digital medium, which should highlight the distinctive features of certain works. 
 
Like traditional art, digital artworks use a specific method to encode the intended 
information into a given display device. Typically, when considering a specific medium, 
we think in general terms such as paints that are oils, paints that are acrylic, and so on. 
Getting more precise, we can distinguish acrylic based paints according to their texture, 
viscosity, or even their molecular information. This extreme level of medium specificity 
is rarely important within aesthetics, but since the specificity of digital media is relevant 
to a discussion of ontology, it is worth elaborating on here.  
                                                          
4 Manovich (2013). See also Paul (2003), p. 7. The digital medium, although usually associated with recent 
and experimental artworks, has been around for nearly a hundred years. However, as Paul claims, what 
remains `new' about `New Media' is the near limitless possibilities the digital medium offers. 
5 Lippard (1973); Tamblyn (1990), p. 253-256; Binkley (1990), p. 238. 
6 I qualify this because, as I mentioned earlier, Lopes includes analogue computers within his definition of 
computer art. This chapter focuses on the digital medium, however. 
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Digital technologies allow for the production, the display, and the archival of art. 
Literature, music and other works with more traditional media music can be digitized for 
preservation and dissemination, but those digitised displays have nothing to do with the 
works. In comparison to sculpture and music, there persists an idea that digital works are ǮǯȋǤǤǡǮǯȌto be appreciated as a high artform, even 
though much of the traditional arts have used the digital medium (e.g., photography, film, 
painting, sculpture, music). In this respect, the digital medium does not necessarily 
challenge accounts of traditional art forms per se, but it can affect things like 
representation and appreciation in ways that bear on our traditional philosophical 
accounts.  
 
Above, I mentioned that some digital films may be discussed within the same 
philosophical framework as non-digital movies, but that is not always the case with all 
digital works. A digital painting, as I will explain below, may require a different manner 
of regard than an oil painting. The above shows us that it is not always the digital medium 
on its own that impacts theories of art, but the category that the digital medium is used 
in. That is not, of course, to say that the medium has no role in digital art appreciation. 
Digital technology, just like any other media, comes with its own artistic challenges that 
can become meritorious features if used well. In reference to digital cinema and video 
games, Berys Gaut says that giving artists more tools to work with does not necessarily 
mean the work is achieved more easily and, in fact, more tools mean more creative 
power.7 So, while a digital film does not become appreciated as digital art, it might be 
praised specifically for its digital elements.  
 
Typically, the properties of digital media are discussed in terms of being dynamic, 
automatic, and interactive, just to list a few.8 Nelson Goodman applauds the digital  ?ǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǤ9 In her ǡǮǯǡǮǯǡ Ǯǯǡ ǮǯǤ10 These are loaded terms because, like 
interactivity, they are used in various ways by different people within different 
disciplines. These terms characterise the ability of digital media, but they are vague. For 
a user to experience the characteristics Paul suggests, they will need to experience the 
instantiated display Ȃ this means that these characteristics are related to the particular 
properties of the hardware utilised by the work, in addition to the digital media.   
 
Some media theorists (those such as Lev Manovich) say we should not be concerned with 
the properties of digital media in the customary sense (such as binary digits), and it is not 
the hardware but the software that produces the experiential properties.11 Manovich 
makes an example of this with a digital photograph and notes that the viewer (and the 
photographer) will not typically deal with the numbers, colour values, or other data of 
the photograph, as a software programmer does. Instead, digital photographers have the 
ability to interface with the photograph via the software applications, be it Photoshop, 
Google Picassa 3.0, etc.  
 
                                                          
7 Gaut (2010). 
8 Paul (2003) Chapter 2. 
9 Goodman (1976), Chapter 4, section 8 (specifically pgs.166-169). 
10 Paul (2003), p. 67. 
11 Manovich (2013).  
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Manovich goes on to say,       Ǯǯ   ǡ  
always remember that this term means software techniques defined to 
work on particular types of media ecologies, content and media data.12   Ǯǯ         
operates the programmes, but his own example shows that there are distinctive 
properties for both the software and the hardware because proper display requires more 
than functioning software. Suppose an artist created a digital painting on an iPhone. The 
iPhone would be important to its display but only insofar as it was intended to be 
displayed in a certain way. That same digital painting would not (necessarily) have to be 
displayed on a particular iPhone, and the display itself would not be a noteworthy feature 
of the work. The digital painting could not, however, be adequately appreciated if we 
attempted to display the same digital painting on a Gameboy, for example. In this sense, 
it is important that the hardware is compatible with the media and with how the artist 
intends for a work to be perceived, in the same way that a painter may specify the location 
or lighting conditions for the installation process. The display device, or hardware, factors 
into how we perceive and experience the work, which is something Paul Crowther seems 
to agree with when he says: 
...the [digital] image is so dependent on hardware and software for its 
vivid realization, this suspends our sense of its origins in such artifice. It 
might be thought that since the image is so dependent on technological 
support, this means that we must be always and inescapably aware of 
its artefactual origins. However, as in the case of film or TV screens, the 
supporting technology becomes so familiar as to be unnoticed.13  
The properties of the hardware impact display realisation and viewer appreciation, but 
they do not factor into an ontological account of digital works, which is something Lopes 
points out.14  Likewise, D'Cruz and Manga discuss the devices used for digital images but 
not as far as to include the computer architecture in an ontology.15 Instantiations of 
digitally interactive works are comprised of code, software, and hardware, all of which 
are important for interactivity to occur. For this reason, I will favour, within this chapter, Ǯǯances and mean it to include the 
code, software, and the hardware, but I will make exceptions if and when clarification is 
needed.  
 
Instead of utilising the terminology that Nelson and Paul ascribe to the digital media, I 
will address the digital system's potential for speed, capacity, precision, and its 
transmissibility,        ǯ  Ǥ
Importantly, these characteristics, which are all inter-connected because each one makes 
the other possible. Although each of these features might vary in how successful they are, 
an adeptness in each is usually standard of the computer. For example, a particular ǯǡ ǡ 
level. Let us take a look at each.  
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 Crowther (2008), p. 164. 
14 Lopes (2001) p. 77. 




Speed refers to the number of calculations the hardware can do every second. We usually 
recognise a computer's speediness by its responsiveness, i.e., the output in relationship ǯǤe system and the perceptual, 
instantiated effects of the medium are another aspect of the system; this means that the 
system has to processes the communications (within the system) at a rapid rate if the 
output is to be experienced by the user in a real-time manner. This is what Paul refers to 
when she characterises the digital medium as dynamic.16 The interdependent 
relationship between the digital signal, software, and the hardware that instantiates the 
code is what determines the computer's execution speed. Although works with an      ǯ    ǡ 
interactivity would be experienced quite differently because analogue systems entail 
mechanical responses, which rarely compare to the degree of speed that a digital system 
is capable of.   
 
To understand the differences between the interactivity that we are normally able to 
experience with analogue and digital systems, we must first understand the distinctions 
between their analogue and digital signal types.  
 
As described by Kamaraju and Narasimham, an analogue signal is commonly understood 
in the following way: 
An analogue signal is a signal defined over a continuous range of time 
whose amplitude can assume a continuous range of values.17  
Goodman phrases it in a slightly different manner. 
A symbol scheme is analogue if syntactically dense; a system is analogue 
if syntactically and semantically dense.18 
We can understand Goodmanǯ
above. Density refers to the infinite divisibility of the continuous signal mentioned in the 
first definition and so its density references the many values that can be packed into a 
given system. For instance, a mercury thermometer can read any degree of a given 
temperature, and the infinite degrees between if the conditions change. Goodman uses ǮǯǡǮǯǡǮǯǡǤ19  
This infinite system is in strict contrast to digital systems whose binary symbols or 
signals do not have an infinite range of values due to limited word length (or the number 
of binary digits used to represent a value, such as a 32-bit versus a 64-bit number). 
 
Typically, a digital system is one in which the signals and operations are based solely on 
quantised binary information. Quantisation is the act of taking a sampled value and 
assigning it a numerical value limited by the available precision of the discrete system 
(i.e. number of bits). For example, a continuous voltage signal at time t is  ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǥ ǡ   quantised to 12-bits would have a value of 
                                                          
16 Paul (2003), p. 68. 
17 Kamaraju, V., and R. L. Narasimham (2009), p. 242. 
18 Goodman (1976), p. 160. 
19 Ibid., p. 163. 
41 
 
1.0111110, which in base 10 is 1.234375. So, it is clear that quantisation of a continuous 
value leads to a loss of precision. Precision can be increased by adding bits but the same 
output speed necessitates larger computer memories, faster CPU, and more, to 
accommodate the larger values. The quantised number allows for, as Goodman puts it, 
articulation because it is possible to determine the exact number references in the 
system; an analogue system, however, is infinite in it numerical references.20  
 
In Goodmanian terms, digital systems are not dense like analogue systems because digital 
ones are differentiated. Symbols are important for Goodman because they help us 
differentiate the notational system of a representation. Representations consists of 
symbols (or characters as Goodman calls them) that can be classified as either syntactic 
types or semantic types and, therefore, a digital system can be differentiated syntactically 
and semantically. Something is syntactically differentiated if the symbol used within a Ǥ
ǯǡǮǯǡ
how it is written (e.g., A, A, a, aǡǤǡȌǡ Ǯǯǡ
example.21 A scheme is semantically differentiated if the symbols within a scheme all      Ǥ 	 ǡ      Ǯǯ        Ǥ   
ǯ ǡ
imagine a coin bank that accepts up to fifty dimes and the bank is fitted with a counter on 
it that indicates the number and amount of coins that have been deposited inside.22 The 
numbers (0-50) on the counter are the syntactic types. Assuming the counter works 
properly, we could syntactically differentiate each of these numbers, assuming each coin 
is represented by a different number, and at the same time, since this system is also 
semantically differentiated, we could determine the value of all the coins inside ($0.00-
$5.00). 
 
Let us return to the concept of a system's speed, and the ability of both digital and 
analogue systems to respond in an automatic and real-time manner. John Searle's famous 
Chinese Room Argument is a useful analogy, although my application of it here will be 
different.23 The original argument goes (roughly) like this: Searle sits in a room by himself 
and receives Chinese symbols that someone else has passed to him from under the door. 
Searle, using a programme to string together a combination of Chinese symbols, sends 
out another card to convince the people outside the room that he understands the 
language. To better illustrate the digital computer, imagine now that, instead of Searle 
sitting in The Chinese Room, I take his place in what I will call The Apple Room. In front 
of me, I have a 10x10 square grid with boxes numbered 1 to 100, as shown in the figure 
below.   
 
                                                          
20 For more see Ibid., throughout Chapter 4. 
21 Ibid, p. 133. 
22 Ibid., p. 158-59. 




Figure 1: 10x10 grid. 
 
With this grid in place in front of me, imagine, from under the door, I receive binary digit 
(bit) cards, where 0=black and 1=white. The grid has n=100 squares so when I receive 
the nth card, I place it in the nth slot. When all the cards have been placed in the grid, 
according to the above algorithm, I will have created a binary black and white image that 
looks something like this: 
 
 
Figure 2: Binary Apple Image.24 
 
Notice here how important the algorithm (ruleset) is for the image to be realised, yet the 
algorithm is not a salient feature of the image itself. This rather simplified notion of the 
algorithm and work will be fleshed out in the chapters to come, but suffice it to say, on a ǡǮǯprocess. If we were 
to stop here, this would be enough to claim that, if Apple Image were art, then it would 
also be an example of computer art. Like Searle's production of Chinese characters, I could 
translate the bits and operate them in a similar way as a computer system would. Both 
analogue and digital systems can get the same job done and, if I were quick enough at 
                                                          
24 Thank you to Julian Moser for helping me with this image. 
43 
 
placing the cards in their appropriate slots, then the image could be rendered in a 
relatively speedy process. In fact, if a viewer were on the other side of the door, they 
would not experience a long delay in receiving the completed image. That so, suppose 
that I were fast enough to pick up a card and place it in the correct spot within half of a 
second. A grid with 100 squares would then be finished in 50 seconds, meaning, although 
this would be a somewhat speedy response, it is so only in relative terms. 
 
This point about relative speediness can be further illustrated in the representation of a 
single digital photograph. A single digital image consists of thousands of pixels. For 
example, an image with HD resolution 1920x1080 contains 2,073,600 pixels, or 
6,220,800 distinct RGB values.  To apply this to my Apple Room System, a simple digital 
message can be simulated by a human, but it would be impossible to represent the sets 
of numbers required by one digital photograph at the same speed (this is also due to the 
capacity limitation of non-digital systems, which will be described shortly). Suppose 
instead of 100 'pixels' I wanted to create a binary image with a standard photo resolution 
of 1024x768. This prescription would require a total of 788,736 pixels (cards) that I 
would be required to place in their proper spot. Assuming it still takes me half of a second 
to place each pixel, it would take me 394,368 seconds to create the entire image, or 
approximately 4.56 days of non-stop image building. The capability of a digital system, 
however, could render a digital image instantaneously.  
 
Since a digital photograph is not in and of itself interactive, recall Wooden Mirror and 
Wooden Mirror Unplugged, which I introduced in the previous chapter. The human knob 
turner in WMU is theoretically analogous to the digital system of WM but because one is 
mechanical and the other is digital, our experience of each would differ. In other words, Ǯǯis not synonymous. Lopes articulates this point 
that, although WM and WMU are examples of computer art, only the former has the speed 
to be impressive.25 ǯ
of  ǯ speed potential. As such, digital systems have the potential to out-
perform non-digital systems.26 Even with the simple Apple Image, in the time it would 
take me to lift a single bit card, the computer could have all the bits translated and the 
entire image rendered before I could process that bit. The above requires speed, but the 
kind of speediness required of works such as WM would not be possible without the ǯcapacity.  
 
Capacity refers to the hardware's memory and the ability of the digital software to deal 
with multitudes of elements at once. If, for example, the knobs collectively represented 
the memory capacity of WMU, then the knob turner would have to, in some way, record 
the placement of each knob, and for each person that stands in front of the mirror. If the 
same viewer returned to WMU the following day, the knob turner would have to reset 
each knob to their designated position in order for the instance to be realised. Contrast 
this to the capacity of a digital system that can record, recall, and instantiate many 
elements at once, or nearly instantaneously. This is what Paul refers to when she ǡǡǯ         Ǯ   
                                                          
25 Lopes (2010), p. 48. 
26 ǡǯǡǯry. This is related to issues 
discussed in Chapter 1.   
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Ǥǯ27 If, for Apple Image, I memorised whether each bit square was a 1 or a 0 then 
this would be, in a basic sense, a kind of memory system for that image. However, even if 
I were lucky enough to have a photographic memory, my brain's capacity would be 
incredibly limited compared to a digital system. Most digitally interactive artworks 
require a strong memory capacity because, in order to be responsive in an impressive 
way, the computational process would need to perform many functions at once. Without 
this, digital works would (arguably) not allow for a distinctive method of representation.  
 ǯǤ
both Mirror examples have tilt ranges of 0-10 degrees. The knob turner in WMU can 
attempt to get each tile in its exact position, but in order to render the individual in front 
of the mirror, the knob turner requires an ability to position each tile to exact and 
accurate degrees if the individual in front of WM is to be adequately recognised (even 
loosely). Knob turner can get as close as possible to tilting a given tile to, let us say, 1.0123 
degrees, most likely achieving a degree of accuracy, but with a significant margin of error 
to around 1.00 or 1.25 degrees. A digital system, on the other hand, could accurately hit 
exactly 1.0123 degrees, while precisely (and simultaneously) hitting the other tile targets 
of the image.  
 
Although the degree of difference in precision may seem insignificant for this analogy, 
each degree to the ten thousandths place could be the difference of the tiles functioning 
like a mirror or not (making the work display either successful or unsuccessful in its 
objective). Like the single digital photograph mentioned above, if such a thing as Wooden 
Mirror High Definition existed, then you could imagine the number of pixels each tile 
would have to represent. Although it is theoretically possible it is practically impossible 
for knob turner to render the 2,073,600 pixels; the degree of difference between WMU 
and WMHD in their speed, capacity, and precision is remarkable and makes all the 
difference for kind of experiential interactivity that is involved. 
 
This still leaves the transmissible characteristic of the digital medium unaddressed. 
Lopes stipulates that one of the fundamental differences between a traditional display 
and a digital display is the transmissibility of the latter kinds.28 This means that a digital 
work can be displayed, from the information stored in a file, on more than one device and 
it would still be appreciated as the artwork. This characteristic is the most distinctive to 
the digital medium and allows for many philosophical discussions on the ontology of 
digitally interactive artworks. The sections that follow will address some of these 
concepts. 
 
3.3 Transmissibility and Reproduction 
 
Traditional visual art exists as a particular display object that can be auctioned, owned, 
transported, exhibited, and so on; they are fixed to a single physical location at a given 
time. These objects can be reproduced into other concrete objects, such as a print of a 
painting or cast of a sculpture, but these copies are just as fixed to a physical location at 
time t as their originals. Digital media, on the other hand, are transmissible and, therefore, 
not fixed to any specific location. The data can be sent from one device to another, or 
                                                          
27 Lopes (2010), p. 43.  
28 Ibid., p. 96. 
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rendered on many networked devices at once. This will be important to flesh out, if the 
transmissible nature of digital media is distinct from other art kinds.  
 
To clarify, many instances of works can be transmissible if they are digitised, e.g., a radio ǯFifth Symphony, a performance 
of Hamlet might be digitally recorded, or a work of street art could be uploaded to social 
media. However, those digitised versions are copies of an instance, while the works I am 
concerned with are transmissible themselves (as a type).29 While instances of 
performance are not necessarily less appreciable than the type, the digitised versions of 
those instances do lose some information. That means the instanced properties of a 
copied photograph are thinner than the properties of the original. The same is not as 
problematic for digital works because their media allows for duplication with little to no 
information loss because the instances contain properties that relate to the work in a ǮǯǤǡǡǤ 
 
The above can be best illustrated with the information transfer process entailed in 
making a copy or duplication. Communication theory states that there is a feedback loop 
that consists of a sender, a message (with a medium) and a receiver. 30  This makes a 
helpful illustration that we can apply to the duplication processes of artworks. Like 
communication theory, when information is coded (e.g., in a binary format) a third-party 
is required to store and/or convert the coded information into an understandable signal. Ǯǯ the transmitter to receiver, which 
is an inevitable consequence of the communication process. This basic framework applies 
mainly to coded message information, of which, computer art could be considered a 
subset. The flow chart below helps to pinpoint the specific locations where, in traditional ǡǮǯǡǡ
its original. As I proceed, I hope this also highlights the difference between the Ǯǯan ontology and the individual realisations of instances for 
appreciation. This is true of any art form, but there are questions over what constitutes a 
digital work (especially when interactivity is included), and whether hardware matters 
or not. Therefore, it is worth emphasising.  
 
A flow chart adapted from communication theory could be simplified like this for the arts: 
 
 
Figure 3: Flow of artistic communication. 
 
The information of artistic communication flow is analogous to how a medium is applied 
in the production of a work. When we make a copy of a work, the process of copying 
                                                          
29 This use of the term type is merely a place holder to make a point. I will elaborate on what, exactly, I 
consider the work/type to be with these kinds of works. 
30 Simply stated, Claude Shannon proposed that communication occurs when a speaker (encoder) 
transmits information (codes) to a listener (decoder). Shannon (1949).   
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functions similarly to the flow of communication like that above. The following sections 
will look at these different media and their communication flow, or copyability. 
 




Within the traditional visual arts, a copy or print of a painting for example, will not have 
the same intrinsic purity as the work due to the introduction of noise, as illustrated in 
Figure 4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Traditional Distinguishable Reproductions 
 
Each copy remains distinguishable from its original because the information will undergo 
loss of information during the reproduction process. The display object we start with (the 
painting) is distinctive of the copies we end with. We can also imagine in some cases, such 
as with line block prints, that each copy is somewhat distinctive from the other copies. As 
the plates degrade over time, the information that it entails will be slightly different. In 
this respect, even copyable particular works are vulnerable to information loss. These 




If the object display is a physical manifestation of a digital source (e.g., paper print out 
from a JPG file) then, similar to the example above, the reproduction is also 





Figure 5: Digital-Distinguishable Reproduction. 
 
For its transmissible character, the digital storage of information makes it easy to 
reproduce again (e.g., make another printout), but the reproduction is still 
distinguishable from the original, and subsequent copies are distinguishable from the 
first copy. This is like the digitisation of works described earlier, or we can think of 
printed photographs of digital files. Provenance issues aside, one could argue whether or 
not the file is valued as the work instead of the display photograph that a curator hangs 
on the gallery wall. In most cases such as this, the concrete instance is treated as the object ǡǯȋǡ
tradition with a bumpy start). Although the file of a digital photograph may or may not 
retain some value in the eyes of the artist and public, there should be little disagreement 
that the information in the first photographic print is purer, or more closely related to the 
work, compared to any copies of the first photographic print that encounter more noise. 
In other words, the properties of the first print out bear more properties of the work than 
do other copies. Digital photographs are produced with digital media, but this has little 




If an artwork is independent of a particular display object, it is transmissible, meaning, it 
can be instantiated on multiple devices at the same time. Now, the reproduction situation 
is quite different from those in Figures 3 and 4. In contrast to the fixed locations of  ǡ        Ǯǯ
possibilities31 (or what Lopes refers to as transmissible possibilities). What this means is, 
                                                          
31 Crowther (2008), p. 134. 
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once created, digital information has the ability to exist in a stored state, independent of 
its perceivable, instantiated display.  
 
The ability to store information has consequences for the ability to distinguish between 
the original instantiation and subsequent instantiations. With digital works, the 
information is not reproduced but duplicated to perfection, presuming all display 
specifications are met.  
 
 
Figure 6: Digital-Indistinguishable Reproduction. 
 
An interesting example of the above display kinds is David Hockney's 2010 exhibition, 
Fresh Flowers. This show consists of impressionistic digital paintings, individually 
displayed on iPhones and iPads on the gallery walls. Although Hockney's works are non-
interactive, the digital medium emphasises their transmissibility, which could be emailed 
and changed remotely by Hockney at any time during the exhibit. The information 
instantiates on material devices but the iPhone and iPads are independent of the 
information, so Fresh Flowers can be duplicated with very different results than a 
Distinguishable Display (Figure 4)ǡ   ǯ The Night Watch. Unlike 
reproduction of more traditional works, the transmission of digital works will be (near)     Ǯǯǡ       Ǥ  Fresh 
Flowers shows us that digital media makes the ontology of digital works radically 
different, but it does not necessarily change the category in which we appreciate them. 
Although these paintings are digitally produced and displayed, they are, like traditional 
works, autographic paintings created in a manner that harkens back to works created 
since the modern era. The digital medium does make a difference in its ontology, 
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however. These paintings are not particular physical objects such as a painting where the 
display and work are identical.  
    
ǯ n between differentiated (digital) versus dense 
(analogue) systems presented at the beginning of this chapter, we need to remember that 
the different representational systems are individuated in different ways. Digital systems 
such as Fresh Flowers, are, according to, Goodman, differentiated semantically and ǡǯǤ
as a performance of a musical work must comply with the notations of a score, a digital 
image that is tokened must do the same. To name one notation, neither the 1s and 0s of a 
digital system must belong to any other mark or notation, lest the two classes collapse 
into one. Digital systems allow for the 1 and 0 values to be recognised and realised into a 
display in multiple locations (even when an analogue system is involved in certain works, 
the digitization process allows for the same realisation, similar to the analogue versus 




that a representational work should be finitely differentiated, opposed to the infinite 
numbers we find within an analogue system. The information contained in digital 
systems makes certain that a representation will be distinct from other representations 
that have different notations, and allows for multiple transmissions of the work.  
 
Each illustration of the copying process diagrammed above points to distinctive 
characteristics of the digital medium.  The copying processes for all works of art can be 
thought of as a form of communication between the original and its copy; digital media 
allow a distinctive kind of transcription in the reproduction process that will not 
encoun     Ǯǯ    Ǥ  ǡ
capacity, precision, and transmissibility of digital systems reveal to us that, although 
Apple Image is the representation of a digital-like process, it is not digital in nature 
because it does not consist of these characteristics. While the above is relatively ǡǯȋȌǡ
is something that still needs to be addressed more fully.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
Digital technologies have distinctive features that make the responsiveness of digitally 
interactive works possible. Although a digital process is possible without digital 
technology, the simulation bears on our experiences in a very different way. This makes        ǯ ǡ ǡǡǯ
the digital medium allow for a unique duplication process.  As one final note, since writing ǡ
ǯ-analogue distinction have been developed 
further, including significant publications by Katherine Thomson-Jones (2015), Jason 
D'Cruz, (2014), and P. D. Magnus (2014). Since I could not address, in any detail, many of 
their discussions on digital works here, I will do so in the following chapter. 
50 
 
Chapter 4: Ontological Bastards: The Problem of Digitally Interactive Works for 
Theories of Art  
 
In a Goodmanian sense, works of art are thought to be either single, non-repeatable 
works such as paintings, or multiple, repeatable works such as music. These works exist 
within one distinct mode or another, which Goodman calls autographic or allographic 
(respectively). These latter works are usually copayable works, which means we can ǯ
and its tokens.    
 
Following Goodman, philosophers have placed significant attention on the digital image 
as it relates to the distinctions above, but less attention has been placed, in this respect, 
on digital works that are interactive.  This chapter has two parts. In 4.1, I build from 
earlier chapters to discuss how digitally interactive works might have notational systems, 
but I propose that the notational systems function differently than the way notational 
systems function within other art categories. Ultimately, the algorithm is ontologically 
essential for digitally interactive works (and specifically for video game ontology), but 
algorithms make these works problem cases for Gooodman's autographic-allographic 
distinction. To defend this, I will discuss what digitally interactive works are, their 
notational components, and what counts as a copied work before it becomes a faked or 
forged instance.  
 
In 4.2, I turn to a discussion on the type of class that digitally interactive works belong to. 
I briefly look at David Davies view of singular and multiple instances, which he applies to 
an ontology of performance. While there are useful connections between works like 
music and computer art, an ontology of the former does not pinpoint the distinctiveness 
of interactive art. From here, I shift to conceptions of the type-token relationship 
presented by philosophers who discuss interactive art more directly. I conclude with the 
view that, like autographic-autographic distinction, digitally interactive works are 
difficult cases for the type-token distinction, especially when we start to consider things 
like video games.  
 
4.1 The Autographic-Allographic Distinction  
 
4.1.1 What a Digitally Interactive Work is 
 
In order to discuss a tension that I believe exists between digitally interactive works and 
Goodman's autographic-allographic distinction, note that I consider the essential feature 
of computer art to be the algorithm, which is implemented by the program. Importantly, 
the algorithm differs from the binary digits, or bits, that are associated with the code or 
file of a work. The compiled file contains all the information content, but the binary 
format merely allows for the programme to be run by the computer's hardware and 
instantiated into a display. The style of code is not necessarily arbitrary, because it 
determines which hardware a work can be played on, but it counts for very little when      Ǯ  ?Ǣ   ǡ  pertain to a 
successful execution of a work, rather than the work. This characterisation of the 
algorithm and code is cursory, because I will address them in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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Before considering the implications of the above for a Goodmanian view of art, I will first 
review Goodman's autographic-allographic distinction.  
   
4.1.2. Goodman's View 
 
Works are autographic in a Goodmanian sense,  
if and only if the distinction between original and forgery of it is 
significant; or better, if and only if even the most exact duplication of it 
does not thereby count as genuine. If a work of art is autographic, we 
may also call that art autographic.1 
Works are commǮeven the most exact duplicate of it does 
not thereby count as ǯ.2 Autographic works are ones where the object, at time t, 
usually occupies a single place. Paradigmatic art kinds such as paintings, hand-carved 
sculptures, various printmaking forms, and the like, are normally viewed as concrete 
autographic works. Usually, copying these works would result in an inauthentic version 
of the original because particular objects cannot be copied without some loss of 
information (i.e. the properties of the work are altered to a degree that would affect 
appreciation). I s Ǯǯ         
original, but there are exceptions. Printmaking is one such example, which means the 
autographic distinction is not exclusive to non-copyable works. For example, Aubrey ǯ  ck prints from 19th century generated more than one print. Each 
print, if sanctioned by Beardsley, is genuine. Here, it is not my intention to begin a 
discussion on artist intention, I only wish to make the general point that provenance 
matters. Many autogȋǯ
only created once), and so they tend to be single-stage works, but even Goodman points 
out that for some works such as printmaking, there is a two-stage process involved (i.e., ǯ plate and the print).3 For both cases of autographic works, Goodman states 
that the causal history of such works is directly relevant to our appreciation.  
 
Copyable works can also exist as an alǡ Ǯust insofar as it is amenable to ǤǤǤǯ;4 if it is notational, or has a score, then it is potentially repeatable and, 
therefore, allographic. While a work's notational identity is not a sufficient condition for 
it to be allographic, it is a necessary condition. Typical kinds of allographic artworks tend 
to be works of literature, theatre, music, and dance. Additionally, these works are 
generally viewed as two-stage art forms because the work can be achieved in two 
different stages. For example, Beethoven composes the Fifth Symphony at one stage, and 
any performer can generate the same piece at another stage. In these cases, the causal 
histories of the tokens do not factor into our appreciation of the instances as being 
genuine. Unlike paintings, we can appreciate any performance of the Fifth Symphony as 
genuine, regardless of how far removed the performance is from the nineteenth century.5 
                                                          
1 Goodman (1976) p. 113. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p. 114. 
4 Ibid, p. 121.  
5 This does not mean that a one performance could not be appreciated over another. Also, Levinson has 
argued that Goodman places too much emphasis on provenance for autographic works, and that all 
works, not just the autographic ones, rely on their causal history for appreciation Levinson (1993); ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǯǤ 
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I will briefly add that, not all allographic works token another allographic one (for 
example, architectural designs are normally considered to be allographic, but there can 
only be one instance of the Eiffel Tower).  
 
The above suggests that works of art are typically (and readily) perceived within one 
Goodmanian mode of existence or another. A Goodmanian view of the digital image would 
suggest an allographic existence because, as Goodman claims, the digital medium Ǯǯǡǡ
notational.6 Philosophers such as Zeimbekis, Magnus, D'Cruz, and Thomson-Jones have 
spent significant time discussing the notational aspects and the discernibility of either the 
binary digits (or bits) or the RGB value of the pixels within a digital image.7 It is important 
to note that these are, by and large, considered to be the notational components of the 
digital image because these components operate in a similar way as the musical notes of 
a score or letters of the alphabet. For these reasons, digitally displayed works might be Ǥǯ
images can fit in either one or the other, depending on the kind (e.g., photographs might 
be allographic, but a digital painting/picture might be autographic).8 
 
That might be the case for digital images, but what does this mean for a digitally 
interactive work like computer art? As I see it, there is a critical difference to address 
between the notational components of digital images like a photograph and digitally 
interactive works like Looking at a Horse. That is to say, the particular features that make 
a digital image potentially notational do not necessarily factor in the same way for 
digitally interactive works with algorithms. Although Magnus and D'Cruz view the RGB 
values or the bits as the notational components of a digital image, these components 
implement the algorithm within digitally interactive works. The algorithm is connected 
to its provenance. 9  
 
To further this point, let's first consider music, an art form that is generally viewed as 
allographic. In a work such as Beethoven's Fifth Symphony the indicated structure, or the 
work, is comprised of musical notes. If a musician were to perform the Fifth Symphony, 
she would do so by playing the notes and instructional notations as indicated by the 
composer. In this case, the notational aspect of the notes allows for the performance to 
become an instance of the work. With digitally interactive works we could consider the 
ruleset, or the algorithm, to be notational. We must consider the differences between 
copying works like music versus copying computer art. When we transcribe music, we 
copy representations of the notes. Although we have not discussed video games yet, 
consider, for example, what happens when we copy a video game like Mass Effect. If a 
player were to copy a file of Mass Effect from computer A to computer B, we may be 
tempted to view the work as allographic because it is copyable. However, with the copy 
of the video game file, the implementation of the algorithm (i.e., the bits, etc.) is 
transcribed, but the algorithm itself is not. This means that the file on computer A (not to 
mention B) already exists as an instance of the work and, in a way, the bits function 
similarly to the properties of a musical performance, rather than the structure of the 
                                                          
6 Goodman (1976). 
7 Zeimbekis, John. (2012); D'cruz, Jason, and P. D. Magnus. (2014); Thomson-Jones, Katherine, (Spring 
2015 Edition).  
8 For more, see D'cruz, Jason, and P. D. Magnus (2014). 
9 See D'cruz, Jason, and P. D. Magnus (2014). 
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work; the bits, like the performance, are not the works but the representations belonging 
to the instances. To discuss the file of Mass Effect for an ontology of video games has, at 
least to my thinking, more to do with an ontology of copies, or the instances, rather than ǮǯǤOf course, this assumes a strict reading of Goodman. 
 
Because the algorithm is not transcribed when a file is copied, digitally interactive works 
are seemingly not like other allographic works that consist of notational components. 
Prior to a programme, the algorithm is notational in the sense that it can be copied over 
and over; the copy would be identical to the original and, thus, still be associated with its 
provenance.10 The copyability and transmissibility might motivate us to characterise 
these works as allographic. Furthermore, because works with variable displays are 
repeatable, digitally interactive works seem distinctive in comparison to singular, 
autobiographic works. While it is not my intention to say the distinctive nature of the 
digital medium absolutely prohibits digitally interactive works from belonging within an 
autographic or allographic existence, it is my aim to suggest that these are odd candidates 
for such classification rules.   
 
If this is not convincing, then perhaps a discussion of how these works are faked or forged 
will be more convincing that digitally interactive works, when it comes to this distinction, 
are ontological misfits.  
 
4.1.3. Faking a Digital Work 
 
According to Levinson, there are two kinds of forgeries to consider: referential and 
inventive.11 
 
Referential forgery is defined as follows,     ȋ Ȍ Ǯ
existing work'.12 ǡǡǯThe Little Street, in size, colour, style, etc., then 
the artist is attempting to pass off the forged piece as the original artwork. Mark Landis 
has notoriety for forging well known works in this manner, tricking reputable museums 
into believing they are the originals. This kind of fake refers to works that already exist ǯǡǡǤ 
 
In contrast, an inventive forgery is defined in this way, 
x is falsely presented as being a (or instance of a) work of art `that does 
not exist'.13  
The above characterises forgeries whereby the artist paints or creates a work using a       ǯ ǡ     
particular work that already exists. Han van Meegeren's fake Vermeer paintings are 
                                                          
10 Though the algorithm is copyable, there is little reason for anyone to copy it once it is ready for 
programming. Furthermore, the algorithm, as discussed in another chapter, is often created with code. 
11 Levinson (1990).  




infamous examples of this sort of invention, which convinced many that artists such as 
Vermeer had a larger collection of works than previously believed. The differences 
between the two forgeries can be characterised like this: referential forgeries attempt to 
replace a specific work in a collection, and inventive forgeries aim to add works to an 
existing collection by faking the artist's style.   
 
For a discussion of digitally interactive works, both the referential and the inventive kinds 
of forgery are relevant. Pretend an artist-developer wanted to forge Super Mario Bros, to 
the best of her ability, by writing her own programme, and to upload it to the internet. No 
matter how perceptually alike a user might take the referential fake to be, the algorithm 
would be different than the original, and therefore would be a different work.14 In this 
case, the structure and provenance of the work are important in proving authenticity and 
so on some level, exists similarly to autographic works.  
 
Now, pretend that an artist-developer broke into the offices of Blizzard Entertainment15, 
a well-known video game production company, and stole an algorithm (in whatever 
format) in order to program his own instance of the game (i.e., a referential fake). With 
the scenario I present here, the work is now a stolen one, and the subsequent 
programmed instances are unauthorized and, therefore, inauthentic. Although the 
program might implement the algorithm, this would be an example of a plagiarised 
instance because Blizzard did not authorize it at stage two. The provenance and structure 
of the work might be genuine, but the instance would not be, much like the inauthentic 
copy of Beardsley's line block plate. One could claim that, if the original artist-developer 
made a back-up file of the algorithm, then this exemplifies an allographic work. I would 
agree that at this stage it is a copyable work, but it would be an odd example since it is 
not yet playable.  
 
One could also imagine a case where an artist-developer invents a fake to resemble a 
work that looks like it belongs to Blizzard, perhaps intending to pass the game off as a 
sequel or extension pack to World of Warcraft, for example.16 This work, if the artist 
claims it to be an official game by Blizzard and it is not intended by Blizzard, would also 
be a faked work.   
 
As already described earlier, where an artist-developer has access to an authorised file 
and then makes a copy of it, the copy is not necessarily inauthentic; what's at stake here 
is that the notational components involved during transcription of a playable game 
belong to the instance of the work, and not the work itself. Although this does not 
preclude works from being allographic they are markedly different than traditional 
allographic works (such as music) whose notations are actually transcribed. 
 
One worry with digital works is, there might be fakes that are so well done, there is no 
way to distinguish them from the originals. While this poses a potential problem for the 
artwork, it does not negate my claim that these works are at odds with Goodman's 
distinction, and it also highlights the distinctiveness of these works. I am strongly inclined 
to say that interactive works do not necessarily share the same ontologies as 
performance works, and so the ontologies differ in some way. These characteristics make 
                                                          
14 There are many examples of these kind of referential fakes online. 
15 http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/.  
16 Entertainment, Blizzard. "World of Warcraft." United States, Blizzard Entertainment (2004). 
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digitally interactive works misfit cases for Goodman's autographic-allographic 
distinction. There is a possibility that we can save this distinction for digitally interactive 
works with this: digitally interactive works are of a two-step order: at their creation, they 
are autographic works, but the instances they bear are allographic. For this to be true, we 
would have to accept that the copyable notations belong to a slightly different order than 
the way they do with music and literature. Either way, one thing that I hope to have shown 
here is one, the algorithm is significant for the ontology of video games and, two, the 
copyable features that we normally transcribe have more to do with the instance-bearing    ǯ Ǥ  ǡ     
autographic and allographic categories. 
 
4.2. The Type-Token Distinction  
 
As seen in the Figures 4-6 from Chapter 3, and as stated in the autographic-allographic 
discussion above, many kinds of works are reproducible. This is especially true of 
abstract works such as music, which as we know can be repeatedly performed.  To discuss 
the difference between a work and the performances of the work, it is helpful to think in 
terms of the type-token distinction where an original work or event would be considered 
a type and each repeated instance of the work would be called tokens of the type.17  This 
is a useful distinction because, as Richard Wollheim states, works are not necessarily 
singular physical objects and sometimes works belong to a set of things, or types.18 I have 
already suggested, although briefly, that I take digitally interactive works to (primarily) 
consist of abstract things, which allows me to discuss these works in terms of their type-
token existence.   
 
To back up, Wollheim claims that some works of art are type-only works, which are 
usually physical objects of appreciation and usually not repeatable works. We appreciate 
tokenless works, such as the Mona Lisa, for the properties that the single object brings to 
bear; these are shaped by the expressions of a particular object rather than the properties 
of subsequent events or tokens. For example, a painting like Mona Lisa currently hangs in 
the Louvre, and we can appreciate it adequately only if we visit this specific location and 
view the painting where it hangs. Although technology has established the ability 
reproduce many copies of works like the Mona Lisa, we appreciate these works 
differently in virtue of their specific properties. The provenance between the original and 
the reproductions (or copies) is different and their genesis helps us distinguish between 
the authentic work and its less genuine versions.  
 
Other kinds of works are repeatable works and we appreciate them with a different 
discrimination than the above type-only works. Works such as the performances of plays 
or musical works are repeatable, and we appreciate the work in virtue of their tokens.  
Although the discussion that follows addresses how we might appreciate certain works 
in relation to their instances, this does not suggest the instances make something a work. 
David Davies makes this point with the following example,  
                                                          
17 I acknowledge that my generalization extends to things like occurrences, but this section will only 
address types and tokens.  
18Wollheim (1980), p. 4. Also, this is similar to Nicholas Wolsterstorff's concept that, in music, both the 
music and the performance of that piece is heard. See also Lopes (2010), p. 56.   
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Imagine if we were to discover a score by Sibelius for what was 
announced on attached papers to be his Eight Symphony, something 
written late in his life, which, as we learn from the papers, would have 
been performed had not an untimely demise prevented him from 
making his wishes known to anyone. We have surely discovered a 
hitherto unknown and unperformed performable work, a work that 
might have never been discovered.19 
Chapter 8 shows us that some metaphysicians disagree with the above, but I agree with 
Davies and others that works exist independently of their being instantiated. This is not 
to say that performance tokens are unimportant because, as the Davies quote above 
states, the experience of the work matters because that is how we can come to know and 
appreciate a work and, of course, there are sometimes specific properties of individual 
performances that are meritorious in their own right. If performance works can be 
appreciated without their being performed then this intuitively extends to interactive 
works.  
 
Before continuing with the type-token distinction, there is another way in which we can 
think about works and their instances. Once again, Davies has a conception of works and 
instances that he says can either be singular or multiple, where both are directly related 
to the provenance.20 For example, paintings are ontologically singular objects that we 
appreciate in a direct relationship to its genesis. Therefore, according to Davies, any 
multiple instance of a singular work can only be appreciated in its relationship to that 
original, but the properties they bear are not identical and are less genuine. Prints of a 
photograph are considered instances of the original photograph but the copies are not 
intrinsically the same as the original. Davies claims properties of works can be manifested Ǯǯȋ-instances), whereby, ȏȐǮ-ǯǮ-singulaǯ
artworks in terms of the number of P-instances that they admit Ȅ the 
number of manifestations that can stand in this specific relation to 
provenance.21 
While paintings and photographs are appreciated as P-singular instances, music, plays 
and other Wollheimian types can be appreciated as P-multiple instances because their 
multiple instances can be appreciated Ǯindependently of how it came to have [their Ȑǯ.22 So while a painting by Francis Bacon is P-singular because the ǡǯFifth Symphony is P-multiple because the 
instances are intrinsically similar whether by performer X, Y, or Z.  
 
Davies goes on to claim that works can also be experienced in certain ways for their, what ǡǮǯȋ-instances).  
What may be termed a `purely epistemic instance' (`E-instance') of a 
work X, then, is anything that can fully play this role in the appreciation 
                                                          
19 Davies, D. (2011), p. 25. 
20 Ibid. (2010).  
21 Ibid., p. 414. 
22 Ibid., p. 415. 
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of X in virtue of possessing those manifest properties required in any 
event or object that can provide the experiential engagement necessary 
for the proper appreciation of X.23 
Instances of works that can only be experienced from a single object or event are E-
singular, such as paintings, carved sculptures and photographs. Works that are 
repeatable instances are E-multiple works, such as music, plays and literature. Therefore, 
works like music and plays, which seem to have similar characteristics to digitally 
interactive works, are appreciated for their P-multiple and E-multiple properties. 
Although this does not imply that all instances are equally successful (since there can be 
failed attempts), it does allow for multiple, yet authentic, tokens of the type because the 
E-instances share the necessary properties of their P-instances.24  
 
We can think about works as they relate to the type-token distinction or the provential-
epistemic distinction. Performances are multiples because they are repeatable events and 
so we might think it plausible to extend these models to digitally interactive works. 
However, interactive works are not performances. Looking at a Horse, Wooden Mirror, 
and Video games (and other strongly interactive works) share similar characteristics 
with the above descriptions of performance works, but they do not seem to share the 
same ontological model as the kinds Davies and Levinson talk about. The ontology of 
digitally interactive works is not always as straightforward as it is with music because 
the former kinds can consist of display types that are distinctive from other art kinds. The 
following will survey various views on the type-token distinction as it relates to 
interactive works.    
 
In discussing the ontology of digital art, Paul Crowther claims that duplications of digital 
works are tokens of a type, the type being the original programming code and algorithms ǲȏȐǤǤǤǳǤ25 Crowther states that with 
autographic works, any conceivable type, ǯǡ
will gradually degrade over time, which will also become noticeable in any tokens (e.g., 
the prints), with the plate and the prints belonging to different ontological orders. He goes 
on to say that a digital image allows for tokens,  
 
...but in no other respect is [the type] distinct from them; neither is there 
any difference between the individual tokens (except externally - when 
the hardware that realizes them is in some way faulty, or there is a 
problem with the software program). We have a case of absolute type-
token identity.26  
          ǡ ǯ
discussion of digital works focuses more on digital images and not exclusively on 
interactive ones. David Saltz extends the type-token distinction to digitally interactive 
works (which was later to be categorised as computer art). To summarise his view, which 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 413. 




I will give greater attention to in Chapter 6, Saltz says that, although these interactive 
works are protean and transitory, similar to the traditional performance arts, there is a 
distinct ontological difference in the type-token distinction.27 Interactivity in the 
performable arts, he argues, requires the performer to perform the works of art (an actor 
performs the play, the musician performs music, all of which are the direct objects of 
appreciation), whereas with computer art the work may be an indirect object of the users 
actions.28 
The [performative] artists here do not define performance types, but 
create interactive performance environments. Plays, musical 
compositions and dances define a series of actions to be performed; 
interactive performance environments provide contexts within which 
actions are performed.29 
There is something importantly different with interactive art, Satlz goes on to say, 
because, 
the artist cedes control over the sequence of events that any given 
spectator will encounter, allowing the piece to vary with each 
interaction.30 
With this statement, he points to the importance of the interactivity itself, not just the 
outcomes that result from the interactivity, whereby the interactive technology involved Ǯcomǯ.31 He has this view because it is his 
belief that the interaction properties are derivative of the user, not the work. Additionally, ǯ
the traditional arts, he notes another difference that arises with the respective audiences. 
Interactive works are theoretically similar to works like music and plays but, Saltz claims, 
with a key distinction between interactive and performance works: the latter are 
performed for an audience, while the former are performed for themselves; users do not 
merely perform works but perform with the works.32 With interactive art, audiences are ǡǯ
that our notion of authorship cannot be as straight forward with computer art. As stated 
in chapter 6, this leads him to argue the type-token relationship breaks down for these 
works.33  
 
Pace Saltz, Lopes sees no reason why we cannot extend the type-token distinction for the 
category he defines as computer art. For Lopes, works of computer art are types and the    ǡ     Ǯ-ǯǤ34 These 
instances are dependent on the interactivity, which, in agreement with Saltz, makes 
                                                          
27 Satlz (1997), p. 117. 
28 Ibid., p. 123. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 117. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. 123. 
33 It should be appreciated that Saltz wrote about computer art before Lopes defined it, and when these 
technologies and works were in their early phases.  
34 Lopes (2001) p. 65.   
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computer art distinctive of performance works. To precurse the discussion from chapter 
6, Lopes says more specifically that,   
...strong interaction is not a case of the performance of a work. 
Performance is an intentionally directed action in ways that strong 
interaction is not.35 
Lopes does not view the role of users who generate the interaction-instances and the 
roles of performers audiences equally. To make this clearer, consider how Davies 
describes the framework of a performance by saying performers do not guide a musical 
score but instead, the performers are guided by the original composition.36 Interactive 
works have something in common with performance works, but, while users do not 
create the properties of the game, they have the unique ability to direct which properties 
are instanced. If we agree with Lopes, this shows that Saltz was correct in recognizing, 
early on, a difference between interactive works and performance works.  
 
Interactive works are distinctive because, for one, their types have variable displays and 
secondly, they token their types in a much different way than a performance, or any other 
work. If a work fits within the type-token distinction then, as Davies says, we can identify 
the instances as being correct (or not) in virtue of the properties they both bear. We ǮǯȋȌǡ
that some kinds of interactivity are more distinctive than this. With digitally interactive 
works, each instance will not always bear the same properties in the way a performance 
of music will (relatively speaking). However, pace Saltz, interactivity should not 
complicate our notion of authorship because, while these works have variable displays, 
and users can customize the outcomes, all potential outcomes are made possible by the 
algorithm. Importantly, a new work or feature of that work is not created when a user 
interacts with a variable work, those features are merely instanced.  
 
Before discussing the distinctive nature of some interactive works as just characterise 
above, let us consider works like Looking at a Horse introduced in Chapter 1. Users 
generate its display but the display will vary depending on the number of users (among 
other variables). The progression of this work will vary in a different way than Ǥ	ǡǯ
Fifth Symphony is more or less fixed (or constrained) in that the audience, assuming they 
are familiar with the piece, can anticipate how the performance will play out. On the other 
hand, the user has control to change the pattern or sequence of displays of the interactive 
artwork and, are not as certain about the potential outcomes.  
 
The interaction between the fixed and variable features of a work are comparable to jazz 
music and improvisations. Looking at a Horse, for example, is more closely related to the 
musical score of John Coltrane's Giant Steps   ǯ  given the 
variable improv. The jazz performance of Giant Steps will token a specific work of ǯǡalthough it consists of improvisations, an authentic performance is one 
that is in agreement with the work and the rules of improv.37 Similarly, some video games 
and digitally interactive gallery works also consist of variations, which are dependent on 
                                                          
35 Ibid., p. 80. 
36 Davies (2010), p. 413.  
37 Lopes (2010), p. 59. 
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 ǯ Ǥ   Giant Steps, Looking at a Horse, and Dear Esther have a 
chronological sequence that consist of variable displays, meaning there is a start, a finish 
and a variable progression of instances in-between that are characteristic of both 
examples.38  
 
Lopes analogises computer art with jazz works because like the latter, the former will not 
token the properties of the work in an identical way each time. This view characterises 
interactive works, and not only those by the computer, but it does not characterise all 
interactive works. Some video games, for example, do not have a fixed start and finish but 
instead have variable starts, finishes, and instances in-between. As will become clearer in 
Section 2, there are special kinds of interactive works with unique display variability that 
belong to a different ontological order than other strongly interactive works. In brief, 
there are some interactive works that are not just variable in the progression, but will 
also have variable starts and finishes. This is largely to do with narrative.  
 
Digitally interactive works are tricky cases for an ontology of art. Although digital works 
are not the only strongly interactive works, their unique medium allows for the 
potentiality of transmissible and repeatable works, and for works to consist of variable 
displays. Looking at a Horse, for example, will not always token the work in a similar way 
such as those  ǯ Fifth Symphony. This chapter highlights some of those 
complications, which will be addressed in greater detail in the Section that follows.  
 
Between the autographic-allographic and the type-token distinctions, there are plenty of 
challenges that arise for the works in question. It is not my intention to say these 
distinctions fall apart once digital media have been introduced to a work, as Goodman 
originally thought. It is my aim, rather, to show that computer art requires a different 
kind of ontology than other artworks. It is also important to point out that, Lopes defined 
computer art for works that are more characteristic of Looking at a Horse than for works 
like video games; it could be the case that these former kinds are more likely to fit within 
the above ontological distinctions more easily than the game kinds. In fact, while Lopes 
makes a case that video games should not necessarily be excluded from the category of 
computer art, he does not make any claim that games can be art. His point is merely that, 
if a video game is art, then it qualifies as computer art. In the chapters that follow, I will 












                                                          
38 Other works like the life-simulating sandbox game, The Sims, are more open-ended and do not 
necessarily have any end because they are meant to be continually developed over time. We can have a 
similar discussion regarding most video games where the displays do not just vary, but they might bear 
different sets of properties.  
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Chapter 5: Video Games, Art Games, and Players 
 
The preceding chapters broadly concern digitally interactive art in a general sense; this 
chapter begins a new section with a narrowed focus on video games.  I do not take it for 
granted that the reader will be familiar with video games, therefore, this introductory 
chapter will highlight some key features and philosophical accounts of them. Currently, 
there are several different views about what video games are and how we should engage 
with them as games, their art status notwithstanding. Game theorists often discuss video 
games in terms of the productive or creative activities, which pertain to their rules or art ȋǮǯȌǤ	ǡ
games can be viewed as complex mathematical structures that allow for a feedback loop 
between player and the programme, which generally turns to a discussion about the 
rulesets that games consist of. Other scholars take it for granted that video games consist 
of these input/output systems and prefer to discuss them as representational systems, 
whereby we experience imagery, narratives, or sounds that are shaped by specific 
contexts. The latter accounts appeal to artistic and aesthetic conversations, but it should 
be noted that a concept of video games as art is more strongly recognised in the ǡǮǯǤ 
 
In a similar vein, we can put aside the debate about games as objects to discuss the kind 
of engagement, free play or structured play, that is constituted by the rules and aesthetic 
features. Still, other scholars prefer to think about games as awarding certain 
achievements to their players and so the debate is diverted to cover the attitudes that are 
required in order to best appreciate a game. All of this is a lot of ground to cover and, 
unfortunately, I cannot do justice to all the above topics in this space. However, I will give 
a broad overview of video games and touch on the relevant arguments that are currently 
important to the philosophy of games. This should give an adequate survey on video 
games and gameplay for the chapters to follow.  
 
This chapter has three objectives. Firstly, I take a general stock of the predominant (and 
various) views within game theory regarding the important features of a game. This will 
at least provide an idea of where the literature stands today. Secondly, I survey works 
that are usually considered ǮǯǤhough this status relates to a folk notion 
of both art and video games, it has bearing on aesthetic discussions where the distinction 
between art and non-art video games is perhaps not so clear. Thirdly, I draw on some 
parallels between the participants of performance works and interactive works to 
highlight the differences between performers and players. Also in this section, I discuss 
four types of players, as presented by Bartle, and I offer a fifth type of player that I feel 
should be added to the current literature. An understanding of the above will clarify 
certain concepts that will benefit the reader in the proceeding chapters that focus more 
carefully on the aesthetics and ontology of video games.  
 
5.1 What (Video) Games Are 
First, it should be noted that theories of games and theories of gameplay, while different, 
will often converge, especially as it relates to appreciation. There are those philosophers 
who focus on the features that constitute a game (e.g., rules, narrative, obstacles) and 
others who focus more on how we should engage with games and what the correct 
attitude should be in order to constitute gameplay (e.g., constaints, free-play). Crossover 
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occurs because one usually bears on the other. For example, some would claim that ideal 
attitudes towards games involves a form of free-play such as using your imagination in a 
game of make-believe; others would disagree and claim we are not actually playing a 
game if there are no rules that we attend to (among other constraints); still, others would 
claim that we must engage with a game by trying our hardest to win, where others 
highlight sportspersonship instead. In what follows, because the proceeding 
philosophers discuss both the identity of games and the attitudes involved in gameplay, I 
will collapse the two separate concepts for a broad survey on the topic of games, and 
highlight differences when needed. 
 
T   ǯ   on games harkens to a few early 
philosophical authors who wrote about, what we would now consider to be, modern 
games and gameplay. Let us take a very brief look at three of these influential scholars 
before shifting our attention to more recent scholarship.  
 
The first is a work by ǮJohnǯ Huizinga entitled Homo Ludens (originally 1938), in 
which he characterises modern play (in the broadest sense) as it relates to everyday 
activities within society.1 He characterises the state of play as voluntarily entering the Ǯǯǡǡ
different set of roles, rules, and relationships than those from ordinary life.2 As his work 
was originally written in Dutch, English translators have struggled to make full sense of ǯȋǤǤǡǮǯ
than Ǯǯ Ǣ3 also, the term Ludens is derived from Latin, which references many 
more things than gameplay, hence an inclusion of religious practices). As it stands, 
Huizingaǯ focuses on the social aspects of gameplay.  
 
The second influential piece comes from French Sociologist, Roger Callois, who expounds ǯȋȌ that there are four forms of play: games that 
involve competition (chess), role-playing (D&D), chance (Bingo), and what he terms Ǯǯȋs or adrenaline inducing activities like riding a rollercoaster).4  It 
is my view that these different forms of play will bear on the kind of interactivity one 
engages in and, in turn, affect whether we can appreciate the work as a game or art. My 
characterisation of Callois is a bit simple, however. For example, dance combines several 
of the above characteristics because it involves vertigo (whirlwind), mimesis (role-play), 
and competition. Chess, on the other hand, is mostly a game of competition. I would argue 
there are video games that could, conceivably, entail all four forms of play. This 
combination of engagement makes video games tricky cases for a category of art and 
games.  
 
                                                          
1 Huizinga, Johan (1938). Original Dutch edition. 
2 In his view practices like religious rituals would also count.  
3 This is made clear within the forward of the first English translation: Huizinga, Johan (1955).  
4 Perhaps this latter category gives us a better way of explaining experimental games like Mountain, 
presented in chapter 1 of this dissertation. Given the psychological implications of this game (and 
philosophical ones as the game makers claim), it may have greater connection to hallucinogenic 




The third influential game theory text comes from Bernard Suits, who defines gameplay 
in the more normative sense. Instead of focusing on why we play games, he states that 
games essentially involve rules and obstacles. His definition will be covered in more 
detail in Chapter 7, but suffice it to say, he viewed gameplay as the voluntary taking up of 
tasks and overcoming of obstacles by less efficient means (any efficient means would 
make the task too easy and thus not a game).5 This makes gameplay more about the 
process of experiencing games, which are made possible by the gaǯǡ than about 
the outcomes of them. 
 
The above, to name just three, represent the differing conceptions of games that led to a 
broadening division of study between those we call narratologists and those we call 
ludologists. Narratologists, as we ǡǯǤ
They derive their view  ǯ Poetics, which, very roughly, addresses how 
stories should be constructed (with a much broader application today for theatre, films,  ǡ   ȌǤ     ǯ  
component, which, like other story-telling works, help us make sense of the world around 
us. Given their rules, prescriptions, and their representations, games are viewed as 
predominantly story-based things, which is especially true of many video games. 
However, some scholars worry narratology aligns games too closely with literature6 and 
film7 while ignoring the features and mechanics that are distinctive of gaming. For 
example, Espen Aarseth says Ǯ
ǡǡ
attempts from both these fields have already happened, and no doubt will happen again 
and again, until computer game studies emerge as a clearly self-sustained academic ǯǤ8  
 
The kind of sentiment put forward by those such as Aarseth prompts a different group of 
game theorists known as ludologists who focus on games as unique in and of themselves, 
which consist of rules and states of play. The study of ludology is largely influenced by 
Suits and his conception of games as a collection of obstacles and goals rather than 
representations. Contemporary game designer Chris Crawford defines video games in a 
way that characterises a ludological appreciation (whether or not he views himself as a 
ludoglogist). He conceptualises video games as ǲconflicts in which the players directly 
interact in such a way as t   ǯ ǳ.9 Another game designer, Greg 
Costikyan, says video games are ǲa form of art in which participants, termed players, 
make decisions in order to manage resources through game tokens in the pursuit of a 
goaǤǳ10 Both definitions bring goals to the forefront, which began a direct reaction against 
the narratological approach. An historical account of the rivalry between the 
narratologists and ludologists takes me too far afield, but the dividing line has lessened 
more recently with scholars who consider both aspects.  
 
Grant Tavinor is one such person who views some video games as works that consist of 
a rich narrative, but where narrative is only partly what we appreciate of the work.11 
                                                          
5 Suits (1978). 
6 Janet Murray is one such theorist. 
7 Lev Manovich is one such theorist.  
8 Aarseth (2001). 
9 Crawford (2003).  
10 Ibid., p. 8 (Both this and the above quote were found in Sicart, Miguel, (2011), p. 38. 
11 Tavinor (2008). 
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Although ludologists usually view a narratological approach to be a weak account of 
games, others who hybridize the concept of video games have noted that there are games 
that lack narrative altogether, such as Tetris, and yet we still consider those works to be 
more than a set of rules and attitudes. Steven Poole, for example, suggests we can 
conceive of games like Tetris as a kinetic narrative, but this concept worries those like 
Tavinor because it overly stretches the meaning of narrative in order to accommodate 
too many non-narrative games. 12 Instead, Tavinor synthesizes the two perspectives by 
emphasizing the imaginative component of video games, which is made possible by the 
interactivity and ruleset of games. Even with games like Tetris, it is possible that we view 
the shapes (or tetriminos) of colour as props for make-believe (this invokes Kendall ǯȌ, even if it is not prescribed by the work.  
 
To bridge the narrative and ludic divide Tavinor proposes this disjunctive definition of 
video games: 
X is a videogame iff it is an artefact in a digital visual medium, is intended 
primarily as an object of entertainment, and is intended to provide such 
entertainment through the employment of one or both of the following 
modes of engagement: rule-bound gameplay or interactive fiction.13 
Tavinor admits there will be varying degrees of fictive elements in video games, but this 
notion of interactive fiction is a more inclusive concept than narratology or ludology is 
on their own. In a similar vein as Tavinor, Jesper Juul hybridizes the two views because 
he views video games as capable of consisting of both the rules, the narrative, and the 
fictional components. Even the games that consist of minimal fictive elements allow us to 
imaginatively enter the gameworld, even if the rules of the game do not match the 
fictional world.14 Both Tavinor and Juul admit that there may be ludonarrative 
dissonance between what actions are possible within the ruleset and what seems 
possible with the fiction. More on dissonance in Chapter 6. 
 
More recently, game theory as a disciplinary study has grown to further include 
conceptions of video games as designed artefacts, moral objects (or ethical systems), and 
artworks. The latter view returns us to Lopes who, like Tavinor, makes room for the 
inclusion of video games within an art category. Although Lopes hesitates to include all 
video games as art, his definition of computer art allows that video games can be aesthetic 
objects.15 He makes no claims on the game status of these works, only that they are 
potential art candidates. On this point, there is some disagreement. Even for those who 
acknowledge a possibility that video games can be art, there is a worry that it cannot also 
be a game. How might a video game not be a game? There are those who regard art and 
games as incompatible since each require different kinds of prescribed attitudes. Brock 
Rough is one such sceptic who says the criteria of games and art lack compatibility 
because games require an inefficient means toward a goal while aesthetic attention does 
not.16 This is not a psychological incompatibility, or one about ontology, but a logical 
incompatibility between attitudes. Rough makes this conclusion because, when it comes 
                                                          
12 Poole (2013), p. 108. 
13 Tavinor, (2008). 
14 Juul (2004). Here, gameworld refers to the Waltonian fictional world.  
15 Ǥǯ
with what constitutes a work of computer art.  
16 He is agnostic as to whether video games are games and whether they can be art.  
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to gameplay,     ǮǯǤ   thorough discussion of this ǯǡǡ
prescribes an appreciation attitude, but this prescription ǯ
claim for gameplay. I will elaborate on this in the following chapter. For the time being, 
this should make it clear that not all video games can be classified as art, but also, if it is 
art, not all philosophers would classify it as a game.  
 
Another explanation on the game-art compatibility issue is that we have simply 
miscategorised some works (as either a game or not a game, such as Mountain or 
Florence17) or, perhaps we should give an account that stipulates it is merely standard to 
the category that video games are games.   
 
All this to say, the select theories above provide a broad survey of how we might view 
games and gameplay. Many games consist of narratives, but as others have pointed out, 
their stories are not the only thing we laud about them. So too, many players will often 
remark on a gaǯǡ
degree of interactivity a game has (this is usually the case when a game is not interactive ǯ Mountain). Ludologists seem 
right in that games should be appreciated on their own and they should be distinguished 
from other works like literature, but video games more specifically are more than their 
sets of rules.  
I should also point out a difference between mere games and video games as it pertains 
to rule following and has to do with the requisite knowledge each requires of players. 
Steven Johnson says:  
Many of the rules - the identity of your ultimate goal - become apparent 
only through exploring the world. You literally learn by playing. This is 
one reason video games can be frustrating to the non-initiated. You sit 
down at the computer and say, 'What am I supposed to do?' The regular 
gamers in the room have to explain: ' You're supposed to figure out what 
you're supposed to do.'18 
Chess requires knowledge of the full set of rules in order to play it properly. However, 
video games offer minimal rules to their players up front and any instruction that a player 
is aware of ahead of time usually pertains to manoeuvring mechanics involved in playing 
the game and a summary of the overall theme; details on how to achieve the goals or 
outcomes would render the game boring. In order to understand the video game, you 
must play and explore it. So, while rules are essential for all gameplay, the ruleset is not 
always at the forefront when playing a video game.  
 
Each of these components are relevant to game theory and, for my part, I view video 
games as works that permit either a narratological, or ludological appreciation, or a 
hybrid of both. I should make it clear, however, that my view of video games is not 
necessarily in disagreement with Rough, but my view is perhaps less sharp in the 
boundary between art appreciation and gameplay. In other words, I differ from Rough 
                                                          
17 Florence (2018) Annapurna Interactive. 
18 Johnson (2005), p. 42. 
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because I see no reason a work cannot be two kinds of things if it has prescriptions for 
gameplay and art appreciation; I agree with him that those prescriptions might require 
two different attitudes that are not possible at exactly the same time.  
 
Perhaps for the hybrid works discussed above, it is in the fluctuation of the two attitudes 
that real appreciation occurs. Indeed, it seems that some traditional works of art 
prescribe attention to at least two sets of properties Ȃ properties that belong tǮǯǮǯǤǡǮǯ
belong to its utilitarian features, such as those found with ǯǡFountain. In my 
view, it is crucial that we appreciate that this work as both a urinal and a conceptual 
sculpture. ǡǮǯbelong to its propagandistic 
or political features, ǯDeath of Marat. 19 Likewise, video games can have both 
art and game properties. This Wollheimian two-fold account seems logical for the 
properties involved with video games, but what about prescriptions? 
 
If one agrees with ǯaccount of play (that there are four different forms) and if 
something like dance prescribes at least two Ǯǯattitudes, then it might also be believed 
that a video game can be a game and an art. This, of course is an ontological claim, not one Ǥǯgameplay, then I agree that, to be a 
Suitsian about games, you cannot engage in both attitudes at once. But, importantly, what 
I want to suggest is that video games often prescribe many things and interactivity allows 
for the exchange of different attitudes that, perhaps, generate the interesting properties. 
For example, consider the video game The Walking Dead where the player-character can 
have many different encounters depending the options the player selects, but where each 
option leads to the player-ǯ Ǥ       and for ǡǯ
overall point, which is that death is inevitable. I would claim that appreciation in this 
scenario is one of art appreciation. Although this engagement is different than the 
gameplay prescriptions, both are prescribed (at whatever time) by the single work. If ǡǯǤ 
 
As I see it, the structure of video games can, therefore, be viewed as hybrid works and not 
necessarily appreciated as singularly ludic, narrative, or fictive. This makes formulating 
a non-disjunctive definition of video games a difficult, if not impossible task. However, I 
do not think video games need be for entertainment onlyǡǯǤ
I think it better to stipulate that video games, if they are games, will prescribe lusory 
attitudes, and may include a prescription for aesthetic attitudes as well.  
 
I will now shift my focus to address what it generally means to say video games are art 
works, or artistic at the very least.  
  
5.2 Game Art and Art Games 
 
Video games amalgamate numerous art forms, combining processes and styles from 
cinema, painting, music, and literature. This being the case, the topic of video games is a 
revolving door of study for philosophers of art, law, sport, games, and more. Although the 
                                                          
19 Hans Maes discusses a similar compatibility between art and pornography. See Maes, Hans (2011) and 
Maes, and Jerrold Levinson (2015). 
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history of video games is a relatively short one it already consists of changing definitions, 
gaming platforms (including different consoles and devices), associated media, and 
genres, not to mention the expanding target audiences of video games. The manner and 
locations in which the video games are consumed have also changed over the decades, 
from arcades, to local area network (LAN) parties, to virtual reality environments.  
 ǯauthorship 
and licencing. These histories vary from games created by single designers such as Toru 
Iwatani (e.g. Pac-Man) to team-produced video games (e.g., World of Warcraft). There are 
also distinctions between what we should call arcade games, computer games, mobile 
games, video games, or even videogames (no space), which typically have to do with how 
the signal is transmitted and rendered within specific kinds of devices.20 Here, I will adopt Ǯǯǡ
of games regardless of their technology and hardware.   
 
Interestingly, precursors to video games as we view them now emerged as a means for 
early computer scientists to demonstrate the remarkable capabilities of computational 
devices, not to mention the ingenuity of the programmers. In fact, some of the early games 
were so obtuse that they only appealed to the hard-core tech nerds who built them. Since 
then, they have become a primary form of entertainment, which are discussed in a 
number of ways. Video games are denigrated for their violent and debase content (usually 
by those who do not play them), praised for their instrumental value, and, more recently, 
are   Ǥǡǯ
status does not come without complications because, aside from the sceptical arguments 
brought forward by Rough and others, some games are created with artistic elements but 
without the intention of their being art, and others are purposefully created to be viewed 
as art. All the above presents a difficulty for philosophical discussions of video games, but 
also makes for an equally invigorating debate platform.  
 
I will take for granted that video games can be art, so rather than defending their art 
status here I will offer a brief clarification of the kinds of games people generally refer to 
when classifying video games and art. Although this will be a broad and general overview, 
it will distinguish the following games from exogenous game designs, or those games 
whose primary aim is to teach a skill (e.g., math, reading comprehension, memory, 
history, etc.). I believe this will be helpful in moving forward because up until now, I have 
been vague about any distinction between the two kinds of digitally interactive works 
referenced in this dissertation. In the previous chapters, I discuss works of one kind such 
as gallery works like Looking at a Horse and Rain Room and works of another kind like 
the video games Dear Esther, Mass Effect, Amnesia, or Undertale.   
When addressing video game art, authors will refer to them in the art sense if they are 
either (1) derived from or inspired by video games (game art) or (2) video games 
themselves that have been intended for artistic appreciation (art games).21 While specific 
distinctions remain to be made clearer between these categories the general differences 
relate to works that are either intended for the gallery (game art) versus works that are 
aimed for a wider and general commercial consumption (art games). This latter category 
                                                          
20 For more on these distinctions, see: Wolf, (2007) p. 4. 
21 Ibid., p. 14. 
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is the more complicated one to distinguish. In the former category, works might include 
traditional art kinds where iconographies from video games are appropriated for a 
painting, or a screenshot of a video game is used as a portrait, or for a sculpture, etc. Mario 
Ceolin, for example, appropriates recognizable icons and landscapes from specific video 
games and creates paintings and video installations that his audience may or may not 
recognise and identify.22 Although they generally are recognized for their video game 
references, they ǯǡ
environments at places such as at Art Basel and the Venice Biennale.23 In line with this 
sub-category, there is an emerging kind of exhibition that focuses on the curation of the 
actual video and arcade games, sometimes alongside video game nostalgia, which are also 
examples of game art.  
Although not the first to exhibit video games, well-established museums like Museum of 
Modern Art (MoMA), New York, made headlines when they announced their ongoing 
video games acquisitions for their permanent collection and for their exhibition entitled, 
From Pong to Minecraft. Curator Paola Antonelli based her collections on the idea that 
video games themselves can be art, and also with the approach that they are examples of 
design elegance.24 MoMA continues to add to their collection and has subsequently 
inspired similar exhibitions at other museums. While this has helped video games gain 
greater attention within the art world, it also re-establishes the idea that they should be 
artistically and aesthetically appreciated as curated objects, or things to view like a 
painting rather than things to play ȋǡ   ǯ  
collections, MoMA does allow visitors to play certain video games at certain times). I 
should also point out that MoMA does not keep these video games with the rest of their 
permanent art collection; these games are housed in their applied design spaces, which 
comprises objects such as furniture, a mine detonator, and vacuum cleaners.  
Although game art may include works like an arcade game in the gallery space, the sub-
category is normally associated with artistic elements of video games that are 
extrapolated from the game itself and used as its own singular display. For that reason, 
game art may share characteristics with art games, but unlike video games qua games, 
game art invites viewers to appreciate them as particular art objects. 
Alternatively, we can appreciate video games the way they were intended Ȃ by playing 
them. While the game art described above is not usually interactive or game-like 
(although they can be as we can see exemplified with the MoMA exhibitǯ
consoles), art games are interactive to varying degrees. The interactive nature of video 
games causes suspicion for some within art history and art criticism to view them as art. 
Instead, they stipulate that we cannot appreciate video games like we appreciate a 
                                                          
22 Ibid., p. 10. 
23 Vernissage TV. http://vernissage.tv/archive/artists/. Accessed June 2016.  
24 ǯe 40 games in the original console types as well as in their original 
source code. The growing list of acquired games reads, Legend of Zelda, Pong, Eve online, Drawf Fortress, 
and Portal. http://www.wired.com/2012/11/moma-videogames/, accessed December 2015. 
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painting due to the speediness of the interaction instances and our own cognitive speed. 
Some critics go further and doubt the immersive aspect of video games can afford 
appreciation like other interactive works (e.g., installations) because video games do not 
allow the necessary critical distance we need to experience them as art. Instead, video 
games distract, immerse us, or overwhelm our senses to such a high degree that we ǯǤ25  
Perhaps most widely known are the damning words of Roger Ebert, who simply yet 
provocatively declared that ǮǯǤ26  Much of this has to do, I feel, 
with his folk definition of art, which Ebert adopts in making this statement. His simple 
reasoning for such a claim is that ǯ (or 
artworks) can. I will elaborate on this idea a bit more in the following sections of this 
chapter and in the conclusion of this dissertation. Crying is not necessarily the objective 
of games, and yet, games can make you feel things. For the moment, I will state that it is 
my view that some video games can definitely be appreciated for their aesthetic 
properties and, perhaps, as an art. It is art games, rather than game art, that will be the 
focus in the remaining discussions that follow.  
5.3 Art Games 
There are many different genres of play within the category of video games and players 
will often gravitate toward certain ones rather than all of them (e.g., I enjoy puzzle video 
games but massively multiplayer online (MMO) games stress me out). Typically, there are 
four genres of play, which include: target, adventure, action, and tactics games. Simply 
put, target games are those that prescribe efficiency and precision in its players such as 
pinball, Super Mario, Space Invaders, etc. Adventure games include more fast paced and 
detailed contexts, usually with the inclusion of storytelling. Some of these are highly text 
based (e.g. Might and Magic) and others can be highly graphical (e.g., Sword and Sorcery). 
Action games combine other genres but require timing, speed, and skill from their 
players. While these are often fighting games, this genre includes puzzle and chapter-
based games that require completion before advancing to the next level. A game like 
Street Fighter would be considered an action game. Tactics is the fourth genre that 
consists in strategic planning and logic, such as Bos Wars. These games can range from 
fantasy-like games to historical ones, but, like chess they require strategical actions 
against a direct opponent (even if it is the computer), rather than independent and 
isolated puzzles.27   
The above games might be platformer games like Super Mario, Hollow Knight, or Trine, 
where the player can move their character in linear directions only. There are also 
                                                          
25 Following those such as: Theodore Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and more recently Oliver Grau (2003). 
26 Ebert originally stated the quote above on air, but here is a more interesting and in depth rational for 
his previous statement: http://www.rogerebert.com/rogers-journal/video-games-can-never-be-art.  
Accessed January 2016.  
27 For more on these genres, see Melissinos, Chris, and Patrick O'Rourke (2012).  
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sandbox games where the player has more freedom to explore the game world in what 
seems like three-dimensions. This means that players can deviate from certain paths in 
the gameworld to, for example, explore the forests, or various rooms at an inn, or speak 
with minor non-player characters, etc. There are also first-person shooters (fps) where 
you take the perspective of your character, while other games are played using an avatar, 
the player-character represented on the screen in front of you. These game styles and 
mechanics are different from each other and will often determine the kind of play or 
engagement of a player, but they do not determine the art status of video games. In fact, 
you will find both art and non-art games in the above genres. 
Within the category of video games, there are two sub-ǣǮǯ
and ǮǯǤThese sub-categories get us closer to distinguishing between non-
art and art games. Typically, entertainment-based video games have a longer tradition 
and they are not normally considered art because they are created with the intention that 
players will direct their attention entirely (or predominantly) on the lusory and 
competitive (or other game related) elements. In general terms, they are appreciated 
more widely as mere video games that are intended to entertain. This category would 
include everything from works like Angry Birds, Tetris, World of Warcraft, Diablo, and, 
arguably, Undertale. These games would not normally be considered art because they 
were not intended for an art category by their developers. That so, I will explain shortly 
that there is crossover and ambiguity regarding the non-art status of some of some video 
games.  
Alternatively, to the entertainment games, a work might fit into a category referred to as ǤǮǯ
not solely aim at entertainment (or pure gameplay) like the ones just listed, but instead 
have some other primary intent, e.g., educational, therapeutic, aesthetic, etc. Art games 
such as Apothen, Braid28, Trine, Limbo and Kathy Rain are considered serious video games  ǯ
features. The artistic features of serious games widely range in style and there are many 
ways in which developers include mechanis    ǯ   
visual style, the quality of the narrative or music, or sometimes notable aspects of the 
platform design. Unlike the perceptual features found within mere entertainment games, 
the features of art games will often borrow stylistic features from established art 
categories to reference a style or genre, and from art forms such as painting, film, and/or 
literature.  
For example, in contrast to entertainment games, a serious action role-playing game 
might be like Apothen. Your character is a young warrior, whom you must help fight the 
Greek gods who have been punishing humans. Although it has noteworthy gameplay 
features, it consists of aesthetically beautiful representations of Classical Greek-like 
                                                          
28 Game theorists, particularly Ludologists could argue that Braid is not a bona fide game for the reason 
that your character cannot die.  
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murals. Braid is a puzzle-        ǯ
girlfriend. At face value, the gaming mechanics make the game seem somewhat simple 
(you move your character backwards, forwards, and up and down), but it is more 
complex than this. For one, its artwork is notable and reminiscent of both Post 
Impressionism and Surrealism. For another, the interactivity helps to drive the story, 
which is told in a somewhat postmodern, non-linear manner. The literary format is 
noteworthy because it differs from the story-telling of most puzzle-platformers that are 
told more straightforwardly. Limbo is visually unique compared to many video games 
because it is created entirely with a black, white, and grey pallet, which conveys a strong 
film noir aesthetic as you navigate a little boy through various obstacles to find his sister. 
The dark tones add to the aesthetic of the gruesome imagery, and the character will often ǤǮ
and deatǯ Ǥ29 Games like Kathy Rain focus more on character development and 
narrative, and in that respect functions similarly to a mystery novel. This latter example 
also shows that an art status does not entirely rely on the complexity of the visual 
artwork; Kathy Rain is not painterly or cinematic but is instead a throwback to retro 
games with its pixelated and rudimentary appearance. This too becomes an artistic ǡǡ Ǯǯ
with aesthetic interest (hence another ambiguity between the sub-categories).30  
An emphasis on narrative as an artistic means is a relatively recent feature for art 
games.31  A narrative feature will be distinctive of the non-art narrative games because, 
while the narrative in non-art games work to propel the game features, the narrative in 
art games encourages the player to contemplate things like the cultural, social, moral, or 
purely aesthetic aspects.32  
Each of the above examples has artistic content that becomes significant if not primary to ǯǤ
art feature or features that should be recognised, the art does not necessarily preclude 
these games from being highly competitive or obstacle driven, in the same way that pure 
entertainment video games are goal oriented. This, of course, is debatable. Although it is 
assumed that art games are created with artistic intent, the art games genre has extended 
to non-art games that are later    ǡ ǤǤǡ Ǯǯ Ǥ 
modifications are made to an entertainment video game to produce or enhance the 
artistic and aesthetic elements of the game, the industry (or general public) will 
sometimes recognise this in retrospect.33  
                                                          
29 Hatfield (2010).  
30 Perhaps an interesting way to look at this trend is through the value of antique properties. For more on 
this, see: Curtis and Baines. (2016). 
31 I emphasis the word since we are aware from narratologists that even mere games not aiming to be art 
games consist of narrative.  
32 Devine, Theresa Claire, William Andrew Presnell, and Samuel Miller (2014).  
33 This would not necessarily include modded gaming or patches where the story or some other structure 
of the game is changed.  
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Following the above, it is clear that more needs to be done to further disambiguate this 
category because as the technology for consoles and PCs become more complex and 
sophisticated, so too will the graphic (and other) results of purely entertainment video 
games.34 Fallout 3 and Undertale are two popular and relatively recent video games that 
serve as borderline examples because they have artistic merit even though they were not 
necessarily intended for the art game genre. Fallout 3 is a FPS game, but in addition to the 
normal interactive and competitive features, the game offers players choices that create 
both moral and emotional contemplation, or what game theorist Carlos Díaz calls a Ǯǯ.35 Undertale is also a popular role-playing game that requires the 
player to make ethical choices, ones that have lasting effects and consequences 
throughout the game. This feature of entertainment games combined with the nostalgia 
that we now view older non-art games (like with Kathy Rain) has led to ambiguities when 
video games are labelled as art or non-art.  
Earlier I said that the focus of the chapters to follow is on art games opposed to game art. 
However, I do not care much about making sharp distinctions between entertainment 
games and serious games given that many in the former category have artistic elements. 
Whether these are just art assets of the game, or the game is art, is a question for another 
time. 
 
5.4 Stages of Video Game Development 
 
Within the philosophy of art, a player of a video game is often compared to a musician 
who performs a musical work. Aaron Smuts says, 
The video game player can plausibly be considered a performer in a 
larger video game performance.36  
That so, we should recognise that there is a divergence in how performative works like 
music and interactive works like video games exist and how they are experienced. An 
ontology of performance seems a close candidate for video games, but it remains 
unconvincing because it fails to draw out the distinctive features of interactive works, as 
will be shown in the following chapters. In this section, I discuss a few parallels between 
video games and musical works for the relevant subjects involved, i.e., composer, 
performer, and audience. This will begin a differentiation between performance works 
and interactive works, which will prepare us for a more in-depth analysis between the 
two in Chapter 6.  
 
                                                          
34 This is not to say that all art games will be aesthetically complex, beautiful, or the like in a visual sense, 
as mentioned with a popular resurgence of retro-like video games that are pixelated and visually simple. 
Still, there are pixilated video games that are visually complex and painterly, such as Kingdom. For more 
on disambiguation of art games and game art, see: McElroy, Justin.  Video Game Blogs. (2008); Chen, 
Jenova, (2008); Young, Nora & Misener, Dan. 
35 Díaz, Carlos Mauricio Castaño, and Worawach Tungtjitcharoen (2015).  
36 Smuts (2005). URL: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/c/ca/7523862.0003.006/--are-video-games-
art?rgn=main;view=fulltext. Accessed February 2017.  
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The development stage. While composers of music might collaborate on a work, the 
concept of authorship of a musical work is usually a straightforward one. Video games 
present a challenge when we try to identify a specific individual who is artistically 
responsible for the work, due to the many collaborative levels involved in video game 
production. Production houses, those such as Blizzard Entertainment, employ both 
individual and team-based developers, artists, composers, designers, programmers, and 
more. While most video games (there are exceptions) involve the collaboration of many, 
I will bracket a discussion of collaborative authorship here as it is a topic dealt with in 
detail in the philosophy of other art forms like film and comics. That so, identifying what 
occurs at the developmental stage of video games is helpful to highlight where the 
property bearing features of the work originate, which will be necessary for the following 
ontology chapters.  
 
We can pinpoint the genesis of a musical work (broadly speaking) when a composer ǡǯǤ
structure is complete a musician will be able to interpret the work from the notations 
because, according to Levinson, the indicated structure of a musical work ǲencompasses 
all of what the work signifiesǳ.37 In some ways, when a complete algorithm is created, the 
algorithmic structure contains a parallel degree of information similar to the indicated 
structure. Instead of a pattern of notes, key and time signatures, dynamics and other such 
instructions that become relevant to the score, an algorithm for a video game will 
typically include the features relevant for the background textures and colours, the 
characters, narrative, tones, and other important elements of the game and gameplay. 
However, there is a significant difference between music and video games, which bears 
upon an ontology of video games, because as already mentioned, the complete structure 
of a video game, or algorithm, once it is created, is not in an interactive state. As such, a 
player cannot play a game with only the algorithm, whereas a musician could perform a 
musical work from the composed indicated structure.  
 
The algorithm contains the essential content information, which often requires the 
collaboration of many. In addition to platform designers, musicians, artists and the like, 
programmers will often participate in the development stage as well. So, while an 
algorithm consists of the relevant properties of the game with or without the code, this 
by no means suggests programmers are not involved at this stage or responsible for 
important features. For example, a programmer might discover, after or during 
development, that a certain action or movement is not possible in the way the algorithm 
prescribes and so they might offer feedback on the specific physics of the design. In other 
cases, a programmer may create something new and unexpected for the developers that 
later becomes a welcomed feature of the work. This is similar to authors who make edits 
to their own works after reviewers provide feedback and suggestions. Here, I am not 
interested in a chronology to pinpoint exactly when the game is considered a complete 
game, but rather to point out that the developmental stage is crucial for the algorithm,    ǯ structure. Once the algorithm is considered complete, it is 
ready for the next sage. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on what form the algorithm 
takes before it is programmed, how it exists, etc. 
 
                                                          
37 Levinson, Jerrold, (2013). 
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The programming stage. The performer of a musical work instantiates a piece by playing 
the correct pattern of notes along with any other components that belong to the structure 
that has been indicated by the composer. Differently than music, the algorithm requires 
an additional step before it is ready for gameplay, namely the programming language. 
Pace Smuts, under my view of video game works the player is not analogous to the 
performer as one might think, rather, the programmer is.38 As stated, this conception of 
programmer-as-performer is in opposition to Smuts, who says, ǥ
works. The video game player can plausibly be considered a performer 
in a larger video game performance. Since the primary goal of most 
game design is to enhance such aesthetic experiences, it would seem 
that we have good reason to evaluate games as art works. Unfortunately, 
the philosophy of art and aestheticians appear oblivious to the aesthetic 
experience of performers of art works. However, we must ask, does not 
even the amateur musician have aesthetic or artistic experiences?39  
To be fair, Smuts makes the above claim to argue a case that video games are art, and not 
necessarily to parse the specific roles. Without a doubt, there are strong similarities 
between music and video games, or performers and players. However, works in the 
former category are performative, while works in the latter are interactive, and they each 
invite us to do different things. Within an ontology of performance, Smuts is correct in 
characterising the player like a performer, but given the significant differences between 
performance and interactivity, it seems a stretch to force such a parallel when players do 
not fully attend to video games in the same way musicians attend to a musical score. A 
significant difference between the performer and programmer lies in reference to the 
impact each respective person has on the work at different times. While performers have 
an external relationship to the work (i.e., typically, a performer performs a piece after it 
is already a work), programmers are internal to the creation of a work, much like a film 
producer or director. Although there is not an exact parallel between performer and 
programmer, not to mention a performance ontology ignores the distinctiveness of video 
games, what I hope to show is a correlation between the music performer and the video 
game programmer is more closely related than the performer and the player, as it is 
typically understood.  
 
 However, it may be the case that the algorithm and code are normally viewed 
dependently when considering the appreciation of a video game, but the processes and 
attitudes undertaken for development (algorithm) versus production (programme) are 
two different things. An art game developer will, collaboratively or independently, work 
on creating a concept, style, audio assets, narrative, and everything else belonging to the    ǯ    Ǥ      
create a work within the genre of art game, the developer will potentially use each of 
these features as a means toward some artistic end. There is no question that developers, 
whose role we discussed in the above section, might enlist programmers (and designers, 
audio engineers, etc.) in the process of creating all the relevant features of the work. In 
fact, the algorithm in and of itself is an abstract thing in that it may be created 
simultaneously as it is programmed. That so, the code is distinctive of the algorithm, the 
                                                          
38 ǯǤ 
39 Smuts (2005). 
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ǯǤǡre not merely 
technicians because, like performers, they interpret the work into a compliant and  Ǥ 
  ǯ  ǡ      
development I wish to highlight, rather than specific individuals. 
 
The differences between the stages of development and programming may not be overtly 
clear, but perhaps it is easier to emphasise them when we consider independent game 
makers rather than the developers from big production houses.  For independent game 
makers, the programming process might be devastatingly expensive and incredibly time 
consuming because, coders come with a high cost and so will sponsorship. As a result, 
algorithms often remain in an un-coded state for considerable lengths of time and some 
never go into production at all (an interesting question then arises, are these existing 
works or incomplete works?). Developers who do not have the resources and means to 
contract programmers do have an option to cut costs and time by purchasing existing 
code and source code software to implement the game themselves, but this will have     ǯ  Ǥ40 In the same way that 
Photoshop produces similar or standard looking effects for different photographic 
images, the stock code in a software format makes the code inaccessible and, therefore, 
tends to produce games that restrict certain creative choices, e.g., lighting effects, 
background textures, etc.  
 
Indie game developer Julian Oliver bemoans the struggles that developers such as himself ǡǮǯǡǥǯ41 Oliver 
is one such art game developer who often has to choose between a few million dollars 
budget and a significantly larger team to outsource his algorithm for programming, or 
instead, give up partial ownership of his project to the sponsors using the stock source 
code. Oliver explains in his interview that he is usually left with the latter choice as the 
only viable option. The intuition that follows from this is that programming is essential 
for a video game to be in a playable state and enter the marketplace, but the algorithm is 
the significant asset and does the heavy lifting as far as the creative framework goes. 
Importantly, the programming turns that creation into a particular instance and allows 
for gameplay. That so, we can also look at the elegance of a certain code, much like a 
beautiful mathematical equation or philosophical idea. The programming language is 
what makes the implementation of the algorithm possible and so the attitude of the 
programmer is concentrated with a similar attitude of a musician who reads and 
interprets the musical notes on a page. 
 
This leaves one remaining stage (broadly speaking) in the video game process.  
 
The playable stage. Music does not require an audience but it is typically performed for 
one. Video games do not require an audience as such, although we can equate the player 
and the audience as one and the same. Works like video games emphasise the role of the 
player because he or she is responsible for the displays of the work via interactivity. 
Gameplay has similarities with the experience of listening to a musical performance 
because each play through of a video game avails us to variations and different 
                                                          




experiences. However, we should not regard performance works and interactive works 
as parallel examples. While the audience of a musical work will attend to certain features 
in order to enjoy the work, a player will attend to those features in order to achieve 
certain features of that work. Generally speaking, the uniqueness of the interactivity 
afforded by video games leads many within the general community to view the player as 
responsible for creating different features of the work, like when game creator James 
Portnow says: 
Videogames are unique...Because of their inherently interactive nature 
we, as developers, ship products that are by necessity incomplete. A 
painting on a wall is a finished work, a movie on a reel is whole and 
complete, a novel on a shelf is what it will always be, but a game without 
a player is nothing.42 ǡǯis a 
commonly shared one within a folk concept of video games. Gameplay is important 
because it is within this (figurative) space that aesthetic experiences are possible. Players 
are given the opportunity to curate their choices into a game that feels unique to 
themselves, be it how their avatar looks or what kind of role they adopt. In other words, 
many video games are largely customizable by the player. However, although the players 
(and the programmers) use their skills to enhance the aesthetic experiences of the work 
they are by no means responsible for creating those features or outcomes.43 While many 
games allow for a strong degree of user control, especially with narrative sandbox games, 
each choice that a player makes is limited to the possibilities detailed within the structure 
of the algorithm. I will note in the next chapter that those such as Berys Gaut and Grant ǯǤ 
 
Gameplay can bring about subsequent artefacts that also have artistic merit, such as the 
game art described earlier, or those found on YoutubeǯLetsPlay or the broadcasts on 
Twitch.tv. These latter platforms are important communities for gamers and are, at times, 
just as important if not more popular for players than actually playing a game itself. In 
fact, video game fandom is another emerging and interesting area of study, but while 
there might be something of an artistic activity that players participate in, that activity is ǤǮǯǡ
define a strategic action or actions a player makes that go beyond the limits of the game 
rules in order to enhance the experience. Here, a player would certainly exhibit a kind of 
creativity, but those creative decisions do not alter the work, only the experiences. Any 
invitation to appreciate the artistic playing of games would be an appreciation of a 
different kind, not of authorship. 
 
For some, creativity occurs if it exceeds the everyday in originality which, according to  ǡ Ǯ  it is interesting Ȃ illuminating, thought-provoking, 
                                                          
42 ǡǤȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǲǣǳǡd 
May 2013 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1XlfeXpiSuQ). Sourced from the following doctoral 
dissertation: Graham-Baker, Alex. Feeling Like Stories: Empathy and the Narrative Perspective, The 
University of Sheffield, May 2016. 
43 
ǯ
otherwise inaccessible is an interesting point that challenges this, but the glitches are, nonetheless, not 
intended by thǮǯǤ 
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humorous Ȃ ǯǤ44 According to Margaret Boden, novel ideas or artefacts can be 
so in one of two ways: psychological or historical. Boden says more precisely,  
A psychological novelty, or P-creati ǡ   ǯ   Ǥǯǡǡ
people have had that idea before. A historical novelty, or H-creative idea, 
is one that is P-creative and has never occurred in history before.45 
We can envision a scenario where players meet one or both of these criteria during 
gameplay. These creative instances would be recognised as unique accomplishments of 
the player, but these creative instances are in virtue of and separate from the creativity 
vǯǤǡ
is understandable that open-source games could press harder on this issue of authorship 
and provenance because in these sorts of games players are allowed to artistically modify    ǯ Ǥ       
because players manipulate code directly in order to control certain features of the game 
in a customizable manner.46 Although this example challenges our traditional notions of 
authorship, we can turn to the Fluxus, Dada, and performance art movements as 
precedents for works that grant their audiences greater control.  
 
Manipulating code would be a kind of authorship for a particular mod, but not necessarily 
for the work (something I address in more detail in Chapter 7). It is expected that a player 
will have a significant role in gameplay, especially with open-source games, but only 
because the creator(s) have allowed as much. Unlike most audiences of performance 
worǮǯo unfold and shape it. 
 
 
5.5 Art or Aesthetic 
A conversation about whether video games might be artworks or merely aesthetic works 
follows nicely from the above account of designers and programmers. Are we to 
appreciate video games as art? If so, then the theory we employ will need to encompass 
video games, or artefacts that consist of, among other things, algorithms and code. First 
off, formalist theories create immediate issues for video games because using form to 
base our aesthetic judgements renders the works too closely to other art forms, such as 
film, music, and literature. For most artworks, an institutional theory of art is a logical 
place to start. Following Arthur Danto, according to George Dickie, 
 
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of aspects of 
which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some 
person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld).47 
 
                                                          
44 Boden (2004).  
45 Boden (2009), p. 24. 
46 Hackers and hobbyists will also reverse-engineer video games for a completely different outcome than 
the one(s) prescribed in the game, such as JOǯUntitled Game series (1996-2001). See Clarke and 
Mitchell (2013) p. 13. Though this is an interesting aspect of accessing the code, these examples better 
suit other arguments than the one I present here.  
47 Dickie (1974). 
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In a similar manner as Dickie, Derek Matravers reformulates the definition and says, for ǡǲ Ǥǳ48 
 
If video games are artifacts, and I take them to be, then the first condition is met in both 
definitions. The second one is more worrisome because, although video games are now 
exhibited in museums (e.g., MoMA), it is not clear that they are displayed (or appreciated) 
in the way they were created to be for the players. Moreover, the inclusion of video games 
is a rare occurrence in museums and even those who have dared to add them to their 
acquisition list have not fully embraced the idea that they should be displayed next to 
established works as those by Degas, Beuys, or even the vacuum cleaners by Koons. In ǯdefinition, it is not clear that video games are presented to the ǡǮǯ ȋǤǤǡ Ȍǡ   
artworld are the intended appreciators of the work. 
 
Following Jerrold Levinsonǯ definition of art, Rough views an Intentional-Historical 
account to be more tolerant of video games.49 ǯ,  
 
is something that has been intended by someone for regard or treatment in some 
overall way that some earlier or pre-existing artwork or artworks are or were ǳǤ50  
 ǯ-Historical account for two reasons. First, it provides 
a persuasive definition of art as a whole while, he claims, other definitions fall short. 
Second, it seems to tolerate video games, if we agree that video games can be intended as 
an art. In other words, other definitions of art look for functional properties of the work 
or attempt to sǡǯ
works on an individual basis for works. But do video games share any features with 
previously regarded art forms? Or, even if no prior work comes to mind when regarding 
video games, can we at least regard them in a similar vein as our normal art-viewing 
practices? Or do video games merely entail aesthetic experiences without possessing any 
art status? 
 
To answer the above questions, it should first be made clear what the distinctive features 
of video games are so that we can determine what kind of artefact it is. For this, turning 
to the philosophy of technology might prove beneficial given the longer tradition video 
games have had in the field of technology. Although a technological account, as its title 
suggests, is predominantly about technology rather than art there are subtle distinctions 
within this theory that make room for, at the very least, aesthetic appreciation.  
 
A is the case with art, a technological artifact does not have a singular account. To begin 
with an early concept, Aristotle considered technological artifacts to be objects that are 
human made, not natural (but aimed at imitating nature), and intended for some 
                                                          
48 Matravers (2000). 
49 Rough (2016), p. 106. 
50 Levinson (2007), p. 74. 
80 
 
purpose.51 Others have claimed our interpretation of Aristotle need not be as strict and 
perhaps his meaning has more to do with a commentary on nature than technology.52 
Aristotle includes human intention in his definition, which is similar to the concepts we 
have for artworks that require authorship and an intent that the object be an artwork. 
Moreover, his stipulation that the artifact be intended for a purpose prevents byproducts 
of human activity from qualifying as a technological artifact (e.g., sawdust and food ȌǤ	ǯǡ
and says: "[a]n object is an artifact made by an author only if the author accepts it as 
satisfying some sortal description included in his productive intention".53 This definition 
is relevant to art as well but in order for a definition to target technological artifacts more 
specifically, Hilpine stipulates the process requires a "material means to achieve practical 
end x."54 
 
As a practice, a condition of achieving a practical end promotes the normative view that 
technology consists in instrumental rationality more than anything that pertains to the 
creative. Technology concerns rational attitudes because it requires the individual to 
question which options of the ones made available to her are the best ones that will 
achieve the desired goal during the technological process. More recent philosophies 
recognise that this view misses the creative aspect entailed by technology because, after 
all, technological options must first be created if they are to be made available as design 
possibilities. More and more, programming is written on the fly from networked 
computers either for software building or for what has Ǯ-ǯǤ
Although code in and of itself is aesthetically interesting, it is often a component of a 
larger work (artifact), making it an unusual feature to discuss in terms of art artifacts.  
 
When we start to consider the creative and aesthetic aspects of reading, writing, and 
interpreting algorithms and code, a strict view of technology, or the view that it is merely 
about instrumental rationality, seems inadequate and, in fact, seems more closely related 
to a philosophy of science than a philosophy of technology. According to Maarten 
Franssen et al., a descriptive difference between the philosophies of science and 
technology is that, very broadly, science is concerned with understanding the world; 
technology is concerned with changing the world.55 This leads to a standard distinction 
between the two, which can be expressed like so: 
 ȋȌǣǮǡǯ ǣǮǡǯ56 
 
Randall Dipert shares a similar view with the above characterisation of technological 
artifacts but extends it to say that these objects are distinctive kinds of instruments 
whereby something is modified (for the better) to achieve some end.57 This notion places 
function as a key feature of technological artifacts and the reason that governs why we 
                                                          
51 Those such as Hans Blumenberg hold a strict interpretation of Aristotle's focus on the imitation of 
nature, which prohibits technology from being innovated, nor creative. See. Blumenberg (2010). 
52 See Schummer, (2001), p.105-20. 
53 Hilpinen (2004), see also Hilpinen (1992). 
54 Verbeek, PeterǦPaul, and Pieter E. Vermaas, (2009), p. 165. 
55  Franssen et al. (2015). 
56 ǤǮǯ
ǯ Norm and action (1963). 
57 Dipert, (1993), Chapter 2. 
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appreciate them (this raises a concern: what if the artifact malfunctions - is it no longer a 
technological artifact?). Of course, function is not a sufficient condition because biological 
kinds also have functions such as stomachs that digest food, soil that provides nutrients 
to plants, and so on. Natural functions serve a purpose toward some end, but those 
functions do not necessarily require human intention. Although making distinctions 
between natural and technological functions require deeper philosophical attention than 
is possible here, the intuition is that functions of the latter kinds stem from the artifact 
being human- ȋ  ǯ ȌǤ Nonetheless, we can 
conceive of the algorithm and code as purposeful and possessing function(s). 
 
If the above is true within engineering, then it is consistent to view video game creation 
as consisting in both rational and creative and processes. Of course, creative processes ǤǮǯǡ
instrumental pǮǯǡworry that artistic 
appreciation is not central to player engagement. As will be revealed in the following 
chapters, I consider video games, which are both technological and digital artifacts, to be 
aesthetic objects that often allow for aesthetic appreciation. Viewing video games as 
aesthetic objects is not so controversial but it is debated whether video games can be art 
objects. We should not forget that video games are the result of human design, and for 
some theorists, design suggests a culmination of technology and art.58 
 
Philosophies of technology highlight important constituent features of video games. It 
seems, in light of their being purposeful, functional, and objects of design, we could regard 
video games as we have regarded prior works of art. Although I am more convinced that 
video games can be aesthetic objects, I think there is room to consider some games as art 
objects under the Intentional-Historical account of art. At the very least, the Art Game 
seems to indicate that those who create and play video games are open to their art status.   
 
5.6 Player Types 
 
The previous sections in this chapter address creativity as it relates to video game players 
and creators. Although players engage in a creative process when they play games, they 
are not necessarily responsible for the work. That being so, we should appreciate the 
different kinds of attitudes a player might have toward video games. Relevant to this 
discussion of player attitude and creativity is Richard ǯ   
player types, or players who he describes as achievers, explores, socializers, or killers.59 I 
will briefly describe each and then follow-up with an additional sort of player that I 
believe is missing from this list, players I categorise as entertainers.  
 
Achievers are players who ǲregard points-gathering and rising in levels as their main goal, 
and all is ultimately subservient to thisǳ.60 One task achievers are known to do is 
participate in Ǯgrindingǯ, or engaging in repetitive tasks to level up (e.g., repetitively 
picking mushrooms or mining metal in World of Warcraft). Explorers are players who 
                                                          
58 Flusser and Cullars. (1995). 
59 Bartle (1996), p. 5 (pages are associated with the PDF version online at: 




ǲdelight in having the game expose its internal mechanisms to themǳ.61 These players are 
not merely playing the game in order to finish it because they prefer to experience as 
many potential aspects of the game as possible (e.g., taking on additional quests beyond 
the necessary ones to level up). Socializers are ǲinterested in people, and what they have 
to sayǳ.62 Many games will allow you to enable chat windows or to broadcast your 
conversations to other players. Among other things, socializers enjoy the game for the 
community it builds and they might exchange information regarding strategies or events 
in the game, or share personal real-life information with each other.63 Finally, Bartle 
suggests players can be types who are killers, or those who ǲget their kicks from imposing 
themselves on othersǳ.64 These players will usually lead ahead of other players and use 
their powerful offensive and competitive abilities for their own or the ǯ
while also acting as the Ǯǯand fighters for the group. Although their name 
perhaps presents them with a less than desirable identity, these player types are essential 
to the success of the group at large, especially during boss fights.  
             ǯ taxonomy is a 
relatively newer type, whom I will call entertainers, or:  
 
Those who play a video game primarily for the amusement of others.  
 
One of the best-known examples of an entertainer type is Swedish based video producer, 
comedian, and video game commentator, Felix Arvid Ulf Kjellberg, who, within the 
gaming community around the world he is better known as PewDiePie.65 Like other video 
game commentators, PewDiePie records himself via a webcam while he plays through 
and narrates the progression of various video games, which is   ǯ 
(mentioned above). These are sometimes viewed in real-time, but they are often 
streamed after they have been uploaded to sites like YouTube or Twitch. PewDiePie and 
other successful YouTube personas create a cult following in part by playing certain video 
games, but more importantly, by curating their personalities for the community they 
build around them. At the time of writing this chapter, PewDiePieǯ
hover around 53 million, which makes him a very wealthy video gamer. Game 
entertainers can also characterise the sorts of players who compete in e-Sports 
(electronic sports) championships, where players play video games and challenge each 
other in a tournament-style format in front of live and online audiences in an attempt to 
make it to the final round. 
 
The other four player types characterised by Bartle might play within a large group (or 
guild) in order to play with the game and participate with the group members, but this ǯǤǡ
by the desire to reach large audiences, whether they successfully do so or not, by playing 
a video game in a stylish way. They may bring to bear a sense of style in their playing with 
their personalities as well as with their gameplay. This need not necessarily require the 
player to be excellent at all the plays or any of them for that matter as there are popular 
                                                          
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid. 
63 e.g., I do not consider myself a social player, but one such example is when my husband and I met a 
fellow guild member for a beer, meeting face-to-face for the first time after years of playing WoW. 
64 Bartle (1996), p. 6. 




behaviour and attitude is for an audience at large rather than themselves or strictly for 
the game. The YouTube sensation and e-sport champion both represent a very different 
kind of player than the four that Bartle defines and, in my mind, better characterise ǯǤ66 
 
To conclude, all of the above shows that video games as narratives, games, and artworks 
have incredible range in their histories. We also see the important role that the player has 
for the appreciation of games. Players collectively create their own microcosm in a 
broader society, a point that I will return to in the final chapter of this dissertation.  
 
Although players are important to the instantiation of video games and to the 
communities, in no way are they necessary for the creation of the game (perhaps they do 
have part in shaping the video game art status). Apropos of this, David Davies and others 
have said that, for a work of performance, it is not necessary that it be performed in order 
for it to exist, and I would say the same is similarly true of video games; they need not be 
interacted with to exist. Although a player exhibits performative-like tasks, it will be 
made clearer in the following chapters that my view reports different roles for the 
participants involved in performance works and interactive works. I consider the 
differences between them great enough to challenge a performance ontology that is 

























                                                          
66 ǯǡ
who often times can offer input into the chat box to suggest spǯ
commentator to make. Although this is interesting, it takes us in another direction (or at least one similar 





Chapter 6: The Ontology of Interactivity and Player Engagement 
 
We now understand that within the arts there are various ways that we apply and 
understand the term interactivity. Philosophers of art have developed considerable 
scholarship toward our ontological understanding of interactivity. Interests in 
interactivity predominantly reside with the exponential growth and ongoing inclusion of 
the computer and digital media within well-established art forms. Although interactive 
art is nothing new, the recent (albeit tentative) addition of video games to the art canon 
has renewed a curiosity about the ontology of the artworks themselves, the properties 
that are generated in the interactive-   ǡ   ǯ   
relationship between interactivity, engagement, and aesthetic appreciation. Given the 
appeal of interactivity within the arts, a review of the literature within aesthetics 
provides a useful framework for understanding the ontology behind such works.  
This chapter has three sections that explore several influential accounts of interactivity 
by philosophers working within the analytic tradition. The first section introduces a 
number of definitions of interactive art that have arisen in recent literature in an attempt 
to solve some initial ontological problems. Although there is no consensus, the 
scholarship creates a clearer picture of the kinds of works in question and identifies 
distinctive features of interactive works for plausible ontologies. The second section lays 
some groundwork for the final section and discusses the relationship between 
interactivity and our engagement of relevant works, since interactivity guides the kind of 
attitude we might have, be it lusory or aesthetic. This section largely concerns works 
consisting of features that are interactive and narratological. Drawing from the previous 
sections, the third section, although brief, addresses a relatively newer question to 
emerge, which is, are interactive works another kind of performance work? Once again, 
the answer to this question is not singular, nor is it a straightforward one.   
 
 6.1 On the Ontologies of Interactivity 
A good place to begin a survey on the philosophy of interactivity is with David Saltz who, 
in 1997, stated very simply that ǲ[i]nteractive technology is one of the hot concepts of the 
1990sǳ.67 He was right, of course, and his interest in the proliferation of digital 
technologies formed his view that the computer entails a distinctive kind of performance. 
Satlz sates that works such as computer art are performative in a similar manner to     ǲ      ǳ.68 
However, interactivity creates an important difference in certain works whereby 
interactivity becomes the object of our appreciation rather than what is generated by the 
actions.  
 
If the interactivity is an aesthetic action then the user becomes responsible for certain 
properties that are not necessarily inherent of the work. For Saltz, this not only 
                                                          
67 Saltz (1997), p. 117. 
68 Ibid., p. 123. 
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complicates the issue of authorship, it challenges the traditional type-token distinction 
that we normally apply to abstract works because computer art does not prescribe one 
kind of correct instance in the way other performative works do. Consider two examples ǤǯHamlet will vary by degree depending on the production 
and specific performance, but we judge the performance tokens against what we know of 
the work. If, for example, Hamlet and Ophelia survive through the final scene and the play Ǯǯǡ
correct instance of Hamlet ǯȋȌ
kind of variability. Alternatively, consider The Telegarden, a work of computer art that is 
comprised of a table top garden with an attached mechanical arm.69 Users can access this 
work from a networked computer to control the arm and remotely dispense food to the 
garden on an ongoing basis. This example shows us that interactivity generates instances 
of the work that, unlike Hamlet, can vary to a considerable degree and still be authentic.        ǯ  ǡ   
interactivity, as evidence that the instances can no longer be considered tokens in the 
traditional usage of the word  
 
Saltz recognizes that there are non-computer works of art that give us a sense of 
interactive-like features, such as improvisations found within theatre and music, but, for 
Saltz, these features provide a weak picture interactivity compared to works on a 
computer because the latter consists in a different relationship between the work and its 
audience. More specifically, computer art requires an audience, now the user, to interact 
directly with a system in order to instance the work, where the input is recognized and   Ǥ ǡ ǯ 
generates properties that the work did not originally possess.   
 
Dominic LopeǯǯǤǯ
early monograph on interactivity, which predates his work on computer art, strongly 
interactive works, 
are those whose structural properties are partly determined by the ǯ Ǥ   ǯ ǲ ǳ  ȋȌ ǲǳ      
properties it has the apprehension of which are necessary for aesthetic 
engagement with itȄsound sequences in the case of music and 
narrative content in the case of stories.70 
Lopes states this more conciseǡǲǣǯdetermine the subsequent state of play. Structural properties     ǯ Ǥǳ71 The algorithm, or the ruleset and 
structure of the computer artwork or game, allows for the input-output feedback system 
that Lopes describes.  
  ǯ       ǯ ǡ     Ǥ 	ǡ ǯ         
                                                          
69 Ken Goldberg and Joseph Santarromana, Ars Electronica Museum (1995-2004).  
70 Lopes (2001), p. 68. 
71 Ibid., p. 69. 
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account aims only at explaining interactivity on a computer. Therefore, his account 
prevents us from considering non-computer interactive artworks while it is 
simultaneously overly inclusive of anything that runs on a computer, such as online 
shopping or DVD chapter selection.72 Although computer artworks are paradigmatic 
interactive works, games, interactive literature, and interactive theatre are just a few 
examples that should not be excluded from an ontology of strong interactivity.  
 ǡǯǯ
the interactivity. Recall that Saltz questions the consistency of the type-token distinction ǯ
the work does not bear. However, Lopes reminds us of a key point about the type-token 
distinction wherein appreciation of properties is a two-fold affair.73 In other words, it is 
possible for an appreciator of art to simultaneously appreciate certain properties 
generated by the work as well as those properties generated by the instance (or the 
interactivity). For example, it is possible to appreciate the properties of a song written by 
Thelonious Monk while also appreciating the properties of a particular performance of it 
by, say, Ella Fitzgerald. If this is true, then the properti     ǯ
interactivity should not be troublesome where the type-token distinction is concerned 
because, in theory, it is possible to distinguish between properties of the work and its 
instances. However, it will be revealed in the following section that, while this view is 
suitable for some interactive works, it might not fully explain the variability with certain 
interactive works.  
 ǯ
of a work instead of the technology, but Berys Gaut makes two important clarifications 
regarding (1) the audience and (2) authorization. First, in order to pinpoint the 
distinctiveness of interactivity, Gaut says that a useful definition should sharpen the 
distinction between users and audiences, lest it include characterizations of a live 
performance of a musical work just as it does interactivity on a computer. Second, Gaut ǯbe 
an authorized condition of the work. Prescribed interactivity is essential in order to 
prevent certain non-authorized behaviours from constituting any work as interactive, ǯDavid by knocking Ǥǡ
ǯ ǡǲ
in case it authorizes that its ǯ actions partly determine its instances and their ǳǤ74 The reader may be aware that Lopes has since refined his earlier definition    ǡ ǲA work of art is interactive just in case it prescribes that 
the actions of its users help generate ǳǡ75 which importantly distinguishes users 
from audiences and stipulates that interactive-instances need be authorized. As it 
currently stands, the definitions proposed by Gaut and Lopes are two of the most widely 
discussed definitions of interactivity within analytic aesthetics.  
 
The evolving definitions of interactive art continue to disambiguate works that are either 
interactive or passive. How then do the definitions presented above help us to make 
better sense of the ontology? ǯǡ  Ǯǯ 
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understanding of works because the kind of display a work consists of will, in part, 
indicate if it is interactive. A display is definǲǯǤǳ76 He is clear Ǯǯǡǡ
kind and a novel is a display of another kind. Works like paintings and sculptures are 
comprised of single displays meaning the work and the display are one and the same. On 
the other hand, for works of music, literature, and computer art, the display and work are 
not identical and are not tied to any one object per se. Instead, the display could be a set 
of sounds or images. Interactive works, unlike paintings, consist of more than one display     ǯ ǡǡ  ǡ  Ǥ A ǯ variable and, according to Lopes, variability occurs 
in one of two ways: if the display is (1) repeatable or if it has a (2) succession of states.77 
Works like most videogames would be examples of repeatable works because we can 
interact with them in many places given that they can be multiply instantiated at any 
given time. The Telegarden is an example of a work that consists of displays that vary with 
a succession of states, which is different than most video gam   ǲdisplay 
variation doesnǯt come through repeating multiple versions. It comes instead through 
variation in the succession of states that make up the one eventǤǳ78  
 
It is clear that variable displays are remarkable features of strongly interactive works, but 
the above does not satisfactorily deal with differences between the two kinds of display 
variability. ǡǲLopes never introduces 
terminology to discuss different displays in terms of their structural or aesthetic ǳǤ79 ǯ    ǯǡǡǤ 
 
6.2 Clarifying Display Variability 
 
The definition for works that change over time in a succession of states is a relatively 
straightforward one. However, the theory for repeatable works gives rise to further 
questions because it is unclear whether the interactivity creates the variable properties 
or, if not, how the properties change. More specifically, Preston says,  ǯ          
properties change every time someone accesses it. This would seem to 
be no different from the non-repeatable case, however, so this cannot be 
what Lopes means. The emphasis on repeatability and the multiple 
displays of digital art might instead suggest that for repeatable 
interactive artworks each visit creates a new display. Assuming that this 
is what he meant still leaves uncertainty, however, as he does not 
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address the question of whether the properties of each display vary over 
time thanks to user action or not.80 
After all, musical works will have a different display each time it is performed; if 
interactivity means that we merely change a repeatable display each time we access the 
work, then we are back to the same kind of variability like a variable succession of sates.  ǯǤǡǯǡ 
an item is a work with multiple displays when and only when our 
appreciation of it is implicated in our appreciation of its displays as 
belonging among its other displays.81 
But what constitutes different displays? A work with multiple displays could refer to 
displays that each consist of different structural and aesthetic properties, or it could refer 
to a display that is transmissible and so will have different properties because of its 
different locations (but then this, again, seems no different than all works that seemingly        ȌǤ    ǯ
definition for multiple displays would present a clearer position if it were to stipulate that 
some interactive works have multiple, differing displays (like many video games).82 ǯǡ 
for any given artwork, each possible set of structural and aesthetic 
properties F is a display type of that artwork.83  
This inspires the following: a painting will have one display type and one display because 
the object and the display are identical; a digital image or play may have one display type 
and multiple displays (given that, like a repeatable performance work there is a correct 
interpretation of the work with some token variations); some interactive works are not 
repeatable but have multiple display types with one display, where the properties of that 
display alter over time (e.g., Telegarden); other interactive works, such as applicable 
video games, consist of multiple display types, and multiple displays, which accounts for 
there not being any single correct instance of the work, but many.   
 
The above account of display types and displays resolves how repeatable works can have 
differing displays and belong to the same work, but what is still needed is a clear account 
of the properties that the work and the displays bear. One reason for this uncertainty 
hinges on the theory of differing displays. For example, one could play a video game and 
in one playthrough the player-character dies, and in other playing the player-character 
lives. Neither of these displays contain the same properties as the other, so each display 
cannot bear all the properties that the work does.  
 
Preston ǯǡǮǯǮ ǯ Ǥ        an artwork Ǯǯ
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properties to some degree.84 In short, Preston rejects this possibility because, while it 
might be suitable for some musical works (such as most Western classical music whose 
performance properties remain relatively thick), it will not suffice for works that do not 
have a single official or correct display type. For example, unlike reading a (non-
interactive) novel, some games might entail two different outcomes depending on the 
playing of it, but neither outcome is the single correct display of the work, no matter how 
largely the displays vary. In other words, an account for a single set of properties does 
not explain how in one playthrough of campaign from Dungeons & Dragons (D&D), a ǯ     ǡ       
campaign, she is consumed and dies. The player-ǯǯǤis is different than a tragic 
novel that consists of happy moments (e.g., tragicomedies) because a D&D display can be 
wholly tragic and wholly not-tragic and still be of the same work. A single set of properties 
does not explain this.  
 
Alternatively, workǡǲǤǳ85 Under this view, each display may 
contain different properties from each other, but each display will contain the properties 
that belong to the work. This account still fails to explain why works with a vast number 
of display types contain sufficient properties in each of their displays to allow them 
anything in common. In other words, if a display consists of properties in such a thin 
sense, there is less potential for aesthetic appreciation of the work.86 In non-aesthetic 
terms, we can imagine a scenario where a game like soccer can no longer be identified as 
such if all but one rule of the game is thrown out. A greater concern is the worry that 
under this view, if the shared interactive properties of the displays are spread so thin 
between the displays then we are left with a stronger set of non-interactive features to 
appreciate. Clearly, that will not do for works whose distinctive feature is interactivity. 
Preston says,  
What is needed is an account that explains how multiple displays can 
have entirely different properties simultaneously, while all still 
displaying the same artwork, and the potential properties account fails 
to explain this.87 
Preston concludes that a work will consist of all the possible properties that its display 
types and displays might bear. He extends this to games that not only consist of differing 
displays, but also require multiple playthroughs to adequately appreciate the work. The 
video game, The Walking Dead, where several playthroughs reveal an overall meaning to Ǯǯǡ
be experienced from the individual displays, but are somehow understood from the 
collective displays.88  
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86 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claimed that players may never see or explore 99% of the planets in the game. 
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The above accounts of interactive works and display properties reveal the distinctive 
nature of such works and, although the definitions and ontologies of interactive art 
presented above are not all in accord, together they inch us closer toward a better 
understanding of these kinds of works, including their prescriptions, display variability, 
and work properties. Equipped with these accounts, we now have the necessary ground 
work in place to turn our attention to interactivity and engagement.  
 
6.3 Interactivity and Player Engagement 
Gaut addresses video games directly, so let us return to his account of interactivity for a 
discussion of player engagement. While Saltz compares the performative nature of 
interactive art to theatre, Gaut considers video games to be a kind of interactive cinema.89 
As such, he analogises video game players to film audiences, but where the interactivity 
allows a video game audience (the player) to shape the work in the way that film 
audiences cannot. In this respect, relevant kinds of games entail two features of an Ǯ ǯǣ         
interpretive.90 A performance will be compliant to token an authentic instance of the 
work with certain notations that are prescribed. Compliance actions are necessary for Ǯǯȋ
play) it. That being the case, performances will also have aspects that propose ǤǮǯǤ
ǯ
account, any playing, regardless of the interpretation actions, constitutes a token of the 
work type, much like a film screening tokens a film type.91   Grant Tavinor 
shares a similar view with Gaut and has done a good deal to expound on the kind of 
aesthetic engagement that interactivity and video games can entail. For Tavinor, 
applicable video games have features that are interactive and/or narratological.92 
Drawing from the accounts of Lopes and Gaut, Tavinor stipulates that audience ȋǯȌǡ
narrative content. He says,  
Thus, the ontology of a video game such as Skyrim is of a work type with 
number of tokens in the form of different playings. It is because video 
game works are instantiated through this audience participation that 
they are fruitfully considered as interactive works.93  
ǯperformance to consider the notion that some 
kinds of narrative games allow players to act as interpretive performers.94 As Gaut 
suggests, players can act in a manner like a performer and an audience, which leads 
Tavinor to discuss the significant role that the players will have in shaping the narrative 
while they interpret the player-character and framework of the story.  
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Novels encourage readers to interpret stories, but there is more at stake for those who ǯǡǡǤǡǡǯǡ create what 
Tavinor characterises as feedback loops between player and narrative.95 A game like 
Tetris shows us that not all video games (or games in general) allow for interactive 
performances, but games like Until Dawn, Undertale, and tabletop roleplaying games like 
D&D and Microscope are highly interpretative and so players can determine things like 
who to kill, who to spare, which routes to take, and so on. For example, with the video 
game The Wolf Among Us, players select actions and dialogue that (collectively) make the 
player-character either curt, a jokester, kind, or rude. Players curate the player-character 
by deciding on features such as how Bigby Wolf, the player-character, responds to other 
non-player-ǯȋȌǡes to save versus leave behind, 
how he reacts to certain events, etc. With each interaction, the player can interpret the 
player-character with actions that are as consistent with the character type. It is in this 
respect that players become interpretive performers because, like musicians, they are 
responsible for performing (interacting) with the work, but they can appreciate that their 
decisions shape the kind of story that unfolds. It is not only that players interpret an 
individual story with these kinds of applicable games, they can also replay a specific game 
and make different choices than they had made previously in order to shape (interpret) 
a different story. A player might choose a different personality profile for the player-
character, save or kill different NPCs, and so on. The degree of interpretation is, of course, 
made possible by the multiple differing display types that Preston discusses.  
 
What then does performance interactivity say about player engagement? If a player is not 
as artistically engaged, she might adopt a lusory attitude and play for reasons other than 
interpretation, such as to win the game. If a player adopts an aesthetic attitude, then 
perhaps she plays to interpret the story and use the player-character to shape the 
outcomes in a way that befits an interpretation of the character (i.e., it might be better for 
the overall story if the player-character suffers some consequences even if certain actions ǮǯȌǤǡpend on the ǡǡǡǯ
(e.g., ludologial or narratologial). Games that carry lusory and aesthetic prescriptions can ǡǡǮǯ
where the two appreciative modes potentially conflict. 96 For example, if a player 
interprets a player-character to be a passivist when the lusory attitude requires actions 
such as aggressive stealing and killing in order to win, this creates a ludonarrative 
impasse. This example represents an appreciative (interpretation) problem on the side 
of the viewer from the difficulties that arise from there being both gaming and narrative 
features of (applicable) games. Consequences arise when there are different prescribed 
attitudes and the two clash.  
 
The above discussion on lusory versus aesthetic interest might make one wonder if video 
games can be both an artwork and a game. Video games with game and narrative 
components do not always create a dissonance, of course. I will eschew a discussion of 
art and game compatibility and simply say that different modes of interactivity will have 
bearing on how we engage with a work, be it an artwork or a game.97 While interactivity 
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engagement with a work. This should not suggest that all works prescribe more than one 
kind of interactivity, however. Returning to the puzzle game Tetris, while there might be 
reasons for a player to view the tetriminos as props for make-believe, there is no 
prescription of the work to do so. Additionally, games like Tetris do not necessarily 
prescribe aesthetic appreciation. Overall, Tetris may require a good deal of player 
concentration, or prescribe certain kinds of interactivity that allow little room for 
imagination or aesthetic appreciation.  
 
Some games may involve a straightforward prescription for the kind of engagement a 
player should enlist, but there are games that allow for separate modes of interactivity 
and attitudes at different times. __Asteroids__ (2002) is one such example of games that 
specifically target different modes of interactivity, engagement, and appreciation. This 
online game was developed as an adaptation from the space shooter arcade game, 
Asteroids (1979).98 In the original game, the player directs a rocket to try and hit the rocks 
and satellites as they appear on screen.  __Asteroids__ has a similar platform, but where 
the player takes aim at various words that appear on screen. If the words are hit, the 
words explode, sending the letters all over the screen to mix and settle into new words. 
To make gameplay interesting, the player can choose between two different modes: game 
or play. Game mode requires the player to have faster speed and accuracy in order to hit 
the words and avoid colliding with the other words that appear. In this mode, the player 
survives the game by creating enough new words that string into a kind of random poem; 
the object is to win by creating enough words without getting hit. In play mode, the goal 
is quite different. The action is slowed to a pace that allows players to be more particular 
about the words they choose from to form more deliberate poems. Players can also 
prevent other words from colliding with their own, if they so choose to further minimise 
the obstacles they would otherwise encounter. In play mode, the object of appreciation is ǡǮǯǤ__Asteroids__ illustrates the point that different modes consist in 
different norms of interactivity and, therefore, a different motivation and engagement 
with the work.99 
 	ǡǯ	
example from his book, A Philosophy of Computer Art (2010). He describes the variability 
of the rearranged magnetic letters on the refrigerator similarly to the displays of a work 
type. The variable displays function similarly to works of jazz where the score allows for 
improvisations, which means the variable portions still belong to the work. The Frigidaire 
poetry allows for a kind of interactivity that is conducive to aesthetic appreciation. 
However, imagine if, like __Asteroids__, we were to add a time limit on arranging the 
Frigidaire poetry and that two people compete for the best string of words in under thirty 
seconds. Does this activity belong to a game now, or art? Like chess, the timed Frigidaire 
poetry requires knowledge of the game rules and significant decision making by the 
player. Play mode, on the other hand, allows for exploration and a form of artistic 
interpretive performance that Gaut and Tavinor discuss. In sum, I will remain agnostic on 
the compatibility question for the sake of this chapter on interactivity, but while certain 
kinds of interactivity may or may not preclude a work from being art altogether, it usually 
will impact the kind (or degree) of lusory or aesthetic experience we get from the work.  
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Another kind of player engagement is offered by Jonathan Robson and Aaron Meskin, who       Ǯ-ǯ  Ǥ100 Their account centres 
around the fictive and interactive components of video games, which allow players to 
imaginatively make fictional things true of themselves and their player-characters. This, ǡ   Ǯ-involving interactive ǯȋ	ȌǤ	ǡ
works cannot be SIIFs (e.g., Sleep No More, The Mystery of Edwin Drood, etc.), but they do ǲ	ǡǡǳǤ101  
 
SIIFs normally entail first-person communications where players will use language like, ǲǨǳǡǲǳǡǲǯǳǤ
words, SIIFs are (fictionally) about the players who are (fictionally) the characters in the 
gameworld. Self-involving interactivity then has moral implications because, if we 
identify with (or as?) the player-character, we should feel wrong about the actions we 
make in the gameworld (e.g., when your player-character/you commit mass murder on 
airport civilians in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, there should be at least some feeling 
of reprehension or guilt).102 
 
However, Stephanie Patridge holds a different view about SIIFs.103 According to her view, ǯ
linguistic practice nor is well-suited with current theories of  moral criticism. Firstly, she 
says this about ludic practice and video games: although we can and often do use first-
person language with games, we often use it interchangeably with game language. So,  ǡ ǲ    Ǩǳǡ   ǡ ǲǯ    ȋȌǳǤǡǯǡ
and so while there are some self-involving components to video games, the ludic aspect 
reminds us we are playing a game and that we are not (fictionally) the player-characters.  
 ǡǯǮǤǯ104 Although she does not disagree with their account, and she says their 
account most likely does explain why even seasoned players feel a sense of moral guilt 
when playing Modern Warfare 2, it does not answer why players normally do not feel any 
guilt when killing a single guard, for example, in order to proceed in the gameworld. If 
self-involving interactivity means it is fictionally true that players fictionally perform the    ǡ        Ǯ ǯ 
actions in the gameworld. Here, Jesper Juul might offer a reply. Juul believes interactivity 
in video games keeps players from experiencing things like tragedy the same way we do 
with other narratives. More specifically, interactive fictions require players to strive to 
achieve something and so even in killing a character, the player can, at the very least, 
distance herself from any moral responsibility because she can feel skilled and a sense of 
accomplishment.105  
                                                          
100 Robson & Meskin (2016). 
101 Ibid., p. 174. 
102 Infinity Ward, Aspyr (2009). 
103 Patridge (2017).  
104 Ibid., p. 182. 




I suspect there is something right about each of these claims. In agreement with Robson 
and Meskin, interactivity connects players to their player-characters as well as to the 
gameworld and, in a manner of speaking, entangles the roles of the player and player-
character. In A Wolf Among Us, when Bigby Wolf finds one of the central NPCs dead, a ǯǯǡs the character 
and by the choices made. The same is true in D&D when, for example, one player-
character accidentally injures another player-character; this has the potential to actually 
and fictionally make the player feel bad. That being the case, while a player knows that 
rolling double ones means she personally contributes to the accident, the player is 
simultaneously aware that she rolls plastic dice and does not throw daggers. When a 
player actually rolls dice and the player-character fictionally throws daggers, does that 
mean the player fictionally throws the daggers? This is something that Patridge is not so 
sure about. 
 
That we are talking about games is important here. When players fictionally act 
immorally in the gameworld, achievement alone is not enough to stave off imaginative 
resistance (or we would need another explanation for why most of us show restraint in 
the ordinary world). The lusory attitude that suits frames for his account of gameplay 
offers some explanation for our willingness to engage our characters in immoral 
behaviour. It is clear from the above accounts of player engagement that some games are 
complicated hybrids of gaming mechanics and artistic features, and so they do not 
straightforwardly enlist one type of activity or another.  
  
 
6.4 Performances Versus Performance Works  
We have just read how performers and performances factor significantly in each of the 
accounts presented above, which, to those like Saltz, may suggest that things like video 
games are special kinds of performance works. Tavinor disagrees and, although I adopt 
his view, that interactive works are not performance works, more needs to be said about 
the reasons for the distinctions between the two categories. 106     
   
First, one might contend that it is simply easier to include video games in a category of 
performance, especially given the above accounts where terms like performance, 
performer, and behaviour factor as significant virtues of such works. What, specifically, 
is a performance and is interactivity so different? According to David Davies, ǲed at achieving some result, ǡǡǤǳ107 Video games 
do not normally engage audiences, but Davies is careful to stipulate that performances do 
not require a present audience, albeit they require an intended audience. In other words, ǡ ǲȏȐ       
particular kind of explanatory spaceǳǡǡ
                                                          
106 Tavinor (2017), p. 27. 
107 Davies (2011), p. 5-6. 
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to explain certain actions in refe   ǯ  ȋ  
audience is oneself). 108     
Although there is a degree of performance in the actions of some interactive works, not 
all performance-actions entail a performance work. Arthur Danto says we should 
distinguish between actions that are like performances (such as a riot) and things that 
are performances (like a ballet).109 Similarly, Davies makes the point that we can 
distinguish the performance of dancers, for example, from the actions of mattress movers 
because, while both are following directions, only the dancer tries to fulfil the artistic 
expectation of the choreographer or director who instructs her, as well as attempts to 
provide the appropriate behaviour to meet the expectation and appreciation of the 
intended audience. The position held by Davies, that performances have an intended 
audience, allows us to explain a specific type of player, those I call entertainment-players, ǯǤǡǯ      ǡ     
sense do not seem to stand up to such expectations. While players certainly judge their 
actions based on the constraints and norms of playing a game (or on the personal 
expectations of what they hope to achieve), it seems video game playings fail to meet ǯintended audience.      
I propose that, generally, players are a bit like dancers and rioters (or mere mattress 
movers if you prefer). While there are artistic elements of video games and in the ǡǯhe intention that they will be 
scrutinised as artistic; interactive instances of video games can also pertain to the tactical, 
strategic, or, simply played for the purpose of winning. Therefore, if performance works 
consist of actions that are taken to fulfil the artistic expectations of an audience, as Davies 
suggests, then some video games come very close to performance works, but not close 
enough for classification. Not all interactive works prescribe artistic behaviour, nor do 
they normally involve audiences with expectations of artistry.      
  
Intended audiences aside, some video games prescribe a lusory attitude at certain times, 
which is a prescription for players to scrutinise actions that are instrumental, not artistic. 
On the other hand, some video games prescribe an aesthetic attitude, which is a 
prescription for players to scrutinise actions that are artistic; perhaps, there are those 
video games that prescribe both lusory and aesthetic attitudes (or, for the sake of 
argument, prescribe one or the other at different times). Although the interpretive 
performance, compliancy features, and instrumental aspects are, in principle, potentially 
open to scrutiny, they are not necessarily intended for artistic analysis.   
The above examples show us an important distinction between audience actions, 
interpretations, and the work. To the extent that a work (such as video game) entails 
performance-like actions makes interactivity similar to performances, but those actions 
in and of themselves do not make it a performance-work. In short, most interactive works 
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it is normally sufficient that users or players appreciate these works when actioned.  
  
6.5 Conclusion  
The ontology of interactivity provides us with an interesting but challenging terrain to 
cover. Together, the above philosophers offer provocative ontological accounts of 
interactivity and how that feature affects player engagement.  
 
The accounts presented in this chapter are by no means unified theories of interactivity, 
but each makes important explications on a relatively new art category. If there is any 
connection between these philosophical accounts for video games, it is in the ontological 
importance of the algorithm. Although, going backwards from the summation of displays 
will not get you to the rule set of the algorithm, nor reveal all the potential properties of 
the display types, interactivity is how we can appreciate the features of an algorithm. The 
algorithm is also what makes different kinds of player engagement possible and the 
variety of player decisions that will have a whole range of prospects between actions that 
are artistic, compliant, and purely instrumental. The following chapter takes a closer look 











Chapter 7: An Algorithmic Ontology: Video Games and Rules1 
 
The study of games has generated a number of theoretical approaches, both within 
analytic aesthetics and games studies. These theories often converge on the same 
explanandum, but it is not always clear how or if these approaches might fit together and 
be mutually informative to create a unified theory. One such case is the relationship   ǯ       ǡ    
video games ontologically depend on algorithms, a view found in several different 
accounts within the philosophy of art.2 Both theories connect on the issue of game 
identity and individuation, but there are reasons to think there might be inconsistencies 
between these accounts.  
 ǯǡan account 
which might not accept the wide variance that algorithms allow video games. For 
example, a game of basketball ends with a win or a loss, but neither outcome has any real 
bearing on the identity of the game (i.e., losing a game does not change it from basketball 
to football). However, when I play Undertale my choosing to kill or spare another 
character will have lasting consequences and shape the kind of game I play. More 
specifically, I can choose to play this game in a violent or pacifist manner. If I do the 
former, then I will attack the monsters as aggressively as I can; if the latter, then I must 
try and convince the monsters not to attack me. Although we can play a game of 
basketball aggressively or not, the rules do not change, whereas, the different modes of 
Undertale each consists of different constraints and, therefore, different constitutive 
rules. The problem then is that different playings of a single videogame, unlike basketball, 
may entail different game identitiesǢǯ
games is applicable in such cases (particularly for philosophers of art). 
 
Here I will argue that an algorithmic view of videogame ontology has the resources to 
solve this issue of video game identity. I will explain that, although the game rules of 
different videogame displays may vary (and these might have their own identity 
conditions) the identity of the work that allows for these varied displays remains the 
same because they are generated from what I will call  Ǯ  ǯ 
(henceforth, a CGA). The CGA specifies this degree of variance of the rules, the perceptual 
properties, and potentially the artistic properties of a videogame, and is an ontological 
idea that I aim to make more intelligible within this chapter. 
 
Both games studies and analytic aesthetics have important contributions to make to the 
study of video game ontology. My task here is to present a detailed account of the CGA 
and describe how it individuates one video game from another. To this end, I begin by ǯǢǡ
I discuss the algorithmic ontology that I adopt in this chapter and the role it plays in video 
game identity; in the third section, I outline a few problems between games and artworks, 
which is followed by some solutions to those worries in the fourth section; finally, the 
                                                          
1 Thank you to Grant Tavinor and Jon Robson for helpful comments. A more developed version of this 
chapter will appear in their volume, The Aesthetics of Videogames in the Routledge Studies in 
Contemporary Philosophy series. 
2 Lopes (2010), Tavinor (2011), Juul (2005). 
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fifth section addresses the GCA in more detail as it relates to the properties it bears and 
the games they entail.  
 
7.1 Games and Rules 
What, exactly, is a game? According to Wittgenstein defining a game is an impossible task 
because disparate things like dice games, card games, board games, or those played on a 
field lack any single common feature. However, Bernard Suits in his seminal book, The 
Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia came very close to a defining that which Wittgenstein 
deemed impossible.3 Altǯ
game, it defines the conditions for the act of playing a game, or gameplay, from which we 
can extend to games as objects. Initially, Suits summarises gameplay as Ǯthe voluntary 
attempt to overcome unnecessary obstaclesǯ.4 Such a definition is appealing to 
philosophers because it captures something important about those who enjoy playing 
games: players do not take up games for the sole purpose of winning, but for experiencing 
the process (even the failures) of the game.5  ǡǯ
accommodate video games since they encourage a similar attitude. Suits provides a more 
detailed account of gameplay, which he defines in this manner, 
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs 
[prelusory goal], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], 
where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favor of less efficient 
means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just 
because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude].6 
Let us briefly take each component in turn. The prelusory goal is the overall goal of any 
game and it separates gameplay from other things like make-believe and pure play, which 
do not normally have explicit goals. For example, the prelusory goal of tic-tac-toe is to get 
three Xs (or Os) in a row before your opponent does; in running a race, the prelusory goal 
is to cross the finish line first. Of course, one cannot achieve these goals by using any 
means necessary and so to race properly, you must run in your designated lane or path. 
This is what Suits calls the lusory means, which are determined by the constitutive rules. 
The constitutive rules require less efficient actions toward the overall goal, thus creating 
the obstacles mentioned in his general characterisation of gameplay. More efficient 
means would, for example, allow me to drive a car to the finish line, but the constitutive 
rules make further constraints that prohibit me from using a car. Instead, the rules of the 
game define the exact place where I must begin, when the race will start, what designates 
the finish line, and so on. All kinds of rules are important components of a game (e.g., Ȍǡǯ
specific kind of rules. Incidentally, the lusory means is the sufficiency condition that 
Rough worries will become undone when there is a prescription to appreciate an artwork 
(see Chapter 5).  
                                                          
3 Original: Suits (1978). 
4 Suits (2014). 
5 Jesper Juul has a similar concept (though he differs from Suits) that we play video games because there 
is a paradoxical enjoyment of gameplay though they entail failure. See Juul (2013).  
6 Suits (2014).   
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That gameplay lacks a more efficient means of achieving a goal is a significant factor for 
something to be a game for two reasons. Firstly, the constitutive rules are what 
individuate one game from another. If, for example, runners jump and clear hurdles as 
they run toward a finish line, we now have an example of hurdling (assuming this extra 
constraint is a shared decision). Differences in style or technique do not individuate ǡǤ	ǡǮǯǡ
play I make by moving my king two squares and my rook to the square the king crossed, 
but whether I castle or not has no bearing on my playing a game of chess. Similarly, for 
hurdling, as long as I clear my hip and other such rules, it makes no difference which leg 
I lead with because this technique is not part of the constitutive rules.  
Secondly, the constituent rules are important because the inefficient means of games 
prevent (most) non-game activities from counting as gameplay. For this reason, a   ǯ   
playing a game since the set of rules she follows will be, in principle, the most efficient set 
possible. Finally, ignoring the lusory means would make it impossible to adopt the lusory 
attitude that Suits describes at the end of his gameplay definition. A consenting attitude 
prevents unwanted behaviour by others from constituting gameplay (e.g., bullying, 
torture, etc.), and excludes any motivations other than willingness to play the game from 
qualifying as such. To that point, Suits goes so far as to say that a professional athlete who 
is paid to play is unable to adopt the lusory attitude and, therefore, might engage with the 
institution of a game without playing a game.7 For Suits, it is important to distinguish 
gameplay with the act of pure play because, though there are many things we do in the 
spirit of play, those things in and of themselves do not constitute a game if there are no 
rules. An animal chasing its tail, a child jumping off a step, and the person who twiddles 
their thumbs might be participating in a kind of play, but these do not represent Suitsian 
gameplay if there are no rules to follow.8 This places rules at the forefront.  ǯ      ǡ     
consistency across a broad range of games. Instead of looking at similarities (or 
dissimilarities) like Wittgenstein did Suits focuses on the endeavours and challenges 
entailed by all games. That being the case, it is important to note that the above describes 
gameplay as an activity and not games as objects. When considering the ontology of video 
games, rather than gameplay, a definition of games needs to be more precise. I will ǡǯ for a 
definition of games.  
To change the definition from that of an activity to that of an object 
requires only that the lusory attitude requirement be turned into a 
prescription. The game as an object contains inter alia a prescription to 
engage with it with the lusory attitude. This frees it from necessitating 
any actual correct responseȄnamely game-playingȄfor the activity to 
                                                          
7 In addition to Suits (1978), see Suits (2006). 
8 Suits (1978), p. 155. This also differentiates gameplay a different activity from Waltonian make-believe, 
or concepts of pure free play as Miguel Sicart espouses. See Sicart (2014). 
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exist. The game itself is then an abstract collection of rules, ends, means, 
and prescriptions.9  
We now have a concept of game individuation in place, but this still leaves us wondering 
about the nature and compatibility of video games more specifically. 
7.2 An Algorithmic Ontology 
In addition to theories within game studies, we should care about game identity within 
the arts since recent literature allows for the possibility that video games can be art. Here, 
I will defend an algorithmic ontology, or the claim that algorithms of video games are 
ontol Ǥ   ǯ      
move, and, in fact, this puts me in good company, following Dominic Lopes, Grant Tavinor, 
and Jesper Juul.10 For his account of computer art (of which video games might be a 
sȌǡǯǤ11 Further on he clarifies Ǯthe algorithm just is the function that maps any one state of an interaction-instance 
onto the next state, given an interactor's gesture and the sequence of previǤǯ12 
According to Lopes, the algorithm relates to an ontology in a direct way because, like the 
constitutive rules, it helps us to individuate one work from another.13 Lopes stipulates, 
however, that the algorithm is not sufficient for an ontology of computer art because the 
provenance of a work matters, too.14 For example, imagine a scenario in which one game 
developer in New Zealand coincidentally creates an algorithm at the same time that a 
developer in Ireland creates an identical algorithm. Although the works consisting of 
identical algorithms may be perceptually indiscernible from each other, their 
provenances are different and so they are different works. 
For a video game to function properly, both the code and algorithm (among other things) 
are required, but the algorithm is not the code and so we need some initial clarification. 
With the many features of video games to consider, it is important to understand why the 
properties of the program are integral for display realization but do not necessarily factor 
for an ontological discussion. Imagine for a moment that you want to play a video game. 
Whether you access it in disc format, download it from sites like Steam, or via a web 
browser, you access the game via a compiled file. The file is compiled from the program ǡǡǯ
to run it. The program consists of human readable code, which can be written in a number 
of coding languages (e.g., C#, C++, etc.) depending on the type of device the work is 
intended for. To make a finer point, with a game like Amnesia, the code used to create the 
program might look different if played on a PC vs. on a Mac, and the file will certainly be 
different if accessed from different operating systems.15  
 
                                                          
9 Rough (2016), p. 144.  
10 Lopes (2001); (2010); Tavinor (2011). 
11 For more on computer art, see Lopes (2010); regarding the algorithm, see Lopes (2001), p.76 
12 Lopes (2001), p. 76. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 ǮǯȋǤǤUnity) that can compile a single 
program for various hardware platforms.  
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For instance, when using the game engine Unity on a PC, here is what a simple code might 





public class ExampleClass : MonoBehaviour { 
    void Update() { 
        if (Input.GetKeyDown("space")) 
            print("space key was pressed"); 
         




Compare the above with code implementing the same function (checking if the space bar 





class ExampleClass: SKScene  { 
  
 override func keyDown(with event: NSEvent) { 
  if event.keyCode == 49 { 
   ȋǲǳȌ 






The two codes look different, but the different programs entail the same work if they 
implement the same algorithm. Prescriptions for relevant operating systems and 
computer architecture are important for adequate appreciation of a video game, but we 
can see parallel cases in the arts where appreciative features are important for 
experiencing the work, but have little bearing on the ontology of it. With music, the type 
of instrument (e.g., an oboe) might be prescribed but the particular instrument (e.g., that 
particular oboe) is not necessary for an authentic performance. Likewise, the 
programming code of a video game is necessary for gameplay because it translates the ǡǯ
changeability from one device to another complicates the individuation of works if we 
require the code to contribute towards our ontology of video games. To echo Lopes, the 
properties of the program (the code) Ǯhave no more aesthetic relevance than properties 
of a videotape have to watching a movie recorded on videotape.ǯ17 Instead, we can relate 
the algorithm to works like fashion designs, for example, where the design is conceived 
                                                          
16 Thanks to Harrison Ferrone for writing the Swift code. 
17 Lopes (2001), p. 77. 
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as the work and the garment is the realization of that work. Thus, we must carve out the 
program from having any ontological import. 
 
Although the code is not relevant for an algorithmic account, this should by no means 
suggest that the code is altogether unimportant. Not only is a functioning string of code 
potentially elegant, there is something creative about the coding process itself (not to 
mention the programmer will often contribute to the creative elements of the work).18 
While we should view the algorithm independently of the code, we would also do well to 
note the value of source code since it often times is the only implementation of the 
algorithm before it is programmed into a playable video game. The value of source code 
and programs for gameplay aside, the significance of the algorithm supplants that of the 
programs in an ontological framework and, as Lopes says, Ǯǯ
templates; the algorǤǯ19 Therefore, let us return our focus 
to the algorithm. 
 ǯǤ can be extensively ǮǯǤ       Ǯǯ     
typical of the use of the term in game design. Games designers might 
speak of an algorithm involved in a graphical shader, for example, but in 
this use they would be referring quite specifically to the transformations 
that allow the shader to perform its particular task in rendering the 
graphics, such as adding volumetric detail to a texture. Thus conceived, 
algorithms solve computational problems. Furthermore, algorithms are 
typically defined as having terminations, but the objects being invoked 
here can often be run indefinitely because there is no set problem that 
they are meant to solve. Rather their function is to generate an ongoing 
display drawing on the inputs of an interactor (or even without the ǯȌ.20 
If a shader is used for the graphics of a video game, the assets needed to implement the 
shader can be accommodated by the CGA. Shaders require algorithms to perform their 
prescriptions, but these algorithms are separate from (or in addition to) the CGA so more ǯǤHowever, there is a problem 
with relating the term game mechanic to the algorithm, as Tavinor aptly notes, because a 
single game is comprised of many game mechanics and so the phrase minimises the real 
scope of a videogame algorithm; partly, the notion of a CGAȄwhich is the collection of 
algorithms or game mechanicsȄis designed to acknowledge the real scope of algorithms 
involved in videogame ontology. 
Nevertheless, even given this acknowledgement of the scope or complexity of videogame 
algorithms, the idea might still seem too insubstantial to really explain the ontology of 
videogames, especially when we acknowledge their inherent artistic qualities or their 
                                                          
18 The player is also involved in something creative, but this kind of creativity generates the displays of an 
existing work. 
19 Lopes (2001), p. 77. 
20 Tavinor (2011). 
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potential to be art. This is something that worries Marcus Rossberg who, to the contrary, 
claims that if algorithms relate to the ontology of artworks, they do so only in an indirect 
way. He says, 
[r]ules or instructions do not appear to be the right ontological category 
for artworks. Pretending for a moment we have even the slightest idea 
what the ontology of rules might be, it just seems wrong, or even 
incomprehensible, to describe, say, ǯǡǡǡǡǮǤǯ21 ǯǤǡ
partially sceptical of the algorithm (or any rules for that matter) as having any direct 
relationship to the ontology of computer art because the current literature on computer 
art offers only vague accounts of what the algorithm consists of.22 Before we can 
understand the CGA in more detail, I first acknowledge that if all games and sports consist 
of rules, one could be sympathetic to the argument that algorithms are too simple (or 
vague) to count toward an ontology of video games. It is true that mere game rules rarely 
factor as the object of appreciation. For example, we can note the banality of rules when 
we consider a relatively simple game like tic-tac-toe:  
The object of Tic Tac Toe is to get three in a row. You play on a three by 
three game board. The first player is known as X and the second is O. 
Players alternate placing Xs and Os on the game board until either 
opponent has three in a row or all nine squares are filled.23 
Similarly, a basic algorithm operates like a set of instructions. The following illustrates 
what an algorithm might look like for the rules presented above:  
                                                          
21 Rossberg, in Mag Uidhir, (2012), p. 71. 
22 Ibid., see his footnote p. 71. 









The above illustrates that an algorithm, unlike game rules, includes commands a 
computer will respond to, the rules of the game, and it specifies the states of a game 
related to a given input. That said, the ontological structure of an algorithm for video 
games is more comprehensive than what the above illustrates. If we leave an algorithmic ǯǡ best, we are left with a notion that ǯ- that an algorithm is understood as nothing more than ǮǤǯ

how it is relevant to video game ontology.  
 
One should keep in mind that an algorithm is an abstract (and somewhat theoretical) 
entity in the sense that it will often be instanced simultaneously with programming 
language, especially as the algorithm becomes more developed. That being the case, it is 
not so much about the individual roles of the developers or the stages of creation that 
should concern us here; rather, the crucial thing to emphasise is the algorithm as the 
specific property-bearing component of a video game. That means the CGA will contain 
information that extends the mere rules and states of play that the tic-tac-toe algorithm 
shows above to detail prescriptions for things such as features of the sprites and 
characters, colors, background textures, music, text, animations, lighting, narrative, and 
other art assets. For example, consider a game like Amnesia: The Dark Descent, a horror 
survival game where I search through a monster-     ǯ
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memories.24 The perceptual features of this game add to any aesthetic experiences I 
might have during gameplay, features including dark, dingy rooms, eerie lighting, 
shadows, and sinister noisǡǯǤǡ
least for me, intense, scary, and evokes an overall a feeling of creepiness. Amnesia is able 
to do this because the CGA encompasses everything about the specifications of the video 
game such as representational and expressive features of the characters, narrative and 
the tones, expressions, the formal features of characters and background, the brightness, 
and other artistic assets.25 ǡǯȋ
above) then I propose we can assume an algorithm satisfies a video gǯ
concerns when a complete game algorithm defines the relevant properties that are 
required for all the possible display types (and their displays) for a video game to be 
realized. 
 Ǯ ǯ            , 
following discussions from Chapter 6, I will return to these features in the final section. 
Of course, the above definition says nothing of a successful algorithm in any evaluative 
sense, nor does it make a work like Amnesia playable. CGAs define what particular tasks    ǡ    ǯ   ǡ  
  
render those specific tasks; that is the job of the program. In this respect, the algorithm 
serves as the entire structure of thǡǯ
programmer realize the perceptual features into an instance.  
 
7.3 Some Initial Problems ǡǯ
games with an algorithmic ontology of art. Are video games necessarily art? Are they 
necessarily games? If for a moment we only consider the rules, this may sound odd for an 
art ontology at first blush. However, there are similar examples outside of computer art 
and video game categories that serve as preceding examples. Sherri Irvin proposes that 
installation art, conceptual art, and in fact many contemporary works rely on the ǮǯǤ26 Work No. 200: Half the air in 
a given space (1998) by Martin Creed is one such work. This installation requires an 
enclosed room filled with air contained in balloons half its cubic space. Another example 
is Félix González-ǯPortrait of Ross, which consists of 175 pounds of candies piled 
high in a corner, the exact weight of his late partner who died from AIDS. Both examples 
require the curator to follow the rules to generate an authentic display, without which, 
no such display can be realized. If these sorts of parameters do not exclude works from 
an art category then there should be little reason to exclude video games solely for the 
algorithms. Neither does Lopes see any reason to exclude video games as art candidates 
because he views video games as potential works of computer art.27 Following Berys 
ǯ28, Tavinor also allows for the possibility that video games can be 
                                                          
24 "Amnesia: The Dark Descent." (2010). 
25 Shaders (software separate from the algorithm programmed from the GPU) can also be used to 
determine these features. This is not in discord with an algorithmic ontology because algorithms 
accommodate the specifications of the shader. 
26 ǯǤȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ ? ? ?Ǥ 
27 Lopes (2010). 
28 Gaut (2005). 
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art because he views video games as consisting of gaming mechanisms and imaginative 
components made possible by the interactivity. As such, recall his proposed disjunctive 
definition of video games: 
X is a videogame iff it is an artefact in a digital visual medium, is intended 
primarily as an object of entertainment, and is intended to provide such 
entertainment through the employment of one or both of the following 
modes of engagement: rule-bound gameplay or interactive fiction.29 
Both the rule-bound gameplay and interactive fiction that Tavinor mentions in his 
definition point to the underlying algorithm at work in the video game. Neither is possible 
without the implementation of the algorithm and the algorithm creates the identity of the 
rules and fictions. Like Tavinor, Juul says video games are comprised of rules and fictions 
and that our view of art (and games) should not be so limited as to exclude things like 
video games.30 Juul goes on to say, ǲit turns out that the fiction in video games plays an 
important role in making the player understand the rules of a game.ǳ31 Juul discusses a 
video ǯǣ 
While games are regularly considered lowbrow, this is often due to some 
very naive notions of what is highbrow or what is art. In a very simple 
view of art, art is what is ambiguous, whereas most games tend to have 
clear rules and goals. As Immanuel Kant would have it, art is without 
interest, whereas game players clearly play with much interest and 
probably send the wrong signals simply because they look completely 
unlike visitors to an art gallery. We cannot reasonably use such claims 
as checklists, and we should avoid thinking about art, and games, in a 
limited and unimaginative way.32 
If we are amenable to the fact that video games can be art then one might wonder if they 
can be games. Not everyone agrees that games can be art or that games can be art. For ǡǡǯanalysis, argues that 
games cannot be intended to be works of art because games are goal-
directed activities that require a voluntary selection of inefficient means 
that is incompatible with the proper manner of regarding that is 
necessary for artworks.33 
Rough defends three points of incompatibility. First, there is no prelusory goal for 
artworks; second, artworks do not prescribe inefficient means; third, there is a logical 
incompatibility between the prescriptions of the attitudes (because art adds a condition 
of appreciation, whereas the lusory attitude is sufficient for games). This incompatibility 
means, for Rough, that a videogame can be a work of art, or it might be a game, but it 
cannot be both. 
                                                          
29 Tavinor, (2008). 
30 Juul (2005). 
31 Ibid., p. 163 (also see his introduction and Chapter 5).  
32 Ibid., p. 20-21. 
33 Rough (2017) (as found in the abstract). 
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   ǯ ǡ   ǯ nition that includes an art 
condition is problematic for an account of games, but not necessarily for video games 
(given they may not be an art and a game). For the sake of the argument at hand, I do not 
commit myself to the idea that all video games can be art (or that all video games are 
games). For those who see video games and art as incompatible, then what follows is not 
all lost if you relate a Suitsian view to only those video games you do view as games. The 
above stipulation is important because I do not want to suggest to the reader that when I Ǯǯde facto.  
Let us assume that the rule-bound gameplay and or interactive fictions we are talking 
about fit within a similar framework as games, given, if nothing else, their algorithms. The 
question remains, are these ontological theories compatible? 
7.4 In Search of a Unified Theory 
So far, algorithmic rules do not seem in contest with Suitsian rules and, although this is 
the view I ultimately take, we would be too hasty to leave it here without considering, as ǡǮǯǤǡ
do not seem to have determinate sets of constitutive rules known by the player prior to 
playing a video game. It should now also be clear that algorithms are more expansive than 
Suitsian constitutive rules when we consider things like art assets and expressive 
elements video games entail. As with all games, the rules of video games are signature 
features, but remember that for Suits a change in the constitutive rules means a change 
in game identity. Video games have several mechanics that allow players to change the 
constitutive rules of a particular game, which would mean some video game works do not 
always present players with a single game, but with many.  
Let us consider at least two ways in which a single video game might constitute different 
games before I elaborate on how this Suitsian view is consistent with an algorithmic 
ontology. The first example in mind is video game mods (modified games) where a player 
can change certain features of a game by changing the code. For example, pretend I wrote 
the code to mod the video game Civilization, a mod that allows me to add new military 
units that were not previous options of the game. Mods are likely to consist of varying 
constitutive rules from one mod to another, and so each mod would constitute a different 
Suitsian game, although the modded games bear the same title. Before taking this 
example further, I want to consider a second way that a player might change the 
constitutive rules, which is by changing the difficultly settings of a game. If, for example, 
I wanted to make a playthrough more challenging then I can change the play mode from 
easy mode to difficult, meaning instead of doing abc, I must xyz. Terraria is one such 
example that offers players either a normal world or expert mode. The latter is more 
challenging and entails different consequences and rewards than the normal (default) 
world can. Additionally, various fighting games allow players to determine the number of 
rounds it takes to win, the size of the ring, the time limits, and so on. In these cases, the 
constitutive rules change between the settings and, like the mod, present us with different 
Suitsian games.  ǯ
and provenance so let us take a more thorough look at the above examples to tease out a 
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clearer picture. My position is this: the CGA comprises a single video game work, which 
can afford many different potential games (appreciated from the displays). I will first 
discuss how the two examples above are examples of single works before explaining how 
a single work might consist of different games.  
Two things are happening with modified games that might make it seem the identity of 
the work changes: (i) the modded game will appear different from the original game (e.g., 
the properties that the extra military units bear versus the properties before the game is 
modded), and (ii) hypothetically, this mod was created by me, not by the developers of 
Civ.  
First, we should take a clearer look at how a mod works.  Imagine the CGA is like a sealed 
black box with inputs and outputs that look like holes. These ports, which are designated 
by the creators, are what allow for certain modifications; a mod can only interact with the 
algorithm through the designated inputs and outputs. In other words, the mod will not 
affect the identity of a game if it is permitted by the CGA. Let us return to point (i) from 
the paragraph above. The modded game appears different than the pre-modded game 
because code has been added, via the hypothetical ports. For clarity, lǯ -
modded game Civ and my modded version Civ*. Under an algorithmic ontology, the mod 
does not constitute a different work because, although the code changes when I add a 
new military unit, the set of rules allow for this change and accepts the given modification. 
Many more mods might be permitted by the game, but this does not mean a CGA would 
allow all modifications. Imagine instead that I wanted to play the same game, but rather 
than playing with the built-in civilizations of Civ, I wanted the ability to colonize the moon ȋǯ   Civ**). The mod for Civ* works because the developers made certain 
provisions for modifying the default civilizations, whereas they did not make such 
accommodations for the algorithm to tolerate Civ**. If I forced the implementation of code 
so that I can play Civ** then I have hacked the game similarly to breaking the black box to 
access the inside. Although this occurrence is an interesting one for other discussions, the 
forced mod is not a genuine instance of the work. Also, recall from earlier that code is not 
necessary for a workǯ identity because code changes all the time between different 
operating systems. That means, sanctioned mods should be of little consequence to the 
work identity.  
Regarding point (ii), the change from Civ to Civ* might tempt some to say the work 
identity changes, not because of the code, but because the additions are made after the ǯ.34 A sceptic could argue 
something like this: works like paintings, plays, and films are assessed as complete works 
at some given time t. After all, an artist like Picasso does not create incomplete-Guernica 
just in case he wanted to add to it later! A relevant example from the history of art is the 
surrealist use of Ǯǯ, which was a method used by visual and literary artists 
to create a work in an ongoing collaborative manner. It works like this -- an artist 
contributes a partial drawing or string of words (e.g., following a rule set such as Ǯ-noun-advert-ǯȌsends it to a different artist who contributes to 
                                                          
34 There are some cases in which players can download about different 70 mods at a time for a single 
video game, which is different than what we normally expect for traditional works. 
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the work, and so on. Although each collaboration represents a modification to the work, 
none of the additions, if sanctioned, change the identity of the work. Additionally, 
consider works from the Dadaists who also allowed their audiences to progress their 
works on an ongoing basis. Similarly, the CGA can allow for certain mods, but this does 
not make the released videogames unfinished works.35 Having said all this, given the 
force of an algorithmic ontology for video games, a game like Civilization 5 is individuated 
from Civilization 6 because each implements a different algorithm. 
Let us return to the example of a vid ǯ difficulty settings. With the following 
pseudo-code, consider what a difficulty setting might look like within a work if an enemy 
has an initial hit point value of n hit points (HP): 




elseif mode == hard then 
{ 
 enemyHitPoints = n+10; 
} 
 
Hard mode assigns the character additional HP so the character becomes stronger and, 
therefore, harder to beat. As I understand it, Suitsian rules cannot survive the change ǮnǯǮn ? ? ?ǯame, in the same way Suits might view 
the modded games as distinct.36 This would be detrimental to my ontology of a video 
game work if I continue to consider myself a Suitsian. In order for these theories to be 
unified, an algorithmic account of video games must show that the algorithm can preserve 
the identity of the work even when various playings of the work constitute different 
games. Before moving forward, in recognition that an account that subscribes to the idea 
that a switch from one level of difficulty to another level constitutes a different game may 
be at odds with our folk notion of game identity, but remember that this level of ǯconditions of gameplay. As such, individuating the 
difficulty levels, if there are different constitutive rules in operation, need not affect our 
notion of games (especially considering that one might alter the settings mid-
playthrough) in any popular sense of how we play games. However, for a Suitsian, a 
change in constitutive rules represents a change in game identity. 
 
7.5 Work and Game Individuation 
I have a solution that fits both an algorithmic ontology and a Suitsian account of games, 
but first it is worth bringing in a (perhaps) less-strict viewpoint regarding game identity. 
According to Lopes,  
The rules of a game may change from one time period to another or from 
one context to another...It is fair to say that this changes the game, but 
                                                          
35 When we consider the ontology of the mods their provenance would be diffǯ
provenance. The point I make here is not to ignore authorship of the mods, but to show the algorithms 
can allow for them.  
36 Thanks to Brock Rough for pushing me on this point.  
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playings of the game under new rules remain playings of the same 
game.37    ǯ view     ǯǤ    
interpretation of this view does not absolutely individuate games just in case their rules 
change over time. For example, if we have a case where game evolves into game* then 
only one set of rules exists at one time opposed to the two sets of rules that exist for game 
a and game bǤ	ǡǯ institution of a 
game versus a playing of a game.38 Although these distinctions take me too far afield, with     ǡ  ǡ Ǯǯ   e its present form 
within the rules of the game until the seventeenth century, yet, we do not typically 
consider it a different game from its predecessor (and I presume neither would Suits). 
It is my view that both the mod examples and the difficulty modes presented above are 
of the same work and different games.     Ǯnǯ  Ǯn ? ? ?ǯ 
settings that we are looking at two different conditional statements, but each statement 
is merely a component of the same CGA; the CGA allows for both conditions. Therefore, 
the switch from easy mode to hard mode does not change the algorithm or identity of the 
work, but the switch does say something about constituting different rules and, therefore, 
different games. The algorithm consists of all the potential constitutive rules that a work 
can have, but when we change the game settings, the constitutive rules of that particular 
display will differ from the other display(s). This is not so different from accepting that 
different playings of the same game might drastically differ from others; as Tavinor and 
others have stated, video games are best appreciated if played multiple times so that we 
can appreciate the scope of the rulesets.39  
Let us return to the example of playing Kingdom two times; in the first playthrough the 
queen (my character) spends her coins wisely, fights off the monsters, and successfully 
expands the kingdom, but in the second playing, she fails and loses everything including 
her kingdom. One might say that all games allow for the same variability because, when I 
play a game of chess it will sometimes end with me winning and at other times with me 
losing. Video game variability is more complex than this implies, however. Following 
Lopes and Dominic Preston we know that some interactive works have multiple differing 
displays.40 This means, certain video games works might consist in a tragic display (if, for 
example, my character dies) and a not-tragic display (if my character lives), which is 
fundamentally different from the win or lose scenario when we play chess. When I lose a 
chess match it might be tragic to me, but any feelings I have in regard to the loss are 
external to the game; when my character dies in a video game the genre of the work 
changes due to the different set of properties it bears compared to the display with the 
protagonist who succeeds. Although a piece of music might have sombre parts and joyous 
parts, it cannot be both fully sombre or fully joyous. This requires explanation because 
                                                          
37 Lopes clarifies that this is due to a genetic component of games. See Lopes (2001). I would say the same 
is true for video games. 
38 In addition to Suits (1978), see Suits (2006). 
39 Tavinor (2017).  
40 Preston (2014). 
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we normally do not view works as capable of being either a tragedy or a comedy (in 
Shakespearean terms) depending on user input.  
There are, of course, works whose performances vary from the work. The many retellings 
of Romeo and Juliet, for example, can differ depending on the particular adaptation we ǯThe Four 
Seasons. With these cases, when we watch a play or hear a piece of music it is possible to 
appreciate the properties belonging to the work, transcriptions, adaptations, and 
performances.  Furthermore, it is ǯ
do not necessarily constitute a new musical work, even if it constitutes a different 
version.41 Songs, especially non-ǡǮǯ
vary to sometimes a significant degree (e.g., All Along the Watchtower by Hendrix v. 
Dylan), but versions of performance works do not usually vary in the manner that 
interactive works do.42 Spring can be performed faster or slower, but those variations are    ǯ Ǥ         
supposed to be tonal is, however, incompatible; two such drastic displays must be 
accounted for within the work, or we must individuate them as two different works. Non-
interactive works should not vary to the degree of incompatibility, but there are many 
video games that seemingly can, a point that Preston raises. 
 ǯǡǡvideo games 
might consist of many display types (e.g., tragic and not-tragic) which consist of many 
displays. If this is true, and I take it to be, we can be sure that the CGA allows for all the 
differing display types (and displays) without it becoming a new work. Each possible 
display is part of the work (algorithm) and the work holds all the properties of the 
variable displays (different games).43  Here, it would seem video games are more closely 
related to constitutively thin work structures due to the variability we can expect from 
the displays. However, setting aside differing displays and types, video games are perhaps      ǯ  thick properties, because the 
algorithm specifies in detail what the player can do; there are just many more differing 
properties to be shared among the displays within video games than with (non-
interactive) performance works. The thick-thin relationship of applicable video games is 
noteworthy. 
 
To briefly conclude, if we can play many different games from a single work then, by the 
above account of video game works, I am happy to agree with Suits that any change in the 
constitutive rules constitutes different games while at the same time preserving an 
algorithmic ontology.  Since each display derives from the work, a video game will consist 
of all properties of those varying displays. Therefore, if the display types and displays 
contain properties of the work, then I view each type as belonging to the same work even 
if the constitutive rules allow for varying possibilities, and different games within that 
work. It would seem then, in this particular case, game studies and aesthetics can function 
in concert to individuate works and games. For video games, this is the strength of an 
algorithmic ontology.
                                                          
41 See Davies (2007), p. 86. 
42 For a discussion on thick and thin properties, see Kania (2006), Gracyk (1996), Davies (2001) 
43 For more, see Ibid., p. 267. 
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Chapter 8: Some Ontology of How to Destroy a Video Game 
8.1 Abstract or Concrete? 
Video game designer Mike Mika reflects on the evolution of video games with a sense of 
regret that in the early days of video game development, digital preservation practices 
were not commonplace. He says,  
There are gaps in the evolution [of video games]. Unlike paintings or ǡǯǤǯǡ
were often erased to make room for another game. Much of our early 
work is now gone forever. I learned the hard lesson that magnetic media 
has a shelf life of about five years. Likewise, a lot of the old game systems 
I had as a kid were showing signs of failure. The work my friends and I 
put into creating games over the eras was now in jeopardy of 
disappearing forever, as was an entire generation of games by creators 
all over the world.1   
Such a fate almost befell the early computer game The Oregon Trail (T.O.T henceforth). 
For those who grew up in the U.S. during the 80s and 90s, this title will be a familiar one. 
First produced in 1974 for the computer desktop, T.O.T is a game simulator that teaches 
kids about American pioneer life in the 19th century. 2 Prior to the 1974 iteration, T.O.T 
was created and programmed by college graduate-teachers, Don Rawitsch, Bill 
Heinemann, and Paul Dillenberger, but instead of a desktop programme, it was run on a 
teletype, or an electromechanical typewriter with an interface system that connected to 
a computer mainframe. In this format, all the game elements were text based, which were 
printed at a rate of ten characters per second. Although rudimentary, T.O.T was, at the 
time, a novel idea and largely popular among the students. However, the teaching tenure 
was up for the three creators of T.O.T just a few months after they created the game so 
they decided to print the source code onto paper and delete the file from the mainframe 
in an effort to preserve their authorship. The title of an article describing this story reads, ǮFor three years, the only copy of the Oregon Trail source code was printed on a stack of 
paperǯ.3 Rawitsch later referred to the 800 lǮǯǡ
the author writes, ǲor that brief period The Oregon Trail existed in a form very few 
videogames can claim. Entirely, singularly analogǳ.4 ǯ one but the phrases Ǯǯ  Ǯ ǯ        
philosophical ones. Any agreement, if there is to be any, on whether video games can be 
lost forever, or whether they linger on, is hinged on the kind of ontological order that we 
ascribe to video game works. In principle, abstract art kinds, such as music, poetry, and 
plays exist as repeatable types, rather than singular, particular objects. The ontology of 
abstract works suggests works like music exist in a less vulnerable state than concrete 
                                                          
1 Melissinos, Chris, and Patrick O'Rourke (2012), p. 11.  
2 By the Minnesota Educational Computer Consortium (MECC). 
3 Wes Fenlon, PC Gamer. URL: http://www.pcgamer.com/for-three-years-the-only-copy-of-the-oregon-
trail-source-code-was-printed-on-a-stack-of-paper/. Accessed March 2017. 
4 Ibid.  
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works like paintings do because abstract kinds do not exist in one physical place nor do 
they (typically) degrade over time.  
The nature of abstract works has been widely discussed amongst philosophers of art, 
starting with those such as Wollheim, Goodman, and Wolterstorff. Still, there remains 
disagreement as to how we should think about them. By some accounts, these works 
cannot be both purely abstract and creatable, which would leave us with two options: if 
they are creatable works then they are concrete; if they are abstract then they are 
discoverable works, not created ones. Still, others suggest a third option. Since works 
such as music are not purely abstract, they are creatable, but since their properties are 
not concrete in the standard way they are abstract-like. Here, I will focus on the 
metaphysics of video games to determine if they, like paintings, can be destroyed, or if, 
like pure abstracta, last forever.  
In a metaphysical sense, a non-creatable entity that does not take up space and time is 
considered to belong to the category of abstracta. Abstract entities like numerals and 
gravity are not created, but there is a problem because theories of art require (in part) a 
work to have a causal event in order for us to regard it as art. Generally, we intuit that if 
an artwork can be destroyed then it was, at some point in time, created. This is certainly 
true of the plastic arts (as art conservationists will attest), but if works like music and 
video games are abstract, then what we need is a greater understanding of what makes 
them similar to abstracta, rather than to concrete objects. For comparison of video games 
and abstract things, consider the number pi. It is abstract because it is not created, it is 
unaffected by human interaction, it does not occupy a particular space, nor does pi solely 
exist in the mind (as an idea). Non-physical entities like pi do not have any causal effect 
on other entities or objects because they exist independently of everything else, although 
they may contain specific features or properties that we can understand and discuss. For 
example, we consider pi an irrational number, and to have infinite and specific numbers 
after the decimal, but those are all intrinsic features of pi, independent of intentional or 
natural causation.  
Video games require physical objects for their instantiations, and, although they require 
some kind of causation, they are not particular objects that occupy singular locations like 
paintings. However, the question of whether video games are abstract collapses into a 
broader question of whether any artworks can fit within a category of abstracta at all. In 
short, I consider video games to be abstract-like, but given the complicated terrain of 
metaphysics, I will tread lightly on committing to any specific abstract account for video 
games, although I will make my preference known by the end of this chapter. The more 
specific goal here is to focus on the abstract nature of the CGA and underscore its 
importance for the survival of a video game. 
8.2 Abstract Ontology Candidates 
There is a tension between the ontologies of abstract entities like pi or the numeral 3 and 
abstract art forms like music; to put it another way, metaphysics and aesthetics are, at 




(i) that artworks can be abstract objects; and (ii) that all art is created 
and can be destroyed.5 
With the above, we could say that (i) precludes (ii) or, (i) on its own presents us with an Ǥǡǲǳǡ
from which my chapter title draws inspiration.6 ǯ   
own interests because, in addition to addressing the metaphysical issues of art, he 
considers works of computer art more specifically.  To question how video games might 
fare with this paradox, it is first worth summarizing various ontological conceptions of 
abstracta and how artworks may or may not be consistent with such accounts. In what 
follows, I begin with a summary of a few established views of abstract works and then 
follow those with more recent ones; this is followed by a discussion on the relevance of 
the algorithm for video game ontology; I end by considering how video games, if they are 
creatable, might be destroyed.  
Platonism is a theory that suggests there are entities which exist as non-physical objects 
outside of a place and time.7 A theory of platonic universals places abstracta into kinds 
(universals that have or do not have formed examples), where each will have features 
that are particular to them, like the earlier example of pi.8 In terms of music, the note D 
sharp has specific properties, which of course becomes important for composers who use 
D sharp in their arrangements, even though D sharp has no provenance.9 Platonic 
universals are neither modal nor temporal and so they are unsusceptible to human 
interaction, they exist independently of any other object, and they have no causal history. 
Given their characteristics, a general Platonist theory states that abstract entities are 
discoverable things rather than creatable. For this reason, philosophers of art may find 
this view unappealing if they subscribe to traditional notions of art authorship. To adopt 
a Platonist view, one must acknowledge that, if some artworks are abstract in the 
orthodox way, then works like music can only be discovered by their composer, not 
created. Therefore, Beethoven discovered rather than wrote the Fifth Symphony. 
Furthermore, this theory would prohibit any scenario in which artworks can be 
destroyed since they, like pi, can be rediscovered time and again.   
An Aristotelian view of universals explains that instantiation is the point at which works 
are created. Those such as Stephen Davies suggest that, on this account, a musical work 
comes into existence with its first performance and it ceases to exist with its last 
performance.10 However, the pitfall with this view is there is no explanation for what 
happens to the works in between instantiations. In addition, one might wonder how we ǡǡǯFifth 
Symphony Ǥǯ
existence is dependent on its particular token, then we would have to allow that 
Beethoven may not have created all of the works we usually ascribe to him if he was not 
                                                          
5 Rossberg, p. 62-63. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Julian Dodd calls these implicit types. 
8 Also, Davies, S. (2003), Dodd (2000), Wolterstorff (1980).  
9 ǮǯǡǤ 
10 Davies, S. (2003). Found in Rossberg (2013), p.  64-65. 
115 
 
the first to perform them (or maybe he wrote things that were never performed and so 
they were never created works). A separate worry is, since the performance would be a 
particular creation, and, if a work exists with its first particular instance, it is then a 
concrete work, and a discussion of abstracta becomes moot.11  
To avoid some of the above authorship issues, Jerrold Levinson proposes the concept of 
an indicated structure (this is an application of mathematical structures to music).12 
Abstract types (musical notes) are invoked or indicated by the composer and arranged to 
create a structure consisting of music and instrumentation. The concrete instances occur 
when the work is performed, but unlike the previous view, the work exists prior to and 
regardless of instantiation. Ǯǯ
that human creativity brings a work into existence even though composers draw from 
orthodox abstract entities.13 To be more precise, Levinson claims that a work such as ǯFifth Symphony Ǯ-structure-as-indicated-by-a-specific-composer-in-
a-specific-historical-Ǥǯ14 Levinson suggests that, in theory, since indicated 
structures are creatable works there is a possibility that they are susceptible to being 
destroyed if they are erased from all record and memory. However, he believes it is more 
likely that a musical work will simply last forever.15 As Rossberg frames it, this conception 
places works like music into a new category of ǲsomehow in between: creatable and 
abstract.ǳ16 
Amie Thomasson has, more recently, proposed an account  Ǯ ǯǤ17 
Thomasson recommends that we form new ontological theories of artworks (and social 
constructs) for newer ideas or things when they are needed, rather than force them into Ǥǯis the fact that new things, 
ideas, and works emerge all the time, which should motivate us to revise (or add) certain 
accounts to the existing literature. With that in mind, Thomasson proposes a new   Ǯ ǯǡ  ȋ nomics, marriage, or scientific 
theories) that are not physical objects but their existence does rely on human causal 
action nonetheless. This view is warranted, but there seems to be an incompatibility 
between this account and repeatable works of art. Alt ǯ  
plausible for constructs like marriage in a general sense, if abstract artefacts are abstract 
particulars as Thomasson suggests, then they cannot be repeatable works because 
particulars are not repeatable things. Rossberg also raises this worry and offers an 
example to illustrate this challenge. He says the particular marriage between Sandi and 
Debbie, for example, is abstract-like, but, this particular event between Sandi and Debbie 
cannot be repeated. This should make us wonder how specific artworks, if they are 
abstract artefacts, can be repeatable things, or what explanation we can offer to show that 
a new work is not created each time it is instanced (e.g., a new marriage between Sandi 
and Debbie, a new Fifth Symphony, a new T.O.T., etc.). On the other hand, when we 
                                                          
11 Rossberg, p. 65. 
12 Levinson (1990 & 2013). 
13 Levinson (2013) p. 51. 
14 Ibid. 
15 As found in Rossberg (2013), p. 65. 
16 Rossberg, p. 74. see also Levinson (2012). 
17 Thomasson (2004), p. 88. 
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instance a specific video game, like T.O.T., it implements the same CGA. Therefore, 
following an algorithmic ontology, it might be that we cannot repeat the displays, but we 
can repeat the work.  
Instead of abstract artefacts, we could return to a more traditional account of abstract art 
and entertain the thought that works are types that token their instances. These are 
repeatable works because, in theory, the type and its tokens are understood as 
equivalence classes because the instances bear the properties of the work. Returning to 
the example of music, Fifth Symphony is the work and every performance of it are its 
tokens (this general characterisation presumes that Fifth Symphony is somehow 
abstract). The issue that others18 have pointed out relates to the number of members each 
class consists of because two-unperformed works will each have zero equivalence 
classes, thus making them identical, i.e., the same work of art.19 I have already discussed 
in many of the previous chapters the more important difference between this theory and 
video games because video games can consist of a work type, many display types, and ǡǮǯoken. 
This suggests that the type-token distinction is applicable to interactive works, but it ǯgive us the whole story of video games and their distinctive qualities.  ǯ
displays revealing variable artistic and aesthetic features of the work. We must remind 
ourselves that the display is not always our sole object of appreciation because the work 
and display are not always identical. For video games, this means a single display should 
not exhaust our appreciation for the work because there are many displays still left to 
appreciate. For example, in the game Dishonored20 a stealth action-adventure game, it is 
the player-ǯǡ
can choose to do so in a stealthy manner or combative one. These choices will determine 
the level of bleakness and violence within the game, meaning several playthroughs could 
produce very different kinds of game displays. This means that the work cannot be 
adequately appreciated until it has been played multiple times. Just how many displays a 
player needs to experience in order to adequately appreciate a video game is not so clear, 
but that is a separate issue for another time. Games like Dishonored make it clear that Ǯǯǡalthough 
drastically different in their outcome, will be a token. This example shows that the type-
token distinction has some relevance, but is too simple an account for video games. 
The summary of abstracta accounts presented above is brief, but it highlights the 
difficulties one runs into when discussing the metaphysics of certain artworks. If we are 
going to make any sense of video games and ascertain if they can be destroyed, we must 
first take stock of how video game works are created and preserved.  
8.3 The Components of a Video Game 
It should be clear from Chapter 7 that video games are comprised of algorithms, 
programming language, and a compressed file, none of which are physical objects. Since 
                                                          
18 Dodd (2003), Wolterstorff (1980). 
19 For more on the type-token distinction see chapter 6 in this dissertation.  
20 Bethesda Softworks (2012). 
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these things require a computer and other hardware for instantiation some scholars such 
as Rossberg view these works as concrete. Although gameplay is essential for an adequate ǡǮǯ
so let us discuss how a video game might exist. 
The author of the T.O.T article mentioned at the beginning of this chapter says that, ǲ[t]oday, there are at least 65 million digital copies of The Oregon Trail, and at least one 
still on paperǳ.21  This is a far cry from when, at one time, the only instance of the work 
was ǲ[e]ntirely, singularly analogǳ.22 Although the printed source code is not a common 
way to document and store games, we can understand the pages to be an instance of the 
work. To be sure, the original game created by Rawitsch, Heinemann, and Dillenberger 
poses an interesting question about originals, instances, and versions. The document 
containing the 800 lines of source code is not the work itself, just as the digital copies that ǮǯǤIn printed form, T.O.T is an implementation of 
the original algorithm so, although it is not in a playable format, it is a concrete instance 
of the work, albeit an unconventional one because it is not how we typically encounter a 
video game work. That means, when the source code was re-digitised later on, that action 
did not create a new work, rather the same work was instanced in a more conventional 
format.  
The 65 million copies of T.O.T. today share a similar title with the work created in 1971, 
but they are played very differently than the teletype version described earlier. For one, 
the contemporary version of T.O.T. is comprised of many images and sounds, in addition 
to the text. For another reason, Rawitsch dug a little deeper in the history of the original 
pioneers than he had with the two weeks it took him and his programming partners to 
create something for their students to play. Consequently, he made certain aspects of the 
newer game more realistic such as how many average miles the original pioneers could 
have travelled per day, the typical sorts of problems they would have encountered, as 
well as a more realistic kind of geography. Rawitsch also realised that Native Americans 
would realistically, at times, help the travellers instead of always attack them as 
previously believed.  So, the change from text to image based notwithstanding, this would 
constitute a different game than the one that consists of 800 lines of source code because 
they each implement a different CGA. Although we can say the document is an instance of 
the original T.O.T., we cannot say it is an instance of the work today. Aptly, each new 
edition gets a slightly different title, e.g., The Oregon Trail Classic Edition, The Oregon Trail 
Deluxe, 3rd edition, and so on. With each new edition, a new work is created. ǯher than to Ǥǡǯ
close to characterising a video game because the work is comprised of abstract entities 
that can be instanced into particulars (as indicated by the creators). The only issue I take 
with fully adopting a Levinsonian account is that it was not intended for works with 
repeatable displays that vary, but rather, for traditional repeatable works such as 
western classical music. He stipulates this himself and recognises that we cannot 
                                                          




necessarily extend his account of musical structures to jazz works or many contemporary 
and non-western musical works that consist of variations, or components that are not 
explicitly scripted. That being so, this theory will not do for works that consist of differing 
display types and displays such as video games, most of which are by default repeatable 
works. For my part, the closest accounts seem to be some variations of a Levensonian 
account or the equivalence classes mentioned within the type-token distinction. If, when 
using the type-token distinction, we combine the accounts presented by Lopes, Gaut, and 
Preston (see Chapter 6), then all kinds of interactive works are justly accounted for. At 
any rate, the above shows us that video games prove to be harder cases than other Ǯǯǡmost likely do not belong within 
a category of orthodox abstracta, the distinctive features of a video game cannot be 
accounted for even within traditional abstract art ontologies. 
8.4 How to Destroy Video Games 
Whether we can create and destroy video games depends on which of the above 
philosophies we choose to endorse. If, for the moment, we agree that artworks are 
abstract and discoverable, then we have to allow that video games are immune to 
destruction. If video games are created works, then we have to allow that they can 
disappear. Of course, then there are the in-between accounts that allow video games to 
be creatable and indestructible. Given the above account of T.O.T, one should wonder if 
video games are susceptible to disappearing forever as the quote from the beginning of 
this chapter suggests, or, like Levinson suggests, if they linger on forever. Current 
accounts do not fully satisfy the distinctiveness of video games, but here is what we do 
know. The numeral 3 consists of inherent properties, but, unlike the numeral 3, video ǯǤ 
Metaphysics makes it clear that video games are not orthodoxly abstract, and although 
once they are in a playable state they can be instanced into particular objects, they consist 
of abstract properties. Therefore, let us assume for a moment that video games, if they 
are created, are potentially destructible. If we grant that video games fit within one of the 
abstracta categories (or a variation of them), and if they are brought into existence by the 
artist in some manner, then how do we destroy them? If we do not consider the work to 
be tied to any particular object, there are a few options for video games. Of course, the 
Platonist account would not be one in which video games can be destroyed. Since this 
view states that works are entities that pre-exist their discoveries, I do not think it 
controversial to think this view is too far a stretch for an ontology of video games. 
However, for those that do view video games within a Platonist perspective then, 
contrary to the sentiment of those like Mika, video games are indestructible and, 
therefore, last forever.  
As stated, a Levinsonian approach does not account for repeatable works with differing 
displays. However, we can adapt his account of a musical structure for a video game and 
say: a video game is an algorithmic-structure-as-indicated-by-a-specific-creater-in-a-
specific-historical-context.23 Although indicated structures of music bear similarities to 
                                                          
23 I would not wish to tie myself absolutely to this characterisation; it is merely to make the point here 
that, like music, algorithms are comprised of abstract kinds. 
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the algorithms of video games, there are more than sounds and instrumentation involved 
in video games. So, if we want to include video games in a Levinsonian account it should 
be clarified that the kind of structure involved in a video game work is the gamǯ
algorithm, as indicated by the developer (whomever they might be). The video game 
Dishonored and many others shows us that many video games consist of repeatable, 
differing displays that can each display different properties and, therefore, different 
endings. Although an indicated musical structure does not account for this, the algorithm 
of a video game does. If one adopts this revised view, then, we should consider what is at     ǯ    Ǥ If we consider that Leǯ
lesser argument is a possibility, that musical works can disappear, then a work like Giant 
Steps disappears if all records of the work are erased and forgotten from memory 
(remembering that the notes on pages are merely representations of the work). We store 
video games in all kinds of ways, e.g., hard drive, website, memory stick, etc., but those 
and the computer hardware that instantiate them can all be easily damaged or wiped 
clean. These, like musical notes on paper or chess pieces are only the representations (or 
the implementations) of the work so their destruction does not necessarily entail the loss 
of a work. Whether or not an erased and forgotten video game entails a destroyed work 
of art or merely a forgotten one that lingers on depends on our interpretation of indicated 
(and algorithmic) structures. I will continue with the possibilities of this and my reasons 
to prefer one of these accounts shortly.  
Viewing video games as an abstract artefact is tempting because it allows for abstract 
things to come into existence when circumstances call for them to, but this theory makes 
the repeatable, differing displays a curiosity. We normally recognize the displays of music 
as repeatable things but, like Rossberg points out, this account does not offer us any good 
reason to think we can repeat a specific work. HoweverǡǮǯ
again, even if a specific musical performance, if it is a particular object, cannot be 
repeated. What does seem appropriate to say, at the very least, that abstract artefacts are 
relevant for the concept of video games more generally and that, like marriage, exists as 
a constructed norm that came into existence when the idea of playing a video game 
occurred. By this view, the concept of video games would last as long as the norm of 
creating and playing a video game endures. However, more needs to be said about 
individual video game works (e.g., Undertale, Dishonored), which might not be as 
enduring as the concept. 
 
There is an additional option we have not yet considered, which is to say that video games Ǯ-ǯǤ24 Smith begins with a 
discussion on the game of chess. According to his view, the board and chess pieces are 
representations of a game, and the game itself is not tied to any specific object or location, 
making it a repeatable work (Smith also recognizes that two people can play chess 
without the board and pieces, but ideas and concepts are still representations and so an Ǯ-betweenǯȌǤhough these works are not tied to a particular 
object, they are tied to an historical context and time due to specific actions of an 
individual. If video games are quasi-abstract then they are not tied to their hardware, etc., 
but are still the results of human creativity. But does this work for video games in the way 
it does for chess?  
                                                          




Let us return to the example of T.O.T. Suppose that during those three early years when 
the printed document was the only existing instance of the work that someone 
accidentally spilled coffee on it, making it illegible. Since the program was deleted from 
the mainframe, the coffee-spilled paper is the only remaining instance of the work, but if 
this too is destroyed, is the work also destroyed? We can answer this question in two 
different ways. One, if video games are abstract in the orthodox way then, while it may no 
longer be playable (exist in an experiential state), the algorithmic structure exists 
indefinitely in an inaccessible state. Two, if they are abstract in the quasi way, then, like 
the game of chess, we should be able to experience an instance of the work even without 
the usual video game representations, including program and hardware.  
 
To be sure, we can roleplay certain adventures that a specific video game entails, and we 
already know the displays and interactivity between some video games and role-playing 
games like D&D are similar. However, assuming the files are gone, we could only engage 
with some of the lusory and narrative features of the work in our minds, not everything 
else that the CGA consists of. Therefore, applying ǯto video games seems ǤǯThe Night Watch is destroyed in a fire, our memory of 
it does not entail its existence. Although a quasi-abstract theory works for games like 
chess, there is no real way to play T.O.T in our heads, nor is there a way to do so from the 
analog-T.O.T. This shows us that video games are more than their rulesets and stories. 
Video games include art assets (including visual and audio elements), as well as rely on a 
specific kind of interactivity for their possibility sets, which are all made possible via the 
CGA. Therefore, another and more plausible way to answer this question is, if video games 
are abstract in the in-between sense, then it would seem for T.O.T to exist, Rawitsch or 
some other individual would need to have memorised the source code in order to 
maintain its preservation (imagining the coffee ruined the document). In other words, it 
is my view that T.O.T. must be in a condition where it is able to be instanced, otherwise, 
the coffee destroys the work along with analog -T.O.T. Games like chess and musical 
works are more easily memorised than video games, making these latter works more 
vulnerable than the former.  
 
To sum up, it is clear that video games are likely candidates of abstract art categories. It 
is also clear that they differ from other abstract works such as music and literature, as 
well as from games like chess. That being the case, we can offer some versions of the 
above theories and apply it to video games, but with subtle differences from the abstract 
works they normally pertain to. That is to say, video games are created (or indicated), 
they are comprised of abstract features, they are repeatable, and they are repeatable with 
differing displays. Furthermore, once a video game has been created, although it need not 
be re-programmed to exist, it must remain in a re-programmable state, a state in which a 
new program can implement the same algorithm. In other words, it is my view that video 
games exist in a somewhat abstract state, but they can be created and destroyed. 
Therefore, it would seem that Mike Mika is correct in saying that video games can be 
jeopardy of being lost forever. 
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Chapter 9: Me, Myself & My Avatar: Virtual Reality and Empathy1 
 
So far, I have addressed video games very broadly in order to discuss an ontological 
account of such works. Now, I direct my attention more specifically to games that use 
virtual technology and focus on players and empathy. Although this chapter emphasises 
a distinctive experience that virtual reality (VR) games might afford players, there are 
currently fewer examples to draw upon than there are with video games in general. For 
that reason, I will use both examples throughout this chapter as needed.  
Within philosophy of art it is well defended that certain narratives can elicit the kinds of 
imaginings that allow us to empathise with a fictional character, be it stories from film or 
literature. 2 VR offers a distinctive way to engage with stories via an immersive, simulated, 
and interactive experience and so they are also promising candidates for empathy. Since 
VR stories grant us access to the characters with a perceptually robust experience, should 
wonder what implications VR has for our emotional engagement with narratives and our 
player-characters. 
VR creates an immersive experience where players feel as though they are physically Ǯǯ
the story. Not all VR games consist of narratives, of course, but those that do will often 
include nuanced characters, intricate stories, and game designs. These characteristics can 
blur distinctions between the real and fictional. Therefore, it can be expected that VR 
narrative games have the capacity to evoke a wide variety of heightened emotions in 
players because of the events they experience. Such is the case for player Jordan Belamire 
who claims she was sexually assaulted in the VR world when playing the archery game 
QuiVr.3 Disembodied male hands belonging to another player continually groped and 
chased Belamire through the VR world, although she repeatedly demanded that the other 
player stop. For Belamire, this assault was real, but many of the dissenting online voices 
claimed otherwise because they viewed these kinds of incidents to be merely virtual 
experiences belonging to a world of make-believe. However, online harassment scholar 
Katherine Cross makes a good point in response to this case: we cannot laud the reality 
of VR on the one hand, and claim there are no real consequences from VR on the other.4  
The above describes a player who feels she was assaulted, rather than solely feeling her 
that character had been fictionally Ǥǡǯ
empathy, but it does say something significant about the realness of the VR experience; it 
would seem then, the reality of VR can make us feel as though we strongly connect with 
our charactersǯ in the gameworld. More specifically, the immersion and the 
actions of players can help them to feel like they understand their avatars, or the player-
                                                          
1 Ǯ
ǫǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
feedback on an earlier draft.  
2 Matravers in Coplan & Goldie (2011), p. 19. 
3 Cross, K. (2016, November). Online Harm is Real. Slate Magazine. URL: 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/11/sexual_harassment_in_virtual_reality_
is_real.html. Retrieved on: Dec. 2016.  
4 The developers of QuiVr responded in favorably to Belamire and have been working on adding a safety 
mechanic to the game that allows gamers to create a virtual force field around their characters if they feel 
threatened. For more, see Cross (2016).  
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characters whose point of view they take in the game. The realness that Belamire 
describes gives VR a privileged position to induce empathy.  
Perhaps the interactivity makes the above true of applicable video games in general, 
which also entail distinctive affordances to explore a story (and make discoveries) in a 
process that is directed by the player rather than solely by the framework of the 
storytelling. This, along with the many hours one usually spends roleplaying a specific 
character will most likely bring about a variety of emotional responses in the player and 
perhaps the feeling that the player understands ǯemotions.  I have felt this to 
a degree for characters in non-VR games. For example, if Filipanova, my avatar in World 
of Warcraft, becomes injured or harmed in some way by another character in the 
gameworld then I, as the player, am likely to have a variety of affective responses, such as 
anger or concern, even though she is a fictional character. This response is in line with ǯ	ǤDoes my response mean that I can empathise with 
my avatar? How much more heightened would my responses be within the VR 
gameworld? For some, my responses characterise a lower level kind of emotional 
empathy very broadly construed. For other scholars, my responses characterise 
something more like sympathy because, for them, true empathy is a higher level, 
cognitive response which, as I will explain, requires intentionality and an ability to 
differentiate between our own emotions and the emotions belonging to another. In this 
chapter, I question whether such a narrow view of empathy is possible in gameplay.  
In what follows, although I am skeptical that higher level empathy normally occurs during 
gameplay, I argue that we can learn from our emotional responses with our avatars and 
that it is possible to empathise with game characters, at least on some lower level. VR 
presents audiences with a diverse set of (sometimes tactile) experiences that provoke 
automatic responses, making the lower level empathic responses more probable. As such, 
I will propose this account Ȃ ǯworthy to herself 
(perhaps surprising), she will reflect upon them later, better equipping her to transfer 
this knowledge to ordinary-life. This is not to suggest that the reflection of games is more 
important than the game or gameplay. As will unfold here, there are both occurrent and 
retrospective gains that are involved with playing a game.  
 
The popularity of video games and the nascent interest in VR makes gaming a valuable 
platform for learning because it enables the potential for empathy-like responses for a 
broad variety of people and situations that we may not otherwise encounter. This chapter 
explores such a possibility. Section I takes a closer look at VR games, especially of the kind 
that aim at empathic learning; section II takes a closer look at various conceptions of 
lower and higher level empathy and the conditions that distinguishes one from the other; 
section III analyses these lower and higher level empathic connections that VR games 
make possible and concludes that the former are more typical during gameplay; section 
IV is a discussion of mediated learning and how knowledge might transfer to different 
contexts (i.e., what we learn from VR can be transferred to the ordinary world); I end this 
chapter with some possible objections to my claims and I conclude with some solutions.    
 
9.1 VR Games 
Developers of video games (not necessarily VR) have recently pursued the idea that 
games have the capacity to enhance the learning experience of their players rather than 
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merely entertain the players. Hush is one such online (non-VR) video game developed 
with the intent to elicit empathic responses (by and large) for those living in war and 
genocide, but also, I would imagine, more generally for those who are less privileged and 
regularly live in fear. 5 You play the game from the perspective of Liliane, a Rwandan Tutsi 
mother living in the midst of the 1994 genocide. You are charged with comforting your 
young son, as you hide in a shack, by humming a lullaby to keep him quiet. If he makes a 
noise, he alerts the surrounding Hutu soldiers to your presence. To hum the lullaby 
adequately, you type out the pattern you see on your screen. The more accurately you 
repeat the pattern, the calmer your baby; the more you veer from the pattern, the more 
restless and noisy your baby becomes.  
Games like Hush belong to a relatively new gaming design platform created with an 
overall objective to foster skills during gameplay, which, in this case, ultimately aim at 
prosocial behaviour, all without losing the lusory, i.e., game-like experience.6 In general, 
VR is used for things like education, training, PTSD therapy, design simulations and, more 
recently, for entertainment purposes (film and gaming).7 Newer gaming technology that 
allows for VR immersion has growing interest in the video game industry. Technological 
glasses or goggles, devices such as the Oculus Rift, HTC Vive, Samsung Gear VR, Google 
Cardboard, make you feel like you are inside the gameworld in a first-person perspective. 
Additionally, players can interact with a scene without a film-like frame and explore the 
virtual world by moving their actual bodies. Within these environments, players 
experience worlds and perspectives that are not their own and from the point of view of 
their player-character. VR equip    ǯ  to affect the 
actions of the character. This further emphasises the control a player maintains over the 
player-character, which further allows the player to act as an interpretative performer, 
which I described in Chapter 6. 
But what is VR? ǡǡǡǮ
systems are dynamic representations of an artificial worldǯ.8 Although the 
representations belong within an artificial world, Aarseth importantly states that,  
virtual worlds technology is not about creating alternatives to reality, 
but about interpreting and understanding our own reality.9              Ǯǯ 
something thaǮǯǮ-that-are-ǯǤ
and again as it is applied to virtual Ǯǯmoney, friendships, and the like. Here, I  ǯ             often 
credited, and VR games provide us with radically new ways of learning.10 Of course, video 
                                                          
5 Hush by Jamie Antonisse and Devon Johnson. Click here to play: http://www.jamieantonisse.com/hush/.  
6 For more on these kinds of games, see Values at Play: http://valuesatplay.org/. Accessed August 2016.  
7 See: Difede et al. (2004); Rothbaum et al (2001). 
8 Aarseth (2001). 





games and VR games can also cause negative consequences, which is something I briefly 
touch on later on.  
Video games will at times represent your character as an avatar, or the player-character 
you see on the screen in front of you, but VR immersion prevents you from seeing your 
character in the same way. Instead, you might perceive aspects of your character like a 
wisp of hair, a limb, or a foot, and sometimes by sound alone. I am not too concerned 
whether or not your VR character is an avatar or represented as a player-character in 
front of you. Either representation is the primary means for understanding the 
gameworld and overcoming the obstacles.11 Moving forward, I will interchangeably use ǮǯǮ-ǯǤ 
Autumn is a VR game that, like Hush, aims at empathic responses using real-life 
scenarios.12 The description reads:   Ǯ   ǯ  uring the months 
following a sexual assault: her struggles with herself and the world Ǥǯ
season, beginning with summer, months after the attack and following 
her transformative recovery into finding a sense of hope. Spring focuses 
on confronting others, and coping with the feelings of judgement and 
shame which can too often follow an experience of rape. Winter portrays 
the deepest pits of her trauma: the fear of leaving the house, constant    Ǥ ǮǡȏǤǤǤȐ     Ǥǯ13 
Articles applaud games like Autumn as therapeutic gameplay that claims to treat PTSD, 
and ǡǮǫǯ14 I see 
no rǯǡǣ        ǯ ǡ     not 
experienced what our avatar has and, can that knowledge allow us to empathise with our 
characters? 
9.2 Empathy 
Before continuing a discussion of VR game characters and players, we first need a better 
understanding of what empathy is. In general terms, empathy is understanding the 
emotions or mindset of another person. It is important to recognise that there are both  
                                                          
11 What we should also find interesting about avatars is they say nothing of the person controlling them. ǯs gender, race, age, or appearance. In fact, often times players will 
gender-ǯǤ
interest in character representations to the functional gaming abilities a character has. This can have a 
significant epistemic impact on the players, a phenomenon that becomes important to my discussion of 
empathy in this chapter.  
12 This game is currently in beta testing (and, at this rate, may never see the light of day).  
13 https://killscreen.com/articles/autumn-oculus-rift-experience-tackles-post-traumatic-stress-
surviving-rape/. Accessed March 2016. 
14 http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/01/treating-ptsd-with-the-oculus-
rift/384262/. Accessed March 2016. 
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broad15 and narrow16 conceptions of empathy, and they can be discussed as both a 
psychological and an epistemic phenomenon.17  
Adam Morton presents this broad definition of empathy, 
One person, A, has empathy for another, B, with respect to a particular 
state of mind, when B experiences an emotion or attitude and A has a   ǯ       
perspective.18 ǯ    mpathy means more than understanding another ǯ Ǥ        than this, but it is 
general enough to initially describe empathy as a shared emotion or attitude of another Ǥǯ
we each have a higher or lower disposition to do to so, which some suspect is linked to 
our innate perspectives and attitudes. However, some believe that empathy can be 
induced, or taught.19 That we might learn how to empathise is, of course, is profoundly 
interesting to some game developers.  
There are two overarching categories of empathy: one pertains to emotional empathy and 
the other to cognitive empathy. First, emotional empathy refers to a broad range of 
emotions or affects that are automatic, not intentional. By intentional, I mean that a 
person is deliberate about trying to empathise with another individual. Emotional 
empathy suggests that a person accidentally feels for another even when she has not 
premeditated to do so. Usually, these automatic responses are characterised as lower 
level emotions, or for some, as a quasi-empathy. Emotions such as care, sympathy, or 
concern, often qualify as empathy, but only in the folk sense or for philosophers whose 
concept of empathy is painted with a broad brush.  For example, consider a scenario 
where you observe a bully traumatizing a victim. If you have experienced this situation 
before, then you might automatically feel the same emotions that the victim does (e.g., 
fear) even though you were not aiming to do so. On the other hand, this situation might 
automatically elicit different emotions in each of you (e.g., you might feel pity or concern, 
while the victim might feel fear or shame). For some philosophers, this is a kind of 
empathy even though the observer and victim experience different but similar feelings 
(e.g., sympathy and fear).  
Another form of lower level empathy is called emotional contagion, a term that describes ǯ, but without any knowledge of why you are 
doing so, e.g., such as when you reflexively begin to smile or giggle because you hear two 
strangers laughing at a table next to you. Although the bully example above could 
characterise a kind of contagion, or at least it could lead to an emotional contagion, the      Ǯǯ  
                                                          
15 Lopes, in Coplan & Goldie (2011). 
16 Following those such as Amy Coplan, Derek Metravers, Al Baker (see footnote below).  
17 Baker-Graham, Alex. (2016), Feeling Like Stories, Empathy and the Narrative Perspective (Doctoral 
dissertation to The University of Sheffield). 
18 Morton (2011), p. 319. 
19 Shapiro, Morrison, & Boker, J. (2004), p. 73-84. 
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Ǯǯǯhter, yet appears to be similarly affected. Both examples 
are psychological, lower level empathic responses that occur automatically and do not 
require any intention or control on the part of the observer (the empathiser). Those who 
maintain a broader definition of empathy would say that the different, but similar, 
affective states described above are sufficient to constitute a kind of empathy.20 For 
others, these are not examples of true empathy. 
Murray Smith conceptualises a narrower view of empathy and characterises the above 
aǮ-ǯǡǮ-ǯǡ
necessary for true empathy.21 This brings us to the cognitive kind of empathy that differs 
from the general feelings of concern or sympathy already described. Unlike emotional 
empathy, cognitive empathy is an intentional process that requires an individual to 
deliberately aim at empathising with another. This requires perspective-taking, for which 
there are two different approaches.  
Firstly, you can hold the perspective of imagining Ǯǯǯ
better understanding of how they might feel (by imagining how you would feel in their ȌǤǡǯ
by focussing on what the other person is feeling. Instead of imagining how you might feel 
in their place, you imagine what they are feeling in their place. This latter process requires 
the observer to focus on the perspective of the other person, rather than her own. 
Although both of these perspective-taking processes involve a stricter, intentional 
approach than the requirements of emotional empathy, the latter example takes on     ǯǤǡ
although empathy requires imagination to personalise an observed experience, the way 
we proceed with these processes bears on the kinds of affective responses we, as 
observes, experience.  
A narrow account of empathy stipulates that only the perspective-taking that imagines 
the feelings of the other can induce genuine empathy because when we imagine what the 
other feels, we are better able to simulate (and understand) their emotions. Alternatively,  Ǯ-her-ǯ    -involved and can lead to (although not 
necessarily) responses of concern or sympathy in the same manner that emotional 
empathy can.  In other words, it has more to do with your emotions. Amy Coplan classifies 
these two approaches as other-oriented-perspective-taking and self-oriented 
perspective-taking, which she views as distinct and not necessarily equal. As Coplan 
states it, both characterise Ǯan imaginative process through which one constructs another ǯ           ǯ
situation.ǯ22 However, as the categories imply, one perspective focuses on the target, 
whereas the other focuses on the self. For Coplan, both perspectives can be valuable, but 
                                                          
20 Additionally, it is suggested that, unlike anger, happiness, or frustration, empathy is not an emotion 
and, therefore, affective matching need not be requisite of empathy (while not denying there can also be 
some kind of match).    
21 Smith in Coplan & Goldie (2011), p. 103.  
22 Coplan, Ibid, p. 9. 
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other-perspective-taking is the more accurate route toward empathy. I will briefly look 
at each in turn.  
Let us being with the self-oriented-perspective-taking, which is requires a process of 
imagining yourself ǯ 
closer to their state of mind. For example, if my friend tells me how happy it makes her to 
have the companionship of her pet dog, I might try to put myself in her position by 
imagining that I ǤǮ-her-ǯ
because, since this imaginative perspective is more self-oriented, the resulting emotions 
will be dissimilar to the emotions of the other person. Murray Smith calls this process Ǯ- ǯǡǡ ǡ ǡ ǲa variation of my 
own state of affairsǳǤ23  If, for example, I do not enjoy pets, I might imagine the wrong 
things associated with owning one, like what the dog would make the house smell like, 
cleaning up after it, fur on the furniture, the noise, or a host of other negative things. My 
response to this imagining might be genuine, but it does not indicate anything beyond a 
general or personal sense of what is, in this case, my own aversion to owning pets. Clearly, 
this is a different result than the feeling of happiness my friend describes and, as such, 
Coplan would suggest my self-orientated perspective-taking is not a reliable process 
towards empathy. Additionally, Coplan and others claim it is problematic to try and  ǯ        that is entirely ǯǡ. For example, if reading a 
mystery novel makes me happy I could use that scenario to imagine ǯ
in place of owning a dog. However, while it might help me to match the happiness my 
friend describes, the experiences are unrelated. For some, taking a different imaginative 
route to force a similar valence does not count as empathetic understanding because the 
processes are unrelated. 
 
Alternatively, other-oriented perspective-taking describes a process in which one     ǯ    in an effort  Ǯǯ ǯs point of view.24        ǯ  
emotions, to some degree, separate from our own, which, ideally, can reduce our potential   ǡ Ǯ  ǯǡ Ǥ   I ǯǡ
focus on the emotions she expresses and feelsǡǡǡǮ-focussed ǯǤ25 ǡ Ǯǯ     nto a kind of emotional contagion 
because, as Coplan points out, other-oriented-perspective-taking is not always possible 
100% of the time since we cannot magically become the other person.26  For this reason, 
Coplan stipulates that the observer must also be able to differentiate between her own   ǯǡ self-other-differentiation. Here, the observer 
views a distinct boundary between themselves and the target and recognises that each of 
the participants  Ǯ Ǥǯ27 Coplan writes that without self-other 
                                                          
23 Smith, Ibid., p. 101. 
24 Coplan, Ibid., p. 13. 
25 Smith, Ibid, p. 101 
26 Coplan, Ibid., p. 15. 
27 Ibid., p. 16. 
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differentiation, Ǯwe either lose our sense of self and become enmeshed or, more often, we 
let our imaginative process become contaminated by our self-perspective and thus end 
up engaged in a simulation that fails to replicate the experience of the other.ǯ28 In other 
words, without self-other differentiation, our emotional responses are automatic rather 
than controlled and cognitive.  
Both emotional and cognitive empathy are connected to observation and imagination, or, 
as Smith puts it, ǲa vivid mental projection of a possible state of affairsǳǤ29 Generally, we 
use the representations of facial expressions and other expressive behaviour of 
characters found within narratives to guide our understanding of a character and their 
affective state. In accompaniment with observation and imagination, the empathiser will ǯǤǡ
it, does not necessarily entail empathy in the narrow sense, but neuroscience suggests  ǡ  ǡ        Ǥ  ǯ ǡǲmimicry of basic actions and emotions may scaffold the imagination, including the 
empathic imagination, of more elaborate, finely-specified states of mindǳ.30 
Although it is generally thought that the knowledge gained from the other-perspective-
taking can be more accurate, the narrow conception that Coplan presents does not allow 
for empathy with fictional characters, given the perspective taking she discusses. ǯǡ
alone, or if she and her character were assaulted. But it is an interesting question because 
this also shows the difficulty players have in maintaining a self-other differentiation (at 
times).  That being the case, all forms of empathy are viewed as relevant and potentially 
useful. The following section will take a closer look at the kind of responses that VR games 
are likely to entail.  
9.3 VR Games and Empathy 
 
Narratives engage our minds and potentially enhance our understanding of a particular 
situation or emotion.31 Susan Faegin makes the case that simulating mental activity is an 
easier process with fictions than with actual people in ordinary life because the fiction is 
created for people who actively seek it out to appreciate it.32 This is certainly true of video 
games, which are created for a specific but very broad audience. Game developers whose 
objective is to evoke empathic responses are more likely to employ gaming mechanics for 
inducing empathy, rather than rely on the predispositions of players (but not at the 
expense of the gaming features lest they lose their demographic). Of course, empathy in 
this sense is intended broadly, and it is normally the case that within folk concepts of 
empathy all forms of empathy are taken to be important on some level. It is my view that 
lower-level empathy is more likely to occur during gameplay than the higher-level 
empathy, which is probably more standard in the ordinary world as well. But first, how 
do we engage with our characters in games like Hush and Autumn?  
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 Smith, Ibid., p. 101. 
30 Ibid., p. 102 (original italics).  
31 Following Clark and Chalmers, Smith discusses this in terms of the extended mind. See Smith (2011), p. 
106; Clark & Chalmers (1998) p 7.  
32 Feagin in Coplan & Goldie (2011), p. 161.  
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It is widely believed that we are more likely to empathise with a person if we feel we are 
familiar with their state of mind.33 Stories within film and literature grant us access to 
characters and we attend to them in a particular order and time so that we might become 
familiar with the characters. Earlier, I said that video games grant the player an incredible 
degree of freedom. Video games allow us to achieve certain features on our own, which 
bears on the (potentially different) outcomes of the game. VR games, like video games, 
allow for a similar process but one in which you physically direct the story as the 
character. Like video games, players gain a significant degree of knowledge about their 
characters through the many hours one will usually invest in gameplay. Depending on the 
game type, this familiarity can condition the player to aptly interpret and understand 
their character over time (not to suggest that there is any single way to interpret a player-
character).  
 
That so, it is not just about the immersive experience of VR that grants access to the 
characters in a robust way, it is the kinds of play the visual representations permit us. I 
will explain. When reading a book or watching a film, we imagine all sorts of things about 
the characters that are intrinsic or extrinsic to the story. Smith states that representation 
and narration may augment empathy because fictions aid us by expanding the 
personalities, occurrences, and feelings we are normally used to observing and 
experiencing in ordinary life.34 With video games, it is common for players to make 
choices in the game in virtue of what is not allowed in society, or what is abnormal for 
their own behaviors. VR extends this because the technology allows players to mirror the 
character(s) in a physical, not just imaginative simulation, and in a manner that 
intentionally determines outcomes for our character.  
 
Actions may enhance our understanding of a particular situation, environment, or 
concept, which is something ǯǮǯǤ35 For example, the act of writing a to-do list might help us to feel 
more organised, or writing out a word may help us to spell it correctly, or, to use the given 
example, rearranging Scrabble tiles can help us process word patterns more easily. These 
actions (and props) increase our cognitive abilities even though, for example, we are 
capable of correctly spelling words without writing them out.  A game can be an equally 
useful sense-making prop. Ted Friedman notes that tests reveal that players see 
themselves as not just the character in the gameworld, but as the whole screen, in a 
manner of speaking.36 Drawing on this, Newman points out that in more character driven 
games, even ones like Super Mario Bros.,      ȏǥȐ     ǯ Ǥ        
player learns to think is better conceived of as an irreducible complex of 
locations, scenario and types of action.37 
If this is so, then games comprise a great deal of epistemic complexity but also 
phenomenological opportunity when we can move like our player-character.  
                                                          
33 This is also why, problematically, we tend to empathize with those we feel more connected to (race, 
religion, socio-economic background, etc.) 
34 Smith in Coplan & Goldie, p. 109-111. 
35 Ibid., p. 106. 
36 Friedman (1995). 




In addition to this phenomenology, research shows that rather than leaving empathic 
responses to chance, games have a greater influence on players to empathise if they are 
aware that empathy is a goal.38 This aligns with the intentionality that philosophers 
ascribe to in characterising empathy instead of the automatic affective responses. That 
so, an objective to induce empathy requires some creativity in how it is presented to the 
player so the intended goal does not take away from the lusory aspect of the work. In 
recognition of this, developers of Hush make this the first message to appear on your 
screen,  
Rwanda, 1994: The Hutu are coming, Liliane. Hide your child. If you 
falter in your lullaby, he will grow restless. The soldier will hear him, 
and he will come for you. Ǯǯǡ
connection between you and the fictional character from the very beginning (contrast 
this with a message that could have read: This is Liliane, a ǥȌǤ
Additionally, the mechanic of typing the lullaby pattern as you see the corresponding 
letters appear on screen, instead of hitting a single button, is an innovative technique that 
is unique from the usual point-and-click, or pushing of a single key commonly associated 
with shooting at a simulated target.39  ǯ     
potential importance toward an enhanced empathic imagination. Instead of merely 
perceiving certain mimickings within the game (aǯ
Strangers on a Train), the physical actions you make as the player are intended to match 
the intensity of the features within the work. One possible disadvantage of VR is that ǯns and affect expressed on their faces like we 
can see when watching a movie.  
However, in playing Hush, the action of typing creates a parallel between the intensity of 
your own ǡ  ǡ    ǯ    
circumstances of the game (it is not enough that you type the pattern correctly, but that 
you do it at the correct time, neither too soon or too late). Although I could read about the 
Rwandan genocide to learn about fear, playing Hush gives me a phenomenologically 
different perspective, if not to any specific event, to the potential emotions and plight of 
a genocide survivor. VR games allow for a greater mimicry of actions with the kinds of 
representations they consist of compared to games like Hush. At least, what we think   ǯ Ǥ        ǯ
experiences in Autumn is unprecedented. To be able to perceive the sights and sounds 
such as quicker breathing, heightened heart rate, or faster footfall while you run from Ǯyourǯ attacker allows you to do more than imagine yourself in her situation because you, 
in a manner, act out certain scenarios in a kinetic and perceptually vivid way. When 
playing Autumn, both you and your character might feel panicked, sad, or lonely at given 
stages of the game because you perceive and imagine yourself to be in the situation.  
                                                          




This process leads to a personal imagining of our characters because, in a way, we become 
responsible for them. The perceptual process allows you to imagine their mental and 
affective states, which may elicit responses that either mirror the perceived emotions in 
a matched sense or resemble the perceived emotions in a reactive way (as with the 
example of the bullying scenario in the section above). What results, whether fear, 
indignation, concern, frustration, shame, etc., might consist of both automatic and 
intentional responses that relate to emotional and cognitive empathy in a broad sense. At 
minimum, the relationship we share with the characters qualifies as empathy under the 
definition presented towards the beginning of this chapter. That being the case, what of 
empathy in the narrow sense? 
Recall that narrow conceptions of empathy require a perspective-taking in which you 
imagine what the other, not yourself, is feeling. Because these games are self-involved, 
there can be no doubt that a strong sense of engagement is likely to occur between you 
and who you imagine your character to be; whether or not you approach your character 
with that kind of other-perspective-taking during gameplay, or whether you can even ǯǤǯǡ-perspective taking need not occur 
100% of the time. Although a player is likely to experience self-perspective-taking more 
frequently, other-perspective might not be entirely incongruent with the overall attitude 
that one normally takes when playing a game.40 This has to do with the attitude players 
adopt during gameplay, as defined by Suits. 
If we take what we have learned about various gameplay attitudes from the previous 
chapters, then we know players focus on more than just fulfilling a ruleset. Broadly 
speaking, while there is an expectation that a player engages in gameplay to compete and 
win the game, the emphasis for the player is in experiencing the process of the game as 
prescribed by the rules.41 In cases such as Autumn, I can play to finish the game, but the 
process also entails overcoming the obstacles that are intended to induce empathy for 
the rape victim. For game developers, the mechanics for eliciting empathy is a promising 
implication of games. However, in order for higher level empathic responses to occur my 
primary motivation during gameplay must consist in a controlled perspective on what I    ǯ Ǥ        
maintain the perspective on my character at all times and not my own is unlikely (some 
might claim it is not possible at all given that I am role-playing the fictional character, but 
these are nonetheless prescribed by the narrative).  
In accord, I would claim that during gameplay empathic understanding (to any degree) is 
usually the result of automatic responses, or other non-epistemic mechanics of empathy 
that I gain along the way. 42  This, of course, is a different kind of engagement than 
intentional perspective-taking. That so, we should not separate higher level empathy 
from gameplay altogether. Importantly, VR games allow one to roleplay the character and 
not merely to engage with a character like we do with novels. This will usually consist in 
                                                          
40 Suits (1978) suggests it is not just for the winning, but we play games to experience the obstacles. 
41 ǡ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the player consciously making decisions based on what they believe their character 
would do rather than project their own state of mind into the situation (this might return 
us to a discussion of SIIFs). These cases are not necessarily Ǯ-her-shoes-ǯ
because a player will surely be aware that they are behaving in a manner not customary 
to themselves or relevant to their current ordinary-life situation, thus making self-other-
differentiation attainable. Overall, such a strict conception of empathy like ǯ, 
seems to make empathising with any fictional character an impossibility.  
For those sceptical that a player can experience high level empathy during gameplay, 
there are still important implications from the more basic, lower level responses (relating 
to contagion, etc.) either during gameplay or after.  I want to suggest that the mimicry of 
lower level affective responses during gameplay can motivate higher level empathic 
responses at a later time, perhaps after some reflection. For other narratives, Smith refers 
to this as occurrent and retrospective empathic responses.43  These kinds of retrospective 
actions (or reflections) of gameplay may play an important role when engaging with 
individuals in the real world. I will discuss this further in the next section before I 
consider a few possible objections to what is presented above.  
9.4 Empathy and Prosocial Behavior 
Recent studies indicate that a person who is instructed to empathize prior to engaging 
with the target seems to yield more positive results (i.e., care or concern) than those left 
to dispositional empathy.44 Games can induce emotions either occurrently or 
retrospectively where players may feel emotions like sympathy, concern, frustration, and 
many others, toward their character and other characters during gameplay or after. This 
presumes we can learn from games at all, rather than only be entertained by them. A 
particularly devastating meta-study from 1973 reported that almost fifty different 
studies showed a negligible difference in learning acquisition among students who played 
games to learn versus those that used more traditional methods of learning.45 That so, 
games have undoubtedly changed since the 70s and more recent experiments and 
research suggest video games can teach skill sets as well as affect behavioral outcomes. 
None of these studies are entirely conclusive because pinpointing the causal relation 
between gameplay and specific actions that are made later on is difficult, especially when 
trying to isolate actions that arise from certain predisposed attitudes versus learnt ones.  
We also have to remember that if prosocial behavior can be learned from gameplay, then 
we have to acknowledge that games can entail antisocial ones as well. That may well be 
the case and certainly warrants investigation, but given the scope of this chapter, I do not 
want to discount the potentially positive role that even less savory characters or player 
actions might actually have. For example, after I successfully accomplished the overall 
goal of Hush I had a morbid curiosity to find out what it was like to make the kid restless, 
which I did the next time I played the game. This might indicate questionable motives on 
my part, but I would not have experienced the degree of reprehension I felt had I not 
played the game this way. It is important to recognize that it is common for players to act 
in ways that are unusual compared to how they would in ordinary life. While this might 
sound concerning, I believe it is not only these less honorable moments that can be useful 
                                                          
43 Ibid. 
44 Belman & Flanagan (2010). 
45 Wentworth et al. (1973), p. 432-440. 
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teaching tools, but it is the collection of various playthroughs that help us frame our 
understanding of a particular situation. In short, when we play a video game, we learn 
more about a situation the more times we play through it and from the different outcomes 
of each.46  
Although much of the earlier literature on video games focused on negative outcomes of 
gameplay, more recent studies indicate an increasing interest to locate positive results of 
gameplay. A comprehensive review of video game literature reports that data-based 
studies show evidence that video games can lead to knowledge and induce affective and 
motivational outcomes.47 Empirical data such as those in the study suggests that gaming 
can be used as an instructional tool. However, understanding a skill and applying it in the 
real-world are not the same thing. There are concerns that knowledge transfer requires 
a similar context (not necessarily representational resemblance) between the virtual and 
real worlds in order for there to be any efficacy.48 That so, game developers demonstrate 
a desire to create games with targeted transferrable skills by mechanics built into the 
narrative.49 One such case that shows a knowledge transfer from the virtual to real is 
summarized by Belman and Flanagan: 
Foubert and Perry (2007) describe an empathy-based rape prevention 
program designed for fraternity members and male student athletes. 
Participants were particularly affected by part of the program in which 
they viewed a videotape describing the rape of a male police officer by 
two other males. Their feedback indicates that they were induced to          ǯ   
prior to viewing the video.50 
Instead of merely stipulating to the audience that the road to recovery after a rape can be 
exceptionally difficult, the video allows the audience to come to this understanding 
through the narrative of the victim. Belman and Flanagan go on to emphasise one ǯ
previously that women find themselves in these situations regularly. Although this is not 
a game, and this says nothing of changed behaviour, these game developers suggest that 
it shows how video games can be used. For at least this one participant, concern for the 
subject of the film (the police officer) was later applied to a broader group (women in 
general). This gives reason to believe our attitudes, at the very least, can be affected by    ǯ   ǡ     
potential to inform our actions. Mafia III (2016) is a popular video game lauded for 
inducing empathy for people of colour by creating the main protagonist as biracial in the 
1960s American South.51 If by playing games we can learn certain feelings associated with 
racism or a traumatic assault then those same emotions can be triggered to make us more 
                                                          
46 Thank you to Henry Pratt for pushing me on this.  
47 Connolly, et al. (2012). 
48 Detterman, et al. (1993). Ablex, et al. (1901). (both cited in Squire (2002)). 
49 This is currently seen most notably with organizations like Tiltfactor 
(http://www.tiltfactor.org/about/) and Values at Play (http://valuesatplay.org/).  
50 Belman & Flanagan (2010), p. 9. 
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aware of real issues around us that we may have otherwise ignored or were simply 
oblivious to. If mimicry is as effectual as believed, then VR games should have significant 
outcomes comparable to the videotape experiment and, perhaps to video games more 
generally.  
To summarise, ideas, presumably, can affect action; while this causal chain may be 
difficult to test, there are indications that video games might allow for knowledge transfer 
from one context (gameworld) to another (ordinary world). In fact, there may be broader 
applications that go beyond the interpersonal. One study shows that induced empathy for 
plants and animals have strong links to proenvironmental behavior (and attitudes) later 
on.52 There are of course negative aspects of empathy, let alone games. Although space 
here will not allow me to discuss all potential concerns, the final section will address a 
few. 
9.5 Objections 
If VR games can induce prosocial behaviors and affects, we have to concede that they can 
induce negative ones, or that perhaps empathy will be applied for immoral reasons. 
Indeed, psychologists note that in some cases of bullying, the bully may have a strong 
perspective-taking sense. Empathy works negatively in this case and gives the bully a 
better understanding of their target and, consequently, better enables the bully to 
manipulate the target. If that is so, we should call into question whether cognitive 
empathy is always sufficient for positive responses or outcomes. As with Jordan ǯǡ
use a level of empathic understanding to be injurious rather than helpful to others. Given 
that video games are things we play with and, not only interact with on a gaming level, 
but interact on a psychological level, we should expect there will be positive and negative 
effects of gaming. Although I will focus on the former outcomes, I will address the 
negative ones as necessary in order to show a wide range of evidence.  
Several meta-studies from the early 2000s report a direct relationship between higher 
aggression in those who play violent video games.53 The analytics reveal similar 
outcomes as watching violent films, but with some indications there may be a wider effect 
from video games.54 Although it was later supposed (by the original psychologists who 
conducted the studies and others) that publication bias contributed to the analyses of 
these earlier studies, it turns out we cannot disregard the findings altogether.55 What is 
thought to be an improved testing method still shows that playing violent video games 
might be responsible for increased aggressive behavior and decreased empathy and 
prosocial behavior in players over a period of time.56 Another meta-study in Italy reveals 
that playing sexist and violent video games potentially makes young males less 
sympathetic to an in-real-life female appearing to be abused by a male (whereas, no 
                                                          
52 This would clearly be a case of lower level empathic responses. For more on this study, see: Berenguer, 
(2007). 
53 ǲǡǡǡ
and with lower leveǤǳǤȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ ? ? ?Ǥ	
studies on negative outcome of violent video games, see Anderson (2004); Anderson & Bushman (2001); 
Anderson et al. (2004); Sherry (2001) 
54 Anderson et al. (2010). 
55 To read more about publication bias and video games see, Anderson et al. (2010), Ferguson (2007a) 
and (2007b), and Rothstein et al. (2005). 
56 This particular study was not conducted with anyone over the age of 16 and was mainly testing 
differences between eastern and western cultures. Anderson et al. (2010). 
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differences were shown in females after playing the same games).57 In yet another study, 
experiments reveal that empathy might not factor at all in reducing aggressive behavior 
after playing violent video games. Although each of the experiments mentioned here have 
limitations, the unknown long-term effects not being the least of them, they show us that 
game developers (and teachers and parents) should take the implications of playing 
gratuitously violent video games seriously.   
There is a growing number of game developers who are making such considerations. Due 
to a recent report that suggested there is a potentially greater efficacy in prosocial 
behavior when an observer uses a combination of emotional and cognitive empathy, some 
game developers have begun beta testing different gaming platforms in an attempt to 
induce both kinds of empathy.58 Of course, empathy in these cases are applied in general 
terms and so they do not offer an absolute account of induced higher-level empathy via 
gameplay. However, what I want to suggest is this, even scenarios where games induce 
only lower level emotional ȋǤǤǡȌȋǤǡǮ-her-ǯ
cognitive response), then plausibly these emotions evoked in the virtual world can be 
combined and put to use toward higher level cognitive empathy in the real world. There 
is always a danger that empathy will be employed for immoral reasons, but that may have 
more to do with the predisposition of the individual rather than with the game. It will be 
nice to see, as with QuiVR, games designed with preventative features that defend against 
immoral behavior.   
As stated above, gratuitously violent video games may pose problems for certain types of 
players but some philosophers argue there are other issues to consider. Adam Morton 
sees a risk in a different possibility, not that we will use empathy for immoral reasons,          Ǯ ǯǤ   
following thought experiment: the wife of an abusive husband witnesses her husband 
belittle and harass a co-worker of his. Because she has an understanding of how her 
husband reasons, she empathizes with how her husband feels and why he acts so 
egregiously, given certain annoying idiosyncrasies of the co-worker. As a result, she   ǯ -than-professional actions toward his co-worker. In this 
scenario, she empathizes with the wrong person, which is detrimental to the co-worker 
and potentially herself.  I agree that, in games, there is a risk that we will empathize with ǡǮǯǤHush and Autumn 
aim at induced empathy, this puts the onus on game developers to be aware of these 
gaming mechanics and responsible for which characters they try to induce empathy for. 
This is a tall order, but we are seeing promising steps. 
Perhaps most detrimental to a chapter like this, which is dedicated entirely to empathy,   ǯ        Ǥ  
empathy is damaging because: empathy leads to burnout and exhaustion, it guides us to 
exclude certain groups, and it creates imbalance in relationships.59 By example, Bloom 
suggests that a compassionate person is just as likely to be charitable to an organization 
aiming at ending childhood hunger as is an empathetic person, but without the emotional 
                                                          
57 Gabbiadini et al. (2016). 
58 For more on the combination study, see: Sutton, et al. (1999). For more on the gaming platforms, see: 
Belman & Flanagan (2010). 
59 For his reasons that follow, Bloom notes significant studies from the fields of neuroscience and 
psychology. I will not recount them in this chapter, but the reader may find them interesting. For more, 
see his article: http://bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy. Accessed January 2017.  
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and mental exhaustion that comes with empathy. Bloom also cites a correlation between 
higher rates of depression among women because they have higher propensity to 
empathize than man. Empathy, continues Bloom, is also likely to make us less objective 
because we are more apt to focus on the individual(s) we feel emotionally connected to 
rather than from objective data. In this case, empathy fails a larger number of people who 
would not be ignored with an objective state of mind. As for relationships, Bloom offers 
an example of a doctor and her patient, claiming that professionalism is maintained and 
confidence is bolstered for the doctor who expresses compassion, and for one who does 
not mimic the emotions and postures of their perhaps agitated, scared, or confused 
patient.  
Bloom makes an interesting and unusual case against empathy.  His points are valid, but 
I take their validity only to a point. First, the example of burnout and exhaustion for those 
ranking with a high level to empathize relates to a perǯ
rather than to empathy that is induced. I can imagine a scenario where playing a game 
that induces empathy 100% of the time would be emotionally and mentally draining to 
the point that most players would stop playing the game. But we should not forget that 
my discussion relates to games, which are first and foremost intended to be played and 
enjoyed. Given evidence that players can learn from gameplay, it is important for game 
developers to understand how they can effectively do so while also engaging the player. 
For example, learning-based games promote improved skills in their users with an Ǯǯ  ǡ  ǡ           
learning a specific skill (e.g., math) more fun or interesting (e.g., Math Blaster) to the user. 
As expected, these sorts of games show improved skills in their users over time, but these 
exogenous games have a limitation because they appeal to a narrower audience (or only 
to those wanting to learn a particular skill). There is a recent interest in the increasing 
pool of evidence indicating that entertainment-based games, games that do not 
necessarily have the primary aim of teaching a skill or moral behaviour, can also enable 
learning development. 60 ThesǮǯ
gaming narrative in a more covert platform (Hush, Autumn, and Mafia III are three such 
games). These games generally have wider appeal than exogenous games because they 
have a broader target audience. Also, in relation to the point about empathy and 
exhaustion, Smith says narratives need not make empathy quantitatively dominant so 
much as they have qualitative moments.61  
Compassion, as Bloom stipulates, is important and I would agree that at times it can be 
just as or more fruitful than empathy. But that is not always so. To use his example of the 
charity case, I might see the commercials of starving children and feel compassion toward 
them, but not to the degree that I feel compelled to donate anything (or maybe I feel 
compelled, but I do not follow through with action). Whereas, if I imagine my own child 
in that horrible situation I might be more inclined to donate on the grounds that I would 
hope someone would do the same ǡǤǮ-
her-ǯǡ
with those who do not resemble ourselves (in look, personality, demographic, beliefs, 
etc.).62 If we leave it at the emotional level then, yes, perhaps it prevents an objectivity 
                                                          
60 Ibid.  
61 Smith in Coplan & Goldie, p. 113.  
62 Similarly, one could argue mechanics of empathy have been successfully used in raising funds for the 
current situation in Aleppo, for the Black Lives Matter movement, etc.  
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that would encourage us to help a broader group. However, this may be less relevant to 
this topic, where players are encouraged to attempt different outcomes in games.  ǯ  of the affective behavior between the patient and doctor sounds 
convincing at first, but this view assumes empathy is a final destination rather than a 
means to an end. If the doctor is able to empathize with her patient she may be able to 
better support her patient while still maintaining a professional affect (for example, given 
that professional behavior is also taught in medical school, we should not assume learnt 
empathy skills would sabotage the other skills the doctor has developed).63   
Although there are concerns where empathy exists, the potential positive aspects of 
empathy should keep us from dismissing it altogether. At the very least, empathy is worth 
more research, especially where games are concerned.  
9.6 Conclusion 
Not every response or outcome that results from gameplay will be positive and most of 
us would acknowledge that the negative aspects of gaming are important to research and 
understand. What I hope to have convinced the reader of here is that video games (more 
generally) and VR games (more specifically) have the ability to provide us with a 
distinctive kind of representation and narratological experience. In summary, there is a 
strong connection between player and character in VR games because the distinction Ǯǯ ǮǯǤ
us a unique access to the experiences, emotions, moral dilemmas, and particular 
vulnerabilities of our characters that arise from gameplay.  
The freedom we have to direct our character in VR game environments gives us exposure 
to various and potentially new kinds of emotions we might not have otherwise 
encountered. Players might make decisions and take actions to direct their player-
character in ways that are different from how they would behave in ordinary life.  This 
aspect of gameplay is what makes player engagement a potentially important connection 
for reflective empathy. Although this kind of engagement is not possible in all games or 
at all times, even the lower level responses during gameplay can foster the narrower 
conceptions of empathy in a player for a later time. This is possibly true of those seeking 
a VR experience like Autumn, and I wager it can also be so with other games where this is 
not the overt aim, like Mafia III.  
Video games like Mafia III and, perhaps especially so, VR games Autumn immerse the 
player in an interactive perceptual experience. What seems significant about the above 
is, given the transparency between your character and self in VR, we should be able to 
claim that a video game can be epistemologically helpful for the real-world.  
                                                          
63 Jesse Prinz has argued that empathy is necessary for morality. Among others, see Prinz (2011).  
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Chapter 10: Games: Failure, Competition, Selfish Punishers, and Why We Need Them  
 
Games allow players to connect with other players and, potentially, to our player-
characters. However, in light of this engagement, games also present us with interesting 
paradoxes. Players, for example, will often experience negative emotions and encounter 
(or exhibit) negative behaviour during gameplay and yet they choose to keep playing 
games. What is more, we do not play games and merely accept the negative aspects that 
gameplay often entails, it seems that we sometimes enjoy games, in part, because of these 
seemingly negative aspects.  
In this concluding chapter, I highlight two features of games that are paradoxical to our 
liking them: failure and competition. To discuss these paradoxes, I draw upon the works 
of Jesper Juul and C. Thi Nguyen (respectively) and analyse how things like failure and 
competition are actually good for gameplay. In turn, I add another paradox of games: the 
paradox of selfish punishers. I extend these views to include an evolutionary explanation 
for some of these paradoxical phenomena in games because it is my view that things such 
as failure, competition, and selfishness are not only good for gameplay, but they have the 
potential to build strong communities. Although group-wellness is not unique to games, 
it is analogous to groups that we find in ordinary life; a healthy community suggests at 
least one key reason we should want to play games.  
10. 1 The Paradox of Failure  
Let us first discuss the paradox of failure. Jesper Juul notes a curiosity with video games 
because he says that players like to fail, at least to some degree.1 Failure in this sense is 
not only about the outcome of a game, such as when one football team loses to another, 
but also about the failures within the process of gameplay. When I play the platformer 
video game Super Meat Boy, for example, I tend to fail throughout each of the levels 
because I constantly run into the quickly spinning ǡǯ-start 
the level from the beginning and try again. When I say I Ǯtendǯ to fail at this game, I tend 
to fail a lot and very badly, but this does not stop me from playing. Juul compares this 
curiosity, which he calls the paradox of failure, to the paradox of tragedy that occurs 
between readers and sad stories.  ǡǯOn Tragedy, roughly goes roughly like 
this: sad books can make us feel sad, yet we find pleasure in reading them, and, perhaps, 
pleasure in the sadness.2 What is even more curious is that we often return to a sad story 
to re-read it, and, although we do not like that the protagonist will die, for example, we 
want him to. At least that is one theory. The paradox of tragedy can help us understand 
games and failure because, to some extent, players similarly choose to play things that 
make them fail because if a game is too easy then it is no fun to play. This is true of non-
video games as well and we see this, for example, with a game like tic-tac-toe, which is no 
longer enjoyable to most people after they have achieved a certain level of strategy. In 
                                                          







short, we seek games out, things that make us fail, when we dislike failing in ordinary life. 
So, what is it that games are doing?  
To understand the paradox of failure with games more clearly, it is also helpful to relate 
it to a more broadly discussed issue between art and the paradox of pain. Aron Smuts 
summarises the premises like this: 
1. People do not seek out situations that arouse painful emotions. 
2. People have painful emotions in response to some art. 
3. People seek out art that they know will arouse painful emotions.3  
Smuts notes at least three methods that we can apply to try and solve the above paradox: 
Deflation: Art is not painful. This type of solution agrees with the first 
premise of the paradox (that we avoid pain), but it denies the second 
premise (that we experience pain in relation to art.  
Compensation: Pain is compensated for.  This type of solution agrees 
with first two premises of the paradox (humans avoid pain and we 
experience genuine pain in relation to art), but proceeds to argue that 
art provides something positive that compensates for the pain. 
A-hedonism: We do not always seek pleasure. This type of solution 
denies the first premise of the paradox by saying that humans are not 
simply pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking creatures. This is an effective, if 
unusual, way of dissolving the paradox.4  
According to Juul, the above methods do not get us much closer to a resolution because 
none or all could fit for a paradox of failure at some given time. ǡǯ
of failure is rather vague, but, I agree with him when he says that if we take the original 
point of view that failure offers catharsis, then video games require different reasoning ǮȏȐ- they produce the emotions in the ǯ.5 When we read a sad novel we may feel sad in an empathic way, or we may 
experience actual sadness. However, failure within games is, to some degree the fault of 
the player and the result of their inability to overcome specific obstacles. Although 
reading a complicated novel requires a certain adeptness, books do not entail failure like 
games often do. Juul says that we are motivated to play a game that causes failure so we 
can attempt to overcome inadequacies (or so we do not fail anymore).6 More specifically, ǲ[f]ailure brings about something positive, but it is always potentially painful or at least 
unpleasantǳ.7  
                                                          
3 Smuts (2007), p. 60, as found in Juul (2013), p.37. 
4 Juul, Ibid. 
5 Juul, p. 4. 
66 Ibid, p. 7. 
7 Ibid, p. 9. 
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Juul goes on to say that we can relate this to a four-stage cycle that occurs when playing 
a game:  
1. New goal is introduced. 2. Failure presents the player as inadequate. 
3. Player searches for failure cause and improves. 4. Inadequacy gone in 
a player; player has a new skill.8 
The fourth stage leads the player back to seeking a new goal and the cycle continues. Juul 
recognises that between the paradoxes of failure and pain, the former is not always a 
philosophical issue given that we are taught from a young age to maintain good 
sportspersonship regardless of a win or a loss. This is one social explanation since, if we 
fail during gameplay, we understand that, socially, we are to put our best attitude forward 
and try again. Games also allow us to accept failure differently than we can with failures 
in ordinary life. For example, playing a game or a certain difficulty mode that is too easy 
is not usually fun for the player, but if it is too difficult, the player can always use the 
excuse that the game design ǮǯǤǡ 
even harder for the sole aim of amusing ourselves or others. Juul contrats this with 
ordinary life where we do not tend to find this self-defeating behaviour. For example, a 
student might self-defeat the night before an exam by not studying and drinking too much 
alcohol, but very little amusement would ensue from this behaviour, or from the failed 
exam that is sure to follow. However, with games there are instances in which failure 
becomes the very object of appreciation, so to speak. As I mentioned in Chapter 5, there 
are those player entertainers who capture and publish their worst fails for the amusement ǤǮǤǯ9  
The paradox of failure is relevant to video games, mere games, and sport. Of the three 
solution methods described by Smuts, it is my view that in the context of games 
compensation is the likely answer to the paradox. So, we play games that cause us to fail, 
not because we enjoy failure on its own, but because we enjoy the challenge and, most 
importantly, the ǤǯǡǮǯǤ ǯ
once again because we enjoy the experience of attempting to overcome the obstacles 
knowing we might win the next round. We are aware, even if in the back recesses of our 
minds, that games are created to be winnable, whereas there is no such promise that we 
will overcome tasks in ordinary life. For games, compensation seems one plausible 
solution to the paradox if we play a game with a proper Suitsian attitude. For another, 
Hume might offer the trade-off account between pleasure and pain for a more convincing 
solution. According to Hume, we might enjoy things that give us pain, such as video 
games, if the pleasure is greater than the pain it entails. Moreover, pain may, at times, 
restrict the degree of pleasure and, therefore lead to a more a satisfying experience (in a 
non-hedonistic sense). 
Juul does not offer an account for the different kinds of failure that games entail or how 
players may experience different reasons for failure. For example, what about the success 
that a player might feel in failing, if it helps their opponent, or perhaps aids the wellbeing 
                                                          
8 Ibid, p. 60. 




a game is not just about winning, but experiencing it. The idea that failure can benefit the 
common good of the group has bearing in the final section of this chapter because it is my 
view that failure can help create stable groups. This might seem like an odd view to take, 
but we know that when we fail, we attempt to do better. On one level this improves the 
player ability, but more broadly, personal failure can, at times, strengthen game groups.  ǡǯual failure does not extend as broadly to include the 
altruism I describe above, we should keep in mind that Juul only discusses a general kind 
of personal failure in games. That being the case, many games are multiplayer activities 
that require cooperation between players and so it is worth investigating additional 
outcomes of failure. In order to make this point, I want to shift the focus from the paradox 
of failure to the paradox of competition, the feature that makes cooperation possible.  
10.2 The Paradox of Competition  
C. Thi Nguyen notes a different paradox with games, the paradox of competition. He 
recognises a seemingly contradictory aspect of games in that, in order for your opponent 
to have fun with some kinds of games, you have to try very hard to win. Nguyen says,  
Such games have a complex and seemingly paradoxical structure: they 
are both competitive and cooperative, and the competitive element is 
required for the cooperative element to work out. We might even call 
them a social technology, capable of converting aggression into a social 
benefit and perhaps even a moral good.10  
The above paradox means that I must be quite ambitious and aggressive against my 
opponent in order for something positive to occur, which is what Nguyen calls a moral 
conversion. But first, what kinds of games does this sort of competition refer to? Not every 
game is suitable for funnelling such opposition in order to get the most out of the Ǥǯ
in the same way as, say chess. In fact, drinking games become more fun, in general, as 
skills of players lessen over time (as Nguyen points out, the reward usually comes with 
the loss in these sorts of games). Chess is different than ones like some drinking games 
because a level of skill is required to overcome the in-game obstacles.  
The above quote suggests to me that even the failure discussed in the previous section 
does not always cause pain, nor does the pain of failure only work by motivating us to 
succeed in the introspective way as Juul suggests it does. In fact, Nguyen views this 
transformation from competition to cooperation as a moral function of some games.11 ǮǯǮthe primary ǯ.12 
Nguyen continues to characterise this contradiction between competition and 
cooperation and says,  
                                                          
10 Nguyen (2017) p. 123. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 124. 
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Rather, the transformation only happens if one successfully creates 
desirable striving. And that depends on finding appropriate opponents,   ǯ l level and to the particular game we are playing. In 
informal situations, this means proper selection of game and player. In 
formal situations, this means, among other things, having good ranking 
and matching systems.13  
This means, the kinds of games that allow for this competition-cooperation 
transformation prescribe the players to endeavour to do well so that the other player does 
well. Accounts will ǯ because some philosophers indicate that players 
will engage with a game to win, and that players must intend to cooperate.14 Nguyen, on 
the other hand, emphasises that cooperation requires players to adopt a correct mental 
attitude, which, in turn, makes the obstacles more relevant than the winning. This 
attitude, including a good (and relevant) game design, and player selection, allows for a 
transformation from aggression to cooperation, which means cooperation does not have 
to be the primary intent. However, this does not suggest that games are always played for 
selfish reasons, nor does it suggest that positive things cannot come from self-
interestedness. In fact, often, if one properly engages in gameplay (in the way Nguyen 
proposes) personal gain is subordinated to the common or greater good of the group. 
Although this conversion is not possible or necessary in all sport or games, Nguyen says 
it can be the primary aspect of striving games, over the goal of winning (or personal 
betterment). Ǯ playǯ, which Nguyen defines thusly, 
One engages in striving play when one takes on unnecessary goals and 
obstacles for the sake of the activity they make possible, and when one ǯ
experience of being so engaged.15 
The reaǯǯ
definition of gameplay. Following Hurka, whom I introduced in Chapter 5, Nguyen adds a 
further condition that gameplay must have intrinsic value, which is not explicit in ǯ
original definition.16 Although Suits claims that we voluntarily take up unnecessary 
obstacles, meaning we engage in gameplay wanting to experience the process a game 
entails, he offers no reason why we should want to engage with games in the first place. ǯǡ
in striving play desire to play the game for the experience of the obstacles and activity 
rather than for solely overcoming them. At times, this could mean that blocking your ǯ ǡ ǡ  , not only for yourself, but for your 
opponent. This, of course, requires our opponent to have similar skill sets or there can be 
no moral conversion, and striving play will not be possible (imagine competitively 
playing chess with a three-year old). Although striving play is not a condition of gameplay, 
                                                          
13 Ibid., p. 128. 
14 Simon (2014), Weimer (2012, 2014). 
15 Nguyen (2017), p. 125. 
16 Suits goes on to clarify this at a later time. Hurka, (2006), p. 226-228. Also in Nguyen (2017), p. 125. 
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it is the mechanism that makes cooperation an achievement of the game, or, as Nguyen 
says, it allows ǮǯǤ17 
The moral conversion described above is different than how morality is typically applied 
within game studies. Usually, philosophers of sport discuss morality in terms of player 
consent. For example, consent between two players allows for a sport like wrestling to 
qualify as such, otherwise, we might deem it to be an act of violence. This is the view of 
Steven Weimer, for example, who views consent as the primary mechanism for moral 
transformation (even with sports that are violent).18  Consent occurs when the players of 
a game or sport agree to the formal rules and, thus, play accordingly. His account does 
not suggest that players do not also play a game for personal excellence, but, according to 
Weimer, where there is a conflict between consent and personal excellence, the former 
should govern.19 He explains that personal excellence cannot be the primary goal or it 
seems gameplay would be more closely related to training and practice.  
Nguyen says that we should not place too much emphasis on player consent, however. He 
illustrates this point by asking us to imagine ourselves playing a game of chess where the 
opponent is far less skilled than ǯ. Within a scenario like this, your opponent (and 
yourselfȌ         Ǯ ǯ  
because there is an imbalance of skill between the two players. When this is the case, 
Nguyen, contra Weimer, stipulates that it is not sufficient for opponents to merely 
consent to a game in order for a moral conversion to take place. If we select a player who 
is far less apt than ourselves and our only goal is to beat them relentlessly, then consent 
does not seem to go far enough for any moral conversion. By this token, if any conversion 
is to occur, and when we want a game to challenge us we need, in addition to conducive 
game design, a proper opponent to make competition possible. 
We are discussing a psychological frame of mind so at least one player within the group 
will have to be intentional about the above attitude, but a player need not maintain this 
intentional attitude during gameplay at all times. Nguyen describes it this way,  
We may enter a game with cooperative intentions, but once we are 
inside, we no longer have to maintain them. We may turn all our efforts 
to wining, albeit within the rules. The difference between games and 
ordinary life is that in ordinary life, we must usually intend to help other 
people in order to actually help them. In games, the very structure of the 
game permits us to be entirely competitive and aggressive, yet the game 
will transform these efforts into something worthwhile for our 
opponents. Games permit us to offload our cooperative intention into 
the structure of the game itself.20 
The above means that we do not have to intend to cooperate with an opponent in order 
for cooperation to occur rather, the transformation will occur if the conditions are right. 
Cooperation, Nguyen adds, might even occur when a belligerent opponent has more 
                                                          
17 Nguyen (2017), p. 126. 
18 See Weimer (2012), (2014). 
19 Ibid., (2012). 
20 Nguyen (2017), p. 130. 
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selfish ambitions when adopting  ǯ   ing gameplay. The 
architectural design of certain games allows for this conversion, a point I will return to at 
the conclusion of this chapter.  
There are at least two things ǯ. First, he never discusses the 
concept of modifications with differences in skill level between opponents. It seems to 
me that a mismatched pair of opponents could still have fun (and strive) in a game even 
if the more skilled person gives themselves a handicap. This is regularly seen in sports 
such as golf, for example. Second, Nguyen should clarify the distinction between the 
normativity and descriptivism of games. The behaviour described above requires 
internal decision-making rather than what pertains to external variables that constrain 
the way we tend to play. If we bear this difference in mind, then it ought to be added that ǯ
game should be played. In other words, for the cooperation Nguyen discusses to occur 
during gameplay, we ought to select the appropriate game and players, and we ought to 
adopt the correct attitude. ǯnormative account of gameplay.  
 In the quote at the beginning of this section, Nguyen addresses the importance of the 
selection process (of games and of opponents) for the conversion from competition to 
cooperation to take place. If everyone who participated in games were cooperative, then 
groups would have a stronger potential to experience the benefits that come from failure 
and competition. However, we know that players range in their behaviour and, often 
times, will exhibit horrible behaviour and attitudes; ǯ   the VR 
game QuiVr, which I described in the previous chapter, is one such example. While 
cooperation and sportspersonship are valued within gameplay, some behaviour like 
selfishness is perhaps less so. In the remainder of this chapter, I will add to Juul and ǯ ccounts and discuss the paradoxical nature of selfishness and its role in 
building strong communities. 
10.3 The Paradox of Selfish Punishers  
From the above we can note that aggressive behaviour may benefit the game overall. So 
too, selfishness has the potential to motivate group wellness. In fact, selfishness allows 
for the introduction of effective punishment, thereby returning stability to the group. 
Guild leaders, game masters, and fellow competitors keep the game group in check and 
have the ability to punish unacceptable behaviour from either a game character or a 
player. Players who continue to take matters too far with their bad behaviour may 
experience expulsion, character consequences, and the like. For example, in my D&D 
group, we continually caught one player selfishly taking all the coveted healing potions 
from the places we looted. The dungeon master (DM) decided to set a trap for, leǯǮthief-characterǯ. In knowing the thief-character would be tempted to steal, the 
DM alerted the group to the contents of the room that our player-characters were in. 
Among other listed items was a wooden chest. The other player-characters went about 
investigating the room and the thief-character, as suspected, went straight for the chest.   ǯ ǡ   ȋ 
check) and set-off a booby trap, which caused a paralyzing potion to spray over his body. 
The paralysis, which lasted for 2 hours, allowed the group to carry on without the thief-
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character in the following missions (allowing the rest of us more loot) until its effects 
wore off. The game narrative did not suffer from this tactic (if anything it added to it), and 
the players all learned a lesson about character control while still enjoying the game.  
Players are typically kept in check by the rules of games and the normative ways they 
engage in games. But what does this say about selfishness and how it benefits gaming 
groups? The following will attempt to answer this question. 
In Chapter 5, I mentioned that Huizinga     Ǯǯ
wherein the fantasy world is protected from the ordinary one. Within this figurative 
circle, individuals leave behind ordinary roles and relationships and trade them for game 
ones, but where characteristics of the real world are still present.21 On the other hand 
(but similarly), Suits viewed games as the only thing humans would do in a utopian 
society when all our utilitarian needs are met. By his account, regular tasks might become 
games if we have no obligation to do them. For example, say that in some utopian society 
robots normally build our houses. But imagine you really enjoy carpentry and so you 
choose to build a house without the robot, which allows you to experience the process 
like a game (note that this also fulfils the condition of inefficient means). Huizinga and 
Suits describe games differently, but notice how both characterise games as structures 
that consist of their own self-contained societies.  
Game groups range in size from single player, to multiplayer, to massively multiplayer 
communities. It is good to remember that these latter groups, although they can be quite 
large, are still selected groups. Games consist of mechanisms that allow groups of any size 
to function well, which, from an evolutionary standpoint, is not surprising. Since the age 
of hunting and gathering, smaller groups tend to be less complicated than the larger ones. 
In this respect, we might be curious about the kinds of cultures that games constitute and, 
more specifically, why things like failure, competition, and selfishness can be good for the 
group.  
Here, I want to turn the focus from the games to the gaming groups themselves and look 
at how they operate as functional organisms. Group success, in other words, can occur, 
not necessarily despite failure and competition, but by virtue of them. Competition may 
result in cooperation, but what this also suggests, to me, is that game communities exhibit 
a framework that fits within an evolutionary strategy. In other words, gaming groups are 
communities that function like Darwinian organisms. With things like failure and 
competition games are motivations for healthy groups because they help communities to 
get along better. Essentially, games build community. However, it is not only because 
games promote cooperation if they are played the they should be played, but also because 
games are normally played with some degree selfishness. Although selfishness and 
punishment, as with the D&D scenario described above, might indicate a problem with 
gameplay, I want to suggest these behaviours indicate a level of selflessness is present. 
This section will consider how selfish behaviour in gameplay might function to promote 
healthy groups. 
                                                          
21 ǡǮǯǤ
Castronova (2005 and 2008). 
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The paradoxes explained in this chapter suggest a general tension between what games 
require of their players and why we keep playing them. Initially, it may seem that things 
like failure and competition entail the negative aspects of gameplay because, if we 
experience enough failure and competition in the ordinary life, why would we choose to 
experience them in games? However, these very characteristics of gameplay promote the 
success of the overall group even if individuals do not always win or better themselves in 
the process. This thought is in line with Juul and Nguyen and the paradoxes presented 
above.  
Correspondingly, evolutionists might characterise the social structure of gaming groups 
as the result of a kind of Darwinian strategy that consists of selfishness and selflessness. 
Although I am hesitant to say games create cultures of absolute altruism, I do think 
players exhibit altruistic-like moments during gameplay and highly coordinated roles 
that make organised communities possible. Of course, games are not just environments 
for selflessness, they are often sources of atrocious behaviour, particularly within the 
online gaming community. One has only to read through the chat windows to see 
examples of misogyny, bigotry, and immaturity. However, to build from the previous 
chapter, games are sometimes excellent examples of things that promote thriving groups 
even in the midst of (and because of) self-interestedness and competition. It is my view         ǯ normative actions, the 
altruistic-like and the selfish ǡǯǤ However, the 
question to ask first is, what is altruism?  
A  ǯ     Ǥ  ǡ    ǡǯǤI should 
say first that it is debated whether or not true altruism exists, especially at the level of 
altruistic thoughts. For example, we might behave in a certain way to benefit someone 
else, but it is debatable whether our actions come from a desire that is truly other-
interested rather than self-interested (this issue is compounded when religious beliefs 
are present). Suppose, for example, in D&D, my party comes across a room full of loot. In 
the distance, my character sees a vicious goblin closing in on the group and so instead of 
staying with the other adventurers to collect treasure, I choose to leave and attack the 
monster so my party can gather treasure in safety. Now, it could be the case that I truly ǯǡǡ
ultimately, I believe the benefits from the loot will eventually trickle down to me if the 
group is successful overall. Although there is disagreement as to whether psychological 
altruism exists, it is believed that, at the very least, altruist-like actions improve the 
functions of a society as a whole even if there are expectations of reciprocity.   
The group functions well when it is organised. According to evolutionary biologist David ǡ ǮȏȐomething is functionally organized when its parts work together in a 
coordinated fashion to achieve a given endǯ.22 Of course, altruism is not required for a 
society to be functionally organised but it is one way of reaching stability or maybe even 
thrift. This question of whether altruism actually exists preoccupies Wilson for which he ǡǮ
                                                          
22 Wilson (2015), p. 9. 
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and between groups, it exists wherever there is group- ǯ.23 
Working together in a coordinated fashion means that cooperation is one strategy that 
usually benefits the group, even if it is less beneficial to the individual.  
According to Wilson, the current level of cooperation within any group is due to the 
degree of competition among groups. This, interestingly, seems to support the claims 
Nguyen makes. To illustrate this point about cooperation and competition, Wilson led a 
study among school children in various neighbourhoods of New York, which he and his 
team called the Binghamton Neighborhood Project (in Binghamton, New York). With the 
help of the local school district they began the experiment by collecting data on school 
children from a survey that profiled their healthy development. Questions to the children 
ranged from where they received help within their communities (e.g., school, parents, ǡǤȌǡȋǤǤǡǲǳȌǤatements 
on a scale from 1 to 5. Once the data had been collected and sorted from the surveys, 
Wilson et al. created a map of Binghamton with a grid that demarcated specific 
neighbourhood districts.  
As a biologist, Wilson knew that these kinds of maps work well to detect problem areas 
for endangered species, to locate the areas where species thrive, as well as to track any Ǥǡǯ
prosocial scores on the map grid with dark dots representing the locations consisting of 
high prosocial behaviour scores (High-PROs) and lighter dots representing lower 
prosocial scores (Low-PROs).24 The gradient revealed interesting results. The students 
who scored as High-PROs also indicated they received the most help from others within 
their communities. Those who scored lower did not give any indication that they were 
often on the receiving end of any prosocial behaviour. This is as Wilson suspected ǡǮ-PROs can expect to succeed when they are in the company of other High-ǯǤ 25 This corroborates what we might expect, that cooperation is beneficial to 
groups.  
Additional experiments were conducted around the specific neighbourhoods to 
determine if these students merely liked the idea of being altruistic or if they in fact 
showed helpful behaviour within their communities (one of four such tests were simply 
to put stamped and addressed postcards on the ground to see if students would pick them 
up and return them to the intended mailbox, or if they just left them). The results of these 
tests supported the information that the gradients on the map reflected. Furthermore, it 
indicated that High-PRO kids were not normally found among those whose families had 
money, but among kids who had little financial capital and greater social capital (where 
they could practice cooperation on a regular basis).26 Cooperation means that, at times, 
you receive help, but at other times you give help. In other words, healthy groups consist 
of individuals who give and take, which is one reason Wilson suspected High-PROs would 
do well with other High-PROs, so the act of giving would not be exploited. Consequently, 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p. 29. 
24 For the map, see Ibid, p. 119. 
25 Ibid, p. 120. 
26 Ibid., p. 122. 
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those who scored the lowest on the prosocial scale where children who had neither 
financial nor social capital. This points to the importance of a social environment, one that 
games often create. 
If altruism exists at the level of action (beyond psychological altruism), games are one 
more kind of group that suggest it could because within games, there are players who are 
givers and takers. I will pause here to emphasise that, usually, when we think about the 
successful evolution of a group, we think in Darwinian terms of individual (sexual) 
selection. In The Decent of Man, Charles Darwin makes the following claims, 
It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives 
but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over 
the other men of the same tribe, yet that an increase in the number of 
well-endowed men and an advancement in the standard of morality will 
certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. A tribe 
including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the 
spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were 
always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the 
common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this 
would be natural selection. At all times throughout the world tribes have 
supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one important element in 
their success, the standard of morality and the number of well-endowed 
men will thus everywhere tend to rise and increase.27  
Some evolutionary biologists consider group success within society to be more than the 
genetic success that Darwin hints at here, and others have carried further.28 Group 
selection, on the other hand relies on cooperation instead of kinship. If this is true, then ǯǤHowever, not all 
evolutionary biologists are in agreement with this. There are those who claim that genetic ǡǡǡǯǡ-between goup 
who say that both genetic and group selection occurs, just at different levels. Wilson 
compares the earlier non-group selection evolutionary theories to outdated pre-
Copernican theories of the universe. He goes so far as to say,  
The controversy over group selection is receding into the past and 
eventually will be forgotten except from a historical perspective, like the     ǡ ǯ
theory of natural selection during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and the theory of continental drift during the early 
twentieth century.29  
This is a big claim and since I am not a scientist myself, I will avoid these controversies 
and merely focus on how games constitute groups that are reflective of the group theory 
that Wilson adopts. At the very least, group selection is just one mechanism used by 
                                                          
27 Darwin (1883), p. 89. 
28 Such as early 20th century scholars, Peter Kropotkin and David Lack. 




Nguyen does not provide a definition of cooperation and, up until now, I have not been 
specific with any particular meaning of it. Martin A. Nowak, in his book, Evolution, Games, 
and Godǡ    ǡ Ǯ         
individual pays a cost (in terms of fitness, whether genetic or cultural) and another gains     ǯǤ30 If we compare this definition with the definition of altruism 
presented earlier then we should be confident that altruistic like actions can occur in 
games, where cooperation often takes place. Wilson notes this kind of group cooperative 
behaviour first among insects (e.g., ants and wasps) where functionally organised groups 
consisted of self-sacrificing actions, which generally had little to do with kinship.31  
As noted above, competition and cooperation seem at odds with each other and the same 
can be said for selfishness and altruism. Studies show that, as a whole, groups fare better 
if everyone within the group is an altruist, which is something we may intuitively expect. 
Not everyone within society (or game groups) are altruistic, however. In ordinary life, we 
all do things that are self-centred and sometimes our actions are intentionally done to the 
detriment of others. We sometimes see this as we compete for jobs, for pay raises, or self-
recognition, and, of course, when we play games. Regardless, the idea recapitulates the 
subtext in the accounts by Juul and Nguyen that sometimes selfishness leads to better 
results in the long run.  
There is at least one study conducted by sociologists Eldakar and Wilson (again) that 
shows a difference between selfish and non-selfish individuals, where the former types 
generally maintain the highest fitness within the group if left unpunished. This stands to 
reason because the selfish individuals usually benefit from their own behaviour and from 
exploiting the benevolence of the altruists.32 Consequently, a non-selfish individual 
would fare better (personally) if they became a selfish member. That being the case, 
balance can be acquired or returned when effectual punishment is introduced to groups 
where selfish members exist. Eldakar and Wilson test and report this theory using the 
following model,  
Now consider a method of social control in which individuals can punish 
selfish group members at a personal cost c, which results in the selfish 
individual losing its acquired energy for a given round of the game. The 
cost is incurred for every selfish member of the group, and punished 
individuals risk the loss of their previously acquired energy (b + pbm) 
at a probability equal to the frequency of punishers that reside in the 
group. Punishment can be exhibited by either altruists or selfish 
individuals, yielding four possible strategies (altruistic punishers, 
selfish punishers, altruistic nonpunishers, selfish nonpunishers) at 
frequencies of pap, psp, pan, and psn, respectively. In a single group, the 
average fitness W of the four strategies are as follows: 
                                                          
30 Nowak (2013), p. 4. 
31 For more on these studies (in addition to Wilson 2015) see, Wilson and Sober (1994). 




The fitness of altruistic nonpunishers (Eq. 3) is exclusively based on the 
altruistic contributions of group members and remains unaffected by 
punishment. 
 
The fitness of selfish nonpunishers (Eq. 4) is determined by the sum of 
withholding cooperation b, and the exploitation of altruists 
(pan + pap)bm, however, is only retained in the proportion that punishers 
are not ȏ ? ?ȋpap + psp)]. 
 
Altruistic punishers (Eq. 5) retain the same fitness as altruistic 
nonpunishers yet bear a cost for punishing all selfish members within 
the group. 
 
Selfish punishers (Eq. 6) exploit the altruistic contributions of group 
members yet punish all other selfish group members.33 
As it turns out, the above tells us the following. The strategies of selfish individuals are 
challenged when punishment is introduced, thereby making their fitness less strong 
within the group. However, punishers fare worse compared to non-punishers in terms of 
their output. All things being equal, this makes the punishment (by altruistic or selfish 
individuals) an act of second level altruism because the punishers sacrifice performance 
for the overall benefit of the group. Now, if we compare the altruistic non-punishers and 
altruistic punishers, the former out-compete the latter while the latter are disruptive to 
the punishment. Therefore, the combination of these two groups create instability within 
the group and, to paraphrase Eldakar and Wilson, non-punishing altruists should not be 
a favoured model of behaviour if selfishness exists in the group because they are second-
level free loaders. Fitness is stronger for selfish punishers than selfish nonpunishers, 
because the former are less likely to get expelled from the group since they benefit the ǯǤSelfish nonpunishers are likely to be expelled. The same test also 
indicates that when cooperation is withheld from selfish individuals, altruism is more 
likely to evolve.34 Finally, groups tend to thrive with selfish punishers and altruist 
nonpunishers because the output between the two creates an equilibrium. To a growing 
number of scholars like Wilson, the above also suggest that there is something more going 
on than Darwiǯ    
consist of kin. In fact, we see cases of more than just successful groups Ȃ super groups 
                                                          
33 Eldakar & Wilson (2008). 
34 Wilson (2015). 
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might consist of groups within groups, within groups, all of which might be successful due 
to group selection.  
So much for altruism and selfishness in society. What does this say about failure, 
competition, and selfishness in games? A predominate conception of games (also related 
to sports) relates to the internalist view that we play games to self-improve and and 
personal developmentǤǯȋ
us to do better) is one paradox that can lead to a highly functioning group, even if at an 
individual level. It would seem likely that failure also motivates a stronger community 
even if the failure occurs for selfish reasons. Simon Smith proposes a view that sounds 
similar to Juul when he says:  ǥǡ
attempt to learn and grow through our performances, and where we 
attempt to develop and exhibit excellence at overcoming the sport-
specific obstacles created by the rules.35 
Nguyen argues against this specific position for reasons explained earlier. That so, ǯder ideas of Suits, Juul, and Nguyen that winning is not 
the only measure of success. Regarding any moral worth, Nguyen suggests that 
competition can lead to cooperation and the overall wellbeing of the group, but I think 
punishment can play a significant role. My own example comes from, once again, playing 
a session of D&D. In a different playing than the one I already described, I was frustrated 
at my group because certain decisions they made prevented my character, Scarabina, 
from participating in an exciting quest that we had been building up to for a few weeks. 
After they completed said quest, without my character, our adventurers decided to hang 
out in a local pub of the game-world and, since I was frustrated at the other players, I had 
my character challenge the other characters to a fight-club-like challenge, including bets 
with our gameworld gold pieces. Ultimately, this challenge dispelled my own frustrations 
and proved to be a lot of fun for everyone in the group. In this case, cooperation was not 
my primary intent, but my aggression was funnelled into competitive playing, which, in 
turn, led to cooperation.  
By the same token, players are not always competitive in a manner that aims for a healthy 
community, even on some secondary level. In fact, many times, selfishness and aggression 
in the gaming world are no different than the actions we experience in the ordinary 
worldǤ ǯ  is one such example. As a result of this incident, the QuiVr 
creators added a force field feature to the game as a form of protection and punishment. 
Players who feel threatened can implement the forcefield by pushing their fingers 
together and their character will teleport to a different location.  This is, of course, a 
temporary fix, but it could conceivably improve the group, which is something that 
remains to be seen. Additionally, things like trolling, griefing, and teabagging are just 
some of the frowned upon behaviours that players might have their characters engage in 
to aggravate fellow competitors within and between groups. However, to keep within the 
theme of paradoxes, not all selfish actions (opposed to altruistic) are detrimental to 
groups as one might presume. Recall that selfish punishers represent, at least minimally, 
                                                          
35 Smith (2000) as found in Nguyen (2017), p. 132.  
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a kind of altruist because their actions promote the wellbeing of the group at the sacrifice 
of their own fitness. Unfit behaviour is usually dealt with by other players and especially 
by guild leaders and game masters who have the authority to publicly shame, suspend, or 
ban these sorts of players from the group. This exemplifies how punishment in the more 
severe sense can curtail bad behaviour, promote altruism, and ultimately, constitute an 
organised group.  
To emphasise competition, Nguyen provides an example of a similar outcome, but where 
no punishment takes place. He describes a scenario in which a belligerent guest comes to 
his house, making the other guests uncomfortable with demeaning behaviour. If this 
example were to follow in line with my previous example above, Nguyen could simply ask 
this guest to leave, and the group would potentially benefit. What Nguyen suggests, 
however, is that the group play a competitive board game and, assuming it is the correct 
game design for moral transformation, everyone can play to their enjoyment. Mr. 
Belligerent channels his competitive energy to the competition of the game and the rest 
of the group benefits from a good match. Notice here, none of the players are intentionally 
promoting cooperation, save, perhaps, for Nguyen and his original suggestion to play a 
game in order to redirect the atmosphere. As it happens, this example as well as that of ǮScrabinaǯ puts another point of ǯǡ
not always necessary for the collective good.  
Notice how all of the above describes certain characteristics belonging to ordinary life, 
mere games, and video games, but not necessarily to art. This affirms some of the content 
presented in the preceding chapters and further reminds us about the hybridity of video 
games and other interactive fictions.  
10.4 Conclusion  ǯǡThe Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs (1842), he notes a 
different kind of paradox, the fact that in the poorest of water conditions, coral thrives. At 
face value, failure, tragedy, competition, selfishness, and punishment should be things we 
turn away from because they seem to be toxic features of any group. Yet, not only do we 
enjoy games that often entail these very things, the group, like the coral, thrives because 
of them. None of this is to suggest that games create groups in a strictly Darwinian or 
Wilsonian sense, and certainly there are clear examples of highly organised groups that 
are less successful.36 However, I view gaming groups analogously to other groups where 
selection strategies are evident, but with at least one significant difference. Another 
important aspect of games, in comparison to ordinary life, that Juul points out is that 
players play them with the understanding that games were created to be winnable. This 
knowledge distinguishes games from ordinary life where there is no such guarantee. 
Games, it seems, are reasons to have community and games help communities to get 
along better, as was the case with Mr. Belligerent described by Nguyen. Failure and 
competition motivate us to do better, particularly when we adopt the correct attitude for 
gameplay. Like the High-PROs shown to Wilson on his neighbourhood map, it seems 
reasonable to extend the idea that for game groups to thrive, individual players must 
                                                          
36 Unfortunately, the Native Americans are one such group within the U.S. that illustrates problems (or 
exceptions) with this theory.  
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sometimes give and sometimes take. Although improvement is not always our own, 
certain actions benefit the overall fitness of the group, making it a healthier organism (or 
superorganism when we consider the sub-groups that games can entail) than when it 
started. In sum, this means that the paradoxical features of games can potentially create 








Interactive works share some of the philosophical issues that are standard to the more 
traditional arts, but it is clear that interactivity is a distinctive feature that introduces 
additional concerns and discussions within analytic aesthetics. Although Chapter 1 
addresses that interactivity might be a standard rather than necessary condition for some 
categories of interactive art, it is certainly the case that if a work prescribes interactivity, ǯǤ
is distinctive of interactive works and especially for interactive narratives, such as the 
kind we see in video games. While this dissertation does not endeavour to compel the 
reader that video games belong within the same established categories of art as the 
digitally interactive works in museums, it does aim to highlight the various aesthetic 
properties that we can appreciate. Since the algorithm, or what I call the complete game 
algorithm, is the principle property-bearing feature of digitally interactive works, I 
argued that there are similarities between these works and those such as performance 
works. However, the differences between interactive works and performance works 
warrants different ontologies and forms of engagement. This dissertation tries to fill in 
some of those gaps. 
A Note About Avatars and Tragedy 
One issue that arose from my research regarding chapters 9 and 10 relates to how players 
experience tragedy with their player-characters differently than with other narratives. 
This question did not fit within the scope of those chapters, but, as it warrants further 
research, I find it worth addressing.  
When it comes to characters and games, there is more to say about how games affect our 
emotions in a different way than other narratives do. More importantly for this 
dissertation is, how player interactivity affects certain experiences of gameplay 
particularly when our characters meet tragic endings. When we read Romeo & Juliet, we 
may feel sad because we know ahead of time the characters die. But, if we were to read a 
particular version where the protagonists survive, we would most likely be upset by the 
changed ending. Gregory Currie refines this a bit and says what really is happening is the 
reader does not want the characters to survive but she imagines they do.1 The deaths of 
Romeo and of Juliet might make us sad but, as the paradox states, there is (oddly) a sense 
of satisfaction in their dying. This paradox was briefly addressed in the previous chapter, 
however, with video games, there is a different curiosity to address.  
The above points to a difference in how the protagonists meet their demise in books vs. 
games, or rather, the roles that the reader vs. player engage in with that demise. For the 
reader, although she may know the character will die, which makes her feel sad, she can 
distance herself from feeling any guilt. Janet Murray says that players can shut a game off 
in a similar way that readers can close a book, should they need to separate themselves 
                                                          
1 Currie (2010). 
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from unpleasant occurrences in stories.2 Jesper Juul and others argue, pace Murray, that 
unlike books, video games involve the player in a more critical way. Although readers can 
intensely engage with a character, they ǯǤTo ǯ	, I can say that if a player is aware the 
protagonist will meet a tragic end, and the player is successful in reaching this goal, then 
the player is responsible for that outcome.  
Does this make the player feel the tragedy more or less acutely than the passive reader? 
To test the effects of this, Juul worked with game developers to create The Suicide Game.3 
The goal of this two-player game is to take turns trying to kill yourself by either taking 
poison or stabbing yourself with a knife. These weapons are scattered around the room     ǯ       Ǥ     
prompted string of letters into a text box, which represents your attempt to kill your 
character. The player must type the pattern at just the right time Ȃ too slow or too fast, 
your character fails the suicide attempt, your turn ends with a notification that an 
ambulance is on their way, and you have failed the game. What Juul wanted to achieve 
from this was to determine what affect a game has that required a player to strive in order ǤǯǤ
compare to a tragic novel, it would need to fulfil three characteristics4: 
1. The protagonist undergoes many painful experiences. 
2. The player is aware that their character meets a fateful demise. 
3. The player exerts effort to self-defeat. 
 
The Suicide Game is a striving self-defeating game, but interestingly, during his 
experiment, it did not generate any alignment between the emotions of the player and 
the character in the way we would expect from a tragic novel. If the character survived 
the attempt then that meant the player failed and they would typically show signs of 
frustration for their inadequacy instead of relief that their character was alive. If their 
character died, that meant the player succeeded and the responses matched those of a  ǡ      ǯ death (although some degree of 
sadness registered in the players due to the content, the theme of the game was 
significantly mitigated by the goal of the game). As a tragedy, one would expect both the 
character and the player to mirror their emotions more closely. 
Although it is possible for me to feel empathic sadness toward my character in the way I 
discussed in Chapter 9, it is not as common to experience the same paradox of tragedy 
with games the way we do with other tragedy narratives. In fact, Juul has argued that it is 
not possible to experience tragedy as acutely in games. Playing a tragic game makes it 
more difficult to mirror the emotions of a character than other narratives because it is in  ǯ        ǡ   
situations like The Suicide Game. To clarify, think of it this way, if we play a game in which 
we know our character meets a tragic end, we will often feel a sense of accomplishment 
                                                          
2 Murray (2016), p. 25. 
3 To play: http://www.jesperjuul.net/text/suicidegame (accessed March 2017). 
4 Juul (2013), p. 96. 
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because we have prioritised the overall goal of our character over the wellbeing of our 
character.5  This emotional outcome differs from the Romeo & Juliet example where the 
reader and characters both experience some degree of suffering.  This is not necessarily 
because tragedy games are impossible, it is largely to do with an awareness among game 
developers that most players do not want to strive in a game in which they know they 
will have to kill off their own character. 
The Suicide Game failed at inducing the paradox we expect from tragedies for several 
reasons. Firstly, the messages that popup on the screen indicating you have failed or 
succeeded are cartoon-like (easing the severity of the subject matter).6 Secondly, and 
probably more importantly, there are no psychological factors of the character that the 
player is aware of. This is in stark contrast to a novel where the author allows the reader 
to feel as though they know the character (and perhaps understand their actions).   ǯ
players until they reach the end. Though the player-character alignment does not quite 
match that of the book-character, it gets closer than when a player expects their character 
to die. For many of the players the game content, although surprising, was not 
experienced as a game tragedy because they were trying to achieve something the 
character actually wanted. In other words, the task of the game allowed players to 
distance themselves enough from the morbid narrative. 
The video game Red Dead Redemption presents us with another example, but one where 
players are not aware of the ending (spoiler alert).7 ǡǯ
a male protagonist who, now a family man, formerly lived a life of crime. This comes back 
to haunt him years later when he is blackmailed into committing questionable missions 
in order to save his wife and son. If the player and protagonist are successful, the player-
character returns home to his family to carry out tasks around the ranch. Although this 
portion of the game is typically described as boring, the daily (banal) tasks create a 
stronger connection between ǯǤ
head when unsavoury characters from his previous life of crime arrive and attack his 
family. At this point, the player must complete the final mission, which is to help the 
player-ǯ family escape. If the player fails, the character dies and the game 
restarts from whence the attack began and, once again, the player can attempt to help the 
family escape. When the player is finally successful, i.e., the wife and son escape, the 
player-character is shot dead (this time, with no prompt or ability to restart). Essentially, 
this is the outcome of the game and the only way to win. If the player is unaware that their       ǯ ǡ      
alignment between the player and the player-character and the paradox of tragedy is 
closer to that of literature or film.  
                                                          
5 Ibid., p. 93. 
6 In addition, there is nothing realistic about the features of this game. Though much of the art and 
mechanics are retro, like the Kathy Rain example mentioned earlier, the problem lies elsewhere. For me, it 
is the minimal focus on narrative description rather than the narrative action that sabotages player-
character alignment.  




those that do not, still differ from other narratives. Games where players expect a tragic 
outcome do not usually consist of features that allow the player to witness harsh 
outcomes and, often times, these games allow the character to come back to life. Because 
these players are usually spared a degree of psychological reasons for a death, or the 
consequences, the player tends to focus more on the success of their gameplay than on 
the tragedy of their character. This seemed to be the case with The Suicide Game. On the 
other hand, players who are deceǯ
experience the paradox of tragedy to a greater degree than the former kind of games, but 
perhaps not as acutely as with other narratives. Although the player is not aware the 
protagonist is fated to die in Red Dead Redemption, the player also does not participate in ȋǯȌǤǡ
the player is allowed to focus on their competencies rather than solely on the tragedy of 
their character. This kind of distancing would be especially true if the player decided to 
replay the game knowing what tragedy was ahead of them.  
Among other things, video games are dynamic sources for storytelling, but rarely do they 
make us feel the paradox of tragedy in the same manner as other narratives. Does this 
mean Roger Ebert was right all along in saying video games are not art because they 
cannot make us cry? Perhaps, it is not out of some limitation of video games that we rarely 
cry from playing them, but a recognition among developers that they are harder to create. 
Juul makes this point when he says books and film allow us a kind of plausible deniability 
in our control over the tragedy.8 Romeo, as I said, will die with or without the reader but 
this is not the case in games. A great deal of control is handed over to the players, which 
is perhaps why there are not, for the moment, more game-tragedies out there. So, it is not 
that video games cannot make us cry, it is that they typically do not make us cry because 
they are not created to do so. More importantly, I think I have argued well enough that, 
whether we cry or not, video games (and mere games) can still make us feel something 
as a result of playing them. Using tears as the litmus test for video gǯ
misguided because it ignores its distinctive features, feature which have been covered 
throughout this dissertation. 
Looking Ahead 
The chapters in this dissertation represent only a portion of the philosophical discussions 
that computer art, interactivity, video games, and the algorithm could raise. In writing 
this, my approach was to let the preceding chapters determine the content of the 
proceeding ones. Questions that I would have liked to have addressed further, but ran out 
of time for, mainly concern distinctions between the performance actions and interactive 
actions of video game players. Differences and similarities between the action kinds are 
suggested in much of this dissertation, but only to make the point that video games belong 
to an interactive ontology, not one of performance.  
Saltz stipulates a difference between the performing and interactive arts because, with 
each, the objects of appreciation are not the same. Similarly, in a recent publication in the 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (2017), Grant Tavinor, after discussing video game 
                                                          
8 Juul (2013), p. 118. 
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interpretive performances under question here may not be a reason to think that video 
games are a performing art, but rather a feature that they have in virtue of being a form 
of art more generally. The specific role of performance in video games is a topic which 
clearly demands more workǯ.9 I agree with Tavinor that players undertake a role that is 
performance-like, and, as I express in Chapter 6, that this does not indicate video games 
are performance works like music and theatre. Roleplaying is a key component of some 
gameplay. Although performative in nature, players interpret player-characters due to 
prescriptions that derive from interactivity and so, just how performance and 
interactivity are related in videogame play is a question I, like Tavinor, find interesting. 
VR, which includes physical movement in addition to interpretive performance, makes 
this question all the more pressing.  
I am also interested in the differences between action narrative and descriptive narrative 
we normally find in games. It seems with SIIFs, the actions can both enmesh players with 
their player characters, and, conversely, it can distance the players, as described with The 
Suicide Game. I think more can be said about what causes this divide.  
Finally, in the introduction to this dissertation, I note that we do not have to justify games 
by their instrumental purposes and outcomes. Digitally interactive works and video 
games can be appreciated for their own sake, and they need not make prosocial behaviour 
(and the like) necessary results. That being so, everything presented in this dissertation 
highlights significant aspects of video games (and digitally interactive works) in virtue of 
interactivity and outside of the boundary of purely enjoying a game ǯǤ The 
way in which we experience their responsiveness to user input, the distinctive manner in 
which they exist compared to particular, non-repeatable objects, and the epistemological 
(and emotional) affordances of video games all highlight the dynamic ability of the 
computer and digital technologies. On that note, I hope the pages within this dissertation 
have done justice to the ground-breaking philosophies that have preceded and that they 
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